

FRENCH MARATHA RELATIONS

(1668-1818)

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P R E F A C E

In the last two decades lot of rethinking and rewriting has been focused towards the 17th and 18th century India. Many scholars have given particular attention to 18th century. Seema Alavi in her introduction to the book "The Eighteenth Century in India" characterizes two critical transitions of the 18th century which changed the structure of power and initiated important social and economic reconfigurations. The first, the transition in the first half of the century from the Mughal political economy to regional political orders. (Dark Ages or a period of economic prosperity) The second, the period following the Battle of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) in the polity, society, and economy as the English East India Company steered its way to the position of political prominence in north India (Period to be understood in terms of continuity or change).

Different aspects and dimensions of it are been discussed vigorously. It has now in real sense become a hotbed of research. These scholars and researchers are more concerned with aspects relating to theories, society, economy and culture of the 18th century. In the 18th century, India had witnessed the rise of the Maratha power. Many a times the 18th century History of India is stated to be the History of the Maratha power. But very little justice has been done to this statement. The Maratha power overran the whole of Indian politics and also controlled the politics in Delhi in the 18th century, which is an established fact. History of a nation cannot be studied in its entirety without political history. Political history forms the main canvas of all the other aspects of history. Political history of the Maratha's up till now has been studied and well researched by many scholars but it has not been in its totality. The relations of the Marathas with the contemporary European powers, especially the Portuguese, Dutch and the French have been neglected.

The Maratha state was founded by Chhatrapati Shivaji in 1674 and lived up to 1818. It was only with the fall of the Maratha power that the English could establish their power firmly in India. The Maratha kingdom i.e. *Swarajya* founded by Chhatrapati, was latter transformed into a Confederacy with the rise of the Peshwa to power. The transformation of Maratha kingdom into a confederacy can be summed up in the following manner- 1630 to 1749 the rule of the Chhatrapati. (119 years), 1749 to 1773 the rule of the Peshwa (24 years), 1773 to 1818 the rule of the *Karbhari's* (45 years). The Maratha state initially started with a stable, efficient, strong central government. It disintegrated from 1749 into a confederacy mainly controlled by a weak central authority with the Peshwa as the head and supported by his aristocrats viz Gaikwad in Gujarat, Holkar in Indore, Shinde in Gwailor, and Bhosale in Nagpur etc. Up till now studying these political aspects of the Maratha history has been the thrust area of many scholars.

In 1950's there have been very less scholars who have given importance to the relations of the Marathas with other contemporary powers. Only to name some of them are Dr.Balkrishna, Dr.Muddachari, Dr.V.G.Hatalkar, Dr.S.P.Sen, Dr.M.A.Nayeem, Dr.Braganze Perriera, Dr.S.S.Desai, and Dr. Pissurlekar etc. These scholars have studied Maratha relations with powers like Bijapur, Mysore, Portuguese, Dutch, French and English. Especially lot of research relating to the Maratha relations with the indigenous powers and English has been done, while research relating to Maratha relation with the Portuguese, Dutch and French powers awaits and need due attention.

Late Dr.V.G.Hatalkar has worked on the topic exclusively fifty years ago and his work "Relations between the French and the Marathas" (1668-1818) has been published by Bombay University in 1958. In the last fifty years various historians including Late Dr.V.G.Hatalkar have made a series of translation of French sources. The government of Maharashtra in nine volumes from 1978-1988 has published his series under

the title "French Records" especially contemporary primary sources. Dr.S.P.Sen has also worked on "French in India" during the same period and published his work in 1958. A lot of source material is also available in the Archives at Pondicherry, Tanjore, Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad. It is a need to study these relations in the light of the new sources, which have been published in these 50 years. Dr.V.G.Hatalkar in his work has given a chronological account of French relations established with the Marathas at different stages and it mainly deals with the political events taking place in the Deccan. In the light of new material and restudying the primary sources the relations have been studied and rewritten by giving due concern to the diplomatic projects, economic aspects of the relations, the American war of Independence, the French revolution, the transformation of Maratha kingdom into a confederacy, the role played by the private merchants and traders on the Malabar coast, French freelancers, the Maratha aristocrats and the external relations of the Maratha power with indigenous powers in connection to the French power.

Although the French-Maratha Relations form the basic core of the research, this research does not claims to be a pioneering work. These relations were earlier studied by Dr.V.G.Hatalkar in his thesis "Relations between the French and the Marathas" (1668-1815) years back in 1958. His thesis is a scholarly work done which encompasses the political relations in totality. No doubt political relations are the main landmarks of these relationships and also the line of research undertaken. Also these relations have to be researched from the Maratha perspectives with the help of Marathi sources available. Dr.V.G.Hatalkar had used all types sources viz English, French, Marathi for his, thesis published in 1958. But lot of primary source material especially French documents procured by Dr.V.G.Hatalkar from the Archives in France were later translated and published in nine volumes under the title 'French Records' in English only after 1960. But however Dr.V.G.Hatalkar did not rewrite the thesis with the help of this newly acquired source

material. Many scholars working in this area have brought out new views. Through studies of these sources and views have to be evaluated and hence rewriting the French-Maratha Relations becomes imperative.

The research undertaken has strictly followed the historical methodology. In this research I have tried my best to observe strict objectivity. As the title itself states 'Relations' the study carries the political aspects in details and also adheres to the events according to chronology. The research also tries to site the Socio-Economic implications of the relations as and where documental evidence is available. The span of the research is rather wider (1668-1818) i.e. 150 years. But it has to be so, because the relations among two powers have to be studied in their totality. Likewise these relations have to be studied with the interrelations existing with the powers of the contemporary period as to understand the ground level realities. The research undertaken also gives importance to the transformation of Maratha State into Maratha Confederacy i.e. *Chhtrapati-Peshwa-Karbhari* on one hand and changes in the administrative setup of the French India Company as this also forms the basis of these relationship. Apart from the Maratha State – Company relations which always remained the core structure of these relations, importance in particular is been given to the role played by the Maratha aristocracy in maintaining these relations on the Maratha side and the French freelancers on the French side.

SOURCE MATERIAL:

There are a large number of original primary and secondary source materials relating to the French-Maratha Relations both in published and unpublished form. The material available is in Marathi, Modi, Tamil, Kannada, Persian, French, English, Portuguese and Dutch languages. I have extensively used Marathi, Modi, French and English documents for my research. I have visited Archives in India viz. Kolhapur, Pune, Mumbai,

Pondicherry and have collected primary and secondary documents. In addition, I have also visited the Biblotheque Nationale, Archives Nationale, libraries in Paris, British Library (India Office Collection) in London and collected photocopies and microfilms. Nearly all the sources used by Dr. V.G. Hatakar and Dr. S.P.Sen have been cross-referenced by me. Recent works on the French in India in particular have been used namely those of Dr.Aniruddha Ray, Dr.Indrani Ray, Dr.Lotika Varadrajan, Dr. Balkrishna etc. have been used. I have made extensive use of the French Records (Nine Volumes) translated and edited by Dr.V.G.Hatakar and French in India Series (17 Volumes), microfilms duplicate from the India Office, British Library, London to frame my research. This research study is divided into six chapters.

As one treads into the past to work on a particular period of history, one finds that the period in question can be controversial, but at the same time monumental and awe inspiring' and such a lot of help needed to reach the end. My journey into the past could not have been undertaken and completed but for the help I received from various quarters at every stage of the development of the topic.

I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to Dr. N.D.Parekar under whose guidance the present research was carried on. Her interest in this work has given me able and valuable guidance in completing my research.

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I owe my debt to my departed parents, my father late Shri Ashokrao.N.Kadam and my mother late Mrs.Sumangala.A.Kadam. Finally not the least but the last, I am indebted to the unfailing and untiring support given to me by my wife Mrs. Kaveri Kadam. To her I owe a big debt of gratitude.

Mr.Umesh Ashokrao Kadam. 

CHAPTER I

The Arrival of the French in India

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The Arrival of the French in India.

The French East India Company.

D) Geography of France :-

Among the European nations which came to India from the 16th century to the 18th century. France was the last nation to arrive. The nations of Europe mainly maritime ones were impelled by a natural desire to secure a share in the rich profits from the Eastern trade. The appearance of France in India although it was last, was not due to lack of entrepreneurship on behalf of the Frenchmen. As seen by the scholars related to the subject it seems that the commercial enterprise of France did not get a boost due to two major political reasons. Firstly, France during the 17th and the 18th century mostly remained engaged in foreign wars, it was basically a center of focus if the European polity of the contemporary period. Secondly in the later half of the 17th century, France had to face civil strife.¹

Apart from these two political reasons there is also a third reason for the last appearance of France in the East and it is mainly related to the geographical position of France and the availability of abundant natural resources. In 1661 the population of France was estimated at about eighteen millions or more than that of Germany and Austria together, and nearly three times that of England. The land was well able to support its inhabitants; for in climate and soil France is one of the most richly endowed countries; and though there is no great mineral wealth, yet there is a variety of product sufficient to provide all the necessities and many of the luxuries of

life. This variety is one of the most striking features of France. It is accounted for partly by its geological formations and partly by its situation between oceanic and continental zones of climate on the one hand and between the English Channel and Mediterranean on the other. For e.g. The mountainous *Dauphine*, the sunny *plateaux of Provence*, the abundance of timber and luxuriant vegetation in parts of *Auvergne*, the typical oceanic climate in *La Vendée* and Brittany for growth of fruits and vegetables, in Paris and east sunny autumn, specially favorable for ripening of vine; far the south and south-west tobacco and salt and north and north-east, districts rich in corn, rye and flax. But the condition of other European countries and England was the exact reverse.²

Thus France had most of the human and natural resources requisite for national prosperity and peace. They were not a sparse population like Germany who tried to cultivate a desert; they were more fortunate in climate and soil than the Spaniards and not divided by religious differences as England. Like the Dutch they did not have a mercantile marine but had enormous forests which if looked after could supply abundant timber for fleets to be constructed. Trade was active in weaving and cloth making and silk. It earned large profits from exports and re-exports from the colonies of the west. Hence it can be said that she was more engrossed in commerce in the west and hence was rather not keen to step in the profitable trades of the Eastern continents.

II) The French in India:-

Of the five great European maritime powers of the 16th & the 17th Century, France was the fourth to enter the race for commercial relations with India. The fifth power Spain, never attempted the contest and Portugal, Holland and England had reaped considerable benefits from their enterprise before the attention

of the French people had been sufficiently attracted to the trade. All of these European nations including France were at first only interested in the riches of the Eastern trade, but it was France in the initial stage who dreamt and dared of having of vast empire subordinate to the Mughals. He was a French statesman who first conceived the idea of conquering by the aid of Indians-of arming, drilling and training natives after the fashion of the European soldiers, thus forming the germ of that *siphahi* army which has since become so famous. It was a French soldier who first demonstrated on the battlefield the superiority of a handful of disciplined Europeans to the uncontrolled hordes of Asia.³

They were the French who conceived the ambitious projects of building up a large territorial empire in India. It was possible for them to do so because of the political condition of India in the first half of the 18th Century. But equally important, at least, was the genius of one man, Dupleix. It was Dupleix who first showed the way of intervening in the internal disputes of Indian powers and of acquiring political control over vast territories through puppet Indian Princes.⁴

France, a maritime nation, came to India with a desire to secure large profits from eastern trade. Their attitude in the early stage was to develop strong commercial relations with the native powers, in India. The French had become quite aware of the commercial profits procured by the Portuguese, English and Dutch who had prior to them received many sanctions from the various Indian powers for trade and commerce. These European powers had also secured regions from native rulers for extensive trade. The French also felt a need of establishing themselves as a strong regional power for trade activities in India.

III) Brief History of the French East India Company:- ✓

France prior to the establishment of a company to trade in the east was much engrossed in her political, commercial and civil enterprise in the west. It had a grand West India Company which traded in Europe and the west reaping great profits. It was only after the tremendous profits secured by the Portugal, England and Spain did France diverted its attention to the East. Thus the late appearance of France in this field, however, was not due to any lack of entrepreneurship on the part of Frenchmen.

Even before the establishment of French East India Company, voyages to the east were undertaken by some Frenchman several times by the route of the Cape of Good Hope. In the year 1529, Raoul and Parmentier (brothers) left *Dieppe* with two vessels and visited Sumatra, the Mollucas, the Maldives and Madagascar and returned to France with a cargo of spices.⁵

It was mainly due to the efforts of Colbert the then Controller of Finances of the French Crown did the French East India Company came into existence in the year 1664, (*Compagnie des Indes Orientales*). This was the sixth attempt to form a grand company to trade with the East Indies. The previous five attempts went to be unsuccessful.⁶

The volume of trade of France with India in 1600 extended on a large scale, it included number of articles and reached with such proportions that it started to hamper the interests of French manufacturers at home. Due to which new letter-patents were issued on 5th August, 1601, by which it forbade import of Indian products into France. In 1601, a company of Saint-Malo merchants was formed and two vessels were sent to India. One of the vessels named '*le Croissant*', under the command of François Pyrard de Laval returned to France after a successful

voyage. It visited Madagascar, the Maldives the Nicobar Islands and Sumatra. The other vessel '*le Corbin*', under the command of François Martin de Vitre wrecked at the Maldives.⁷

The idea of having a French India Company to trade with the east was laid during the peaceful and prosperous reign of King Henry IV. It was he who realized the importance of overseas expedition and envisaged a colonial empire for France in emulation of the Portuguese and Dutch. Hence to compete with the Dutch rival in the commercial field of the east the company was founded under his supervision. King's letters-patents with a monopoly of trade with the East Indies for fifteen years were granted and a company was formed on June 1, 1604. But due to paucity of funds and internal disputes among partners the company could not make any progress. However, the company was reorganized in 1615 under the title of 'The Molluca Company' which too produced no successful result.⁸

During the tenures of the French finance ministers Richelieu and Mazarin, the company did not accomplish any enterprise. Richelieu, tenure saw him occupied in firmly establishing his masters authority in the kingdom, he could not hence devote himself to the development of French commerce. A company, called '*La Compagnie des Indes*' was formed under his auspices in 1642, with a monopoly of trade with India for twenty years. This company mainly concerned itself to the colonization of Madagascar. Although, this colony became a part of severe criticism from all parts of France, it was dictated with a sound and far-seeing policy. The Portuguese, Dutch and latter the English all had blocked the major posts on the sea-route to India. Due to which it was very much essential for France to locate a port of call between Europe and India. Madagascar best supplied their need. An expedition to Madagascar was undertaken in 1643 and the Fort Dauphin was founded. But the

unfavorable climate, ill management of the company and hostility towards the natives caused the failure of the enterprise which could not even recover under Mazarin. By 1661, the colony had to be deserted.⁹

The period of the greatest colonial expansion for France opened with the advent to power of Colbert, the famous finance minister of Louis XIV. He was quite sure that, if a French company carried on commerce with the East Indies, it would contribute largely to the development of French maritime trade. For this he not only Louis XIV of creating such a company but also started to create public opinion favorable to its formation.¹⁰

Colonial companies were created in many countries of 17th Century Europe, successfully than others and attempts had been made to establish them in France of Henri IV and Louis XIII. The schemes of Sully and Richelieu had all foundered on the inertia of the French people, who preferred the status of office and the more honorable way of making a living by cultivation of landed estates. Colbert hoped that he might be able to defeat such opposition, and made bold claims for his new East India Company in 1664, quoting the similar success of similar experiments by other nation and alleging that numerous Frenchmen were enthusiastically waiting to join in this kind of scheme. In the same year he also reestablished the defunct West India Company, but it soon became a redundant institution. The East India Company in contrast to this preserved its monopoly for many more years and was still alive at the death of Colbert, although it had passed through some periods in which its survival was in doubt. The history of the Company is not relevant here, where the debate is concerned with the interaction of the French society and government. The important question to be raised in this context is why Frenchmen of different social groups felt themselves prompted to join or oppose these new corporate enterprises. Sometimes the King and

Colbert applied mental pressure, gentle persuasion, or near compulsion; or they used the services of influential dignitaries and were prepared to grant further privileges in return for investments in the companies; sometime, however, an intendant might be too keen to show his Paris masters that he had tried to promote this new creation.¹¹

This creation of public opinion in favor of the new company can be clearly understood from the publication of April, 1664 titled 'Discourse of a faithful subject of the King touching the establishment of a French company for the East India trade addressed to all Frenchman, prepared by François Charpentier, the Academician and printed at the Kings expense . Louis XIV not only gave his full approval, but also advanced 3,000,000 livres free of interest, from which were to be deducted all losses that the company might incur for the first ten years. By letters-patents in form of an edict the Compagnie was placed under the management of a general chamber of twenty-one Directors (twelve from the capital and nine from the provinces) who received exclusive trading rights for fifty years from the Cape of Good Hope to India and the South seas. A perpetual grant of Madagascar and neighboring islands was granted on condition of promoting Christianity. Also a perpetual grant with right of seigneurie of all lands, places, mines and slaves conquered was conferred.¹²

To understand the history of the French East India Company it is essential to understand under which circumstances did the company came into existence. Here are some correspondences of Colbert with Frenchman of different provinces of France relating to the East India Company.

Colbert to the Presidents and trésoriers généraux de France at the finance office of Bourges, Paris, 20 November, 1664 writes...

'The King, the Queens, the Princes of the blood and all the persons of quality in the kingdom, together with innumerable members of all kinds of professions, have acquired an interest in the East India

Company, in the certain knowledge that they have each gained a hold on the great rewards that will result; His Majesty does not doubt but that you would profit from this wonderful opportunity which is offered to you for earning merit in the eyes of God (the principal motive of this most impressive undertaking being carrying the light of the Gospel to these distant lands); of the King, who has contributed so strongly by advancing a million golden crowns'.¹³

The Archbishop of Lyon to Colbert, Lyon, 28 November, 1664 writes...

'If I have sent you no report of what is happening here concerning the East India Company, it is not because I have been idle; but I have been waiting until enough people were enrolled for the sum involved to be considerable. I said to you, Monsieur, when I took leave of you, that I hoped it would be between 500,000 and 600,000 livres; we have done so well that I can tell you 1,000,000 is assured, on condition that there will be in this city one of the regional chambers of direction, as was promised by the Company in Paris to Monsieur our Mayor and without which few merchants would be prepared to invest in it...'.¹⁴

Anonymous letter to Colbert, 1664...

'You have formed this great society of the Indies which is the finest, most glorious and most useful plan which has ever been devised in France. However, many grumble and seek to find fault with it; the officials, among others, complain that they are being forced to join; they are putting it about that it is a trap to impose the taille on the nobles and others who are exempt from it, and that everyone will be compelled to participate, the church, the nobles and the third estate; that the next step will be to tax them every year, making new demands on them, soon using the pretext that some loss has been sustained or that there is a new enterprise to further which appears useful on the surface; and that finally the King will cease everything when it is least expected, as he has done with other sums....'¹⁵

Pontiac, first president of the parlement of Bordeaux, to Colbert, Bordeaux, 16 February, 1665.

'Those members of the parlement who have invested in the east India Company are very grateful to you for your kindness in telling the King of their zeal.... If all those who belong to the parlement have not signed, Monsieur, it is because some posts are vacant, some officers who are out of the province, and

some who are from families which do not have resources. The others who could have signed are very few in number, I shall not, however, cease trying to persuade them to follow example of their colleagues....¹⁶

Colbert to Brulart, first president, of parlement of Dijon,
Saint-Germain En Laye, 11 February, 1667.

'I have not neglected to report to the King about the willingness which you have encountered among the majority of officials in your court to pay the second third of the sum which they have committed to the East India Company trade. I must inform you that His Majesty showed considerable pleasure at the fruits of your labors, but at the same time he explained that he would clearly distinguish between those who were displaying this zeal for this cause by their strict punctuality, and those who had less scruples about avoiding their obligations; to which he added, and said that this was no idle threat, that he had resolved to exclude them from paying the an nue, when it was the moment for them to do so, because they had failed to please him on an occasion such as this, which was so dear to his heart and of so great benefit to the state....¹⁷

It is clear from these letters what type of modus operandi was operated for the creation of grand East India Company. Thus the Compagnie des Indes Orientales began its existence with a capital of about 5,500,000 livres including the 3,000,000 advanced by the King.¹⁸

IV) The Route to India:-

By the time the old route to India followed by the caravans was not forgotten. During the tenure of Richelieu, Father Joseph of the Capuchin Order had founded numerous missions in and around France. It was he who entrusted to Father Pacifique of Provins, friar of his Order, the task of exploring a route to the Far East. The Father left for Levant in 1622, visited Egypt and Syria, and founded Convents on the Isle of Cyprus and at Aleppo. In 1628, he visited the Persian Court and succeeded in opening monasteries at Ishpan and Baghdad. These monasteries could

serve as resting places on the land-route to India. In 1639, the Capuchins arrived at Surat which was the place of origin of their mission in India. The Capuchins were soon followed by the other Orders like the Jesuits, the Carmelites, the Dominicans, etc.¹⁹

A direct route to India was thus established and the number of travelers soon multiplied. From 1643 to 1649 La Boullaye le Gouz traveled through Turkey and Persia and finally arrived in India, where he explored Rajputana. In 1666 Jean Thévenot arrived at Surat and visited Gujarat, Cam bay, Masulipatam, Aurangabad and the Kingdom of Golkonda. He was followed by Francois Bernier who has furnished us with precious information about India during that period, and later, by Tavernier, the most indefatigable of travelers, who, at the age of 80, died on the route to India.²⁰

France took advantage of both the routes to India, viz, by the way of Cape of Good Hope and via Levant through Persia. The route via Levant was a much shorter route but offered many difficulties. The French East India Company did not reject it altogether but used it for regular communication. In 1664, the Company sent to Ispahan three merchants, Bebbier, Mariage, and Dupont. They were later followed by two noble men, de Lalain and La Boullaye le Gouz of Angevin who were also entrusted with a special mission by the French King. They carried with them letters for the King of Persia in which Louis XIV referred to the friendship that had always existed between the two crowns and also recommended favorable treatment for all the Frenchmen visiting His Highness's Court. The French deputies arrived at Ispahan in the month of July 1665 where they received a warm welcome from the King of Persia, who also granted special trade concessions to them. Of these deputies, Bebbier and de La Boullaye le Gouz proceeded to Surat, where they arrived in March 1666. Here they met Thévenot, Tavernier and Father Ambroise of the Capuchins who had been in India

since 1650 and had acquired extensive knowledge of the manners and customs of the country. The Governor of Surat received these French deputies very cordially.²¹

In his letter dated 1st April 1666 to Colbert from Surat, de La Boullaye le Gouz gave a detailed account of the situation in the country and also expressed his views on the policy to be adopted by the French in India. The Dutch could not tolerate the pressure of the French on the Indian soil as they were the most powerful nation in the East. They wanted to maintain their monopoly in the trade of the East. Hence they started to spread rumors that were no traders but pirates. De La Boullaye Gouz strongly advocated the case of the French traders in India and soon succeeded to get trading concessions on equal footing to English and Dutch from Indian princes. He also suggested to form alliances with different Indian princes by appointing French ambassadors at their courts. He said this would impress on the Princes the glory and greatness of France.²²

The deputies went to Agra to see the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb for whom they had brought letters from the King of France. Aurangzeb gave them a warm welcome by granting them a firman and ordered the Mughal governor of Surat to give them a site at Soually and permission to carry on trade there on the same terms as granted to the Dutch and English. This firman was granted to them on 4th August 1666.²³

Thus the French East India Company established its first step in India by getting trading rights at Surat. The Company by the time also tried to establish itself at Madagascar also named as Isle Dauphine. But unfortunately due to the insalubrious climate, nature of the soil and the hostility of the natives they abandoned their projects at Madagascar. Two Frenchmen, Caron and De Faye, who were appointed as Directors of the Company reached Madagascar in 1667. As they found the conditions

deplorable and un-improving at Madagascar they decided to leave for India and arrived at Surat in the beginning of 1668. It was Francois Caron who founded the first French factory at Surat in 1668.²⁴

V) The Administration Pattern of the French East India Company in India:



While trying to research and evaluate the French-Maratha relations from 1668-1818. It is very important for the statement concerned with this problem to first understand the basic differences of the administrative patterns of French East India Company and that of the Maratha State as a whole. Firstly it becomes quite obdurate to have greater transparency between the administrative system of the Europeans and that of the Indian's. The Europeans up to the 18th century had formed separate institutions to formulate the political administration, while there were no such institutions in India. The native powers were having the total political administration vested in themselves i.e. it was personalized. It was with this administrative setup's the English and French had come to India, the former succeeded in establishing its power while the latter failed. Both had the same base i.e. Institution. Then why did the French failed? The study of English success and its company administration is done by many scholars. But the French administration still remains on the darker side, although it was as efficient and effective as the English counterpart. Hence there is a need to study the French Company administration at Pondicherry which was the centre of the French activities in India. Secondly the studies of administration of political institutions are very important while studying relations with other powers. It is this administration which is the prime agency to use and utilize power to create Empires. It is the administration which acts as an agency; there is an

interaction between the administration and the individual. The individual due to this interaction becomes more and more important and indirectly the study of administration becomes the study of an individual.

The English East India Company was formed on December 31, 1600. The company was a collaboration of many other English companies which came to India to have commercial relations. The company was having a basic administrative set-up which was governed by the Court of Directors. This governance of the company developed with the passage of time. The administrators of the English company were relied upon and had been given autonomy of decision making in the interest of the company. The company prospered in both the stools commercial and also political due to this autonomy and hence it could build a vast empire in India. The French East India Company was formed on 2nd August 1664 by the French King Louis XIV. He had granted the company with letters and patents of fifty years monopoly of trade with Eastern countries. But the company was solely under the authority of the French Crown. The company administration was placed under the Governors of the company who always relied on the decisions of the King and his Court of Instructors. The company administration was not granted autonomy and hence it failed to achieve success in both the stool viz commercial and political.

The King of France was having total control over the French East India Company. The appointment of the Governors, the Directors, the Councilors and the Administrators was made by the King himself. He used to take the advice from his Council of Ministers in these matters. The company itself was formed on the advice of M. Colbert the finance minister of King Louis XIV. Settlements such Chandernagore and Mahé, were under Directors, while those at Karaikal and Bandar (Masulipatnam) were under administrators. Chandernagore was also having a Council

as that of Pondicherry. Pondicherry was the main centre of administration. Here was an old Government House from where the Governor carried out his administrative duties. The Governor was addressed as 'Durai-avargal' and the Deputy Governor as 'Chinna Durai'. The second at Chennai was also addressed the same. He was actually the 'First Council' and the other councilors were rated Third, Fourth etc according to their seniority. Each councilor had a 'Comptoir' in the fort.²⁵

The Council of Pondicherry consisted of the Governor, the second who functioned as the commissary of the troops, master of the company's trade, Chief Justice of the Choultry (Chavadi) court, manager of all money matters, the sea and land customers and the master gunner. The third councilor was the keeper of the Silver Godown while the fourth councilor was the cash keeper. There were also councilors 'ad honores' who were invited when matters relating to their port-folios were discussed and a few super numerous councilors who attended when anyone was absent. The council allotted to them their port-folios and made the appointments of the accountants, 'sous marchands' (an officer), and commis, the lowest rank in the company service, divided into different grades of pay. The council exercised both executive and judicial functions. In the first capacity, it was styled the 'Conseil Supérieur' having inferior councils depending upon it, in the second, it was styled 'Conseil Souverain' as it possessed the fullest powers under Royal Decree of 1701. It also had a secretary. Dupliex had appointed Paradis to this office as secretary. Normally the supreme Council consisted of the Governor and six other members. The drafts issued by them bore their signatures. Sometimes it had nine members and the Governor. A draft of July- August 1756 had five members. Barthélemy, Guillard, Miran, Lenoir and Boyelleau besides the Governor.²⁶

The number of the members of the council was not fixed.

Like the Governor, all the members were appointed by the King. They did not all reside at Pondicherry but were posted at different settlements. At Chandernagore there were several such members and they had the exclusive right to form the local council, headed by the Commandant. At other places like Mahé, Karaikal, Yanam etc. Only the chief of the settlements was a member of the Conseil Supérieur, the other members of the local council being ordinary employees of the company. All official's communications from Paris were first received at Pondicherry and then forwarded to the settlements directly dependent on Pondicherry. These in turn sent them to subordinate factories, where they existed, as in Bengal.²⁷

The Governor was not endowed with any authority to override the council. Even a deputy with special powers from the King could not override the decisions of the council. The company was suppressed in 1770 and all its possessions in India were taken over by the King. The company administrative system underwent a complete change with the appointment of Foucault as Intendant and Commissaire Ordonnateur immediately after his arrival at Pondicherry in October 1773. The possessions in India were brought under the same form of government as existed in the other colonies of France. The executive power was divided into two heads, the Governor and the Intendant, not dependent on the other. The former was entrusted with military and political affairs. Relieved of administrative duties, his sole concern was to deal with country powers. The Intendant was entrusted with the whole civil administration, including finance, police, justice, shipping and commerce. Neither the Governor nor the Intendant was fettered in his sphere of action by the majority opinion of the Conseil Supérieur, since that body was deprived of all administrative power and converted into a Purdy judicial tribunal with the Intendant as the President.²⁸ The

defects of this system of the government and the complications it gave rise to were stated by Law in a lengthy *mémoire* dated January 21, 1776.²⁹

VI) The French Settlements in India:

The French East India Company from the year 1664 to 1761 made rigorous attempts to enlarge its trade volume with India, at the same time it even tried to compete with the English and Dutch in gaining trade rights, procuring firmans and also establishing factories on the Malabar Coast and Coromandel Coast. It established itself by securing factories at Surat, Rajapur, Masulipatnam, Tellicherry, Pondicherry and Mahé etc.³⁰

Francois Caron came to India as the Director of the French East India Company on October 1667. He arrived at Surat in the beginning of 1668 and obtained a firman from the Mughal Emperor to establish a factory at Surat.³¹ They French also established a factory at Masulipatnam with a firman issued by Abdullah Qutub Shah in 1669.³² The counter at Mirjan (1669) was later shifted to Tellicherry in 1670.³³ Of the most important factories established by the French was the factory established at Pondicherry by Francois Martin in 1674.³⁴ Pondicherry passed under the Maratha rule on July 17, 1677. The French again obtained a firman from the Marathas to fortify Pondicherry on January 9, 1689, the Marathas had also ceded to the French customs and other revenues of Pondicherry in return for a loan, of Rs.10, 000/- in June 1690. But the Maratha Chhatrapati sold Pondicherry to the Dutch in 1693 and Pondicherry was captured by the Dutch. It was only in 1699 Pondicherry was restored to the French as a French colony. The French Council was established at Pondicherry on 21st January 1701. The French started their Company administration with the

commencement of the 18th Century. In 1722 a French factory was established at Mahé with the permission of Raja of Colstres.³⁵

i) Pondicherry: - The settlement of Pondicherry of the French was one of the finest in every aspect the French established in India. It was situated on the Coromandel Coast and was in close affinity to Madras and the coast line of Bengal. All the affairs of the Company were carried out from there as it was regarded as the Head-quarter of the French East India Company. The company Governor resided at Pondicherry. In 1665, Francois Martin joined as an under merchant in the French East India Company. He sailed to the Madagascar in this capacity in 1665. For more than three years, he managed a small trading post near Fort Dauphin in Madagascar. Appreciating his services, M. De La Haye, the Director of the Company, promoted him to the rank of merchant. He arrived in India in this capacity at Surat in 1669. Here he tried his best to improve trade activities of the factory due to which he was promoted as Director of Masulipatnam factory. During this time he received invitations from Sher Khan of Gingee to open a trading centre at Gingee. At the same time, Bélanger de Lespinau, an assistant of De La Haye, approached the Governor of Valikondapuram, Sher Khan Lodi and obtained permission to set up a French factory at Pondicherry. De La Haye also sent Francois Martin to Pondicherry to assist Lespinau. He with sixty Frenchmen landed at Pondicherry on January 15, 1674. Baron succeeded Lespinau as Director of Pondicherry factory. On the death of Caron, Baron was sent to Surat to assume charge as Director-General of French Commerce in India. Then Francois Martin was made Director of Pondicherry factory on May 5, 1675.³⁶

Shivaji during his Carnatic expedition defeated Sher Khan Lodi in the battle of Tiruvadi and annexed Gingee. At the instance of Shivaji, Martin remained neutral and later sent two of his men with a few presents and a cash of 50,000 pagodas to Shivaji, who, in return issued a firman virtually conferred on the French the monopoly of trader in Pondicherry.³⁷ Pondicherry till 1668 was an open city and was open to raids and plunders. On October 17, 1688, Martin sent Saint Germain to meet the Maratha Subhedar of Gingee, Harji Raja.³⁸ Harji Raja granted the French permission to fortify Pondicherry after receiving a sum of Rs.11,760/-.³⁹ Pondicherry developed due to the zealous efforts of Francois Martin. Fortifications were built; factories established at Cauveripatam and in Bengal made great profits under the administration from Pondicherry. Everything to the French Company seemed to hold a promising future. But in 1689 Harji Mahadik died and situations changed drastically. The hostility of the Dutch and their intrigues at the Court of Gingee increasingly alarmed threats to the French settlement at Pondicherry. Martin writes to the Home authorities asking for immediate military help. In 1690, Dequesnes naval squadron reached Pondicherry. At the same time Martin allied himself with the Raja of Tanjore for attacking the Dutch. He dreamt of establishing the commercial and political supremacy of the French in India. In his letter to Dlangy, he said: 'Our enemies, the English and the Dutch, are in their last stage of weakness and to attack and to vanquish them, is almost a certainty.'⁴⁰

Rajaram arrived at Gingee on 15th Nov, 1689. In June 1690, he ceded to the French custom and other revenues of Pondicherry in return for a loan of Rs. 10,000/-. In the coming years Rajaram was greatly in need of money, hence he offered the sale of Pondicherry to the French. But due to the paucity of funds, Martin was not able to clinch the offer. The offer was again repeated and the French again

failed to utilize it. Meanwhile the intrigues of the Dutch at the court of Gingee were increasing. The Dutch struck the deal against the French and finally bought it from Rajaram on August 27, 1693.

On 7th February, 1698, the Mughal commander Zulfikar Khan captured the fortress of Gingee from the Marathas. It was only after the 'Treaty of Ryswick' in 1697 that Pondicherry was restored to the French on 16th March, 1699. From 1699 to 1761 Pondicherry remained under the French rule. It was surrendered to the English on 16th January 1761. All the possessions of the French Company in India were restored in February 1763 by the 'Treaty of Paris' signed between England and France. From 1763 onwards Pondicherry was under French rule, only once it was capitulated to the English in 1778.

ii) **Chandernagore:** The settlement at Chandernagore was founded by Bourreau-Deslandes in 1690.⁴¹ But it was not till the Governorship of Dupliex (1731-1741) that the settlement assumed any importance. It was due to the untiring efforts of Dupliex that the town became a great commercial centre. This settlement was captured by the English on 24th March, 1757 and was restored to the French on 25th June, 1765. By the terms of the 'Treaty of Paris', 1763, the French had regained their old trading rights and privileges in Bengal. These *Parwanas* were granted to them by the local rulers. The trade of Bengal was the most important branch of the commercial operations of the French Company. The principal articles of trade were silk, cotton goods of many varieties, opium and saltpeter. The settlement of Chandernagore was a small area. Its normal revenue, from all sources, amounted to fifty to sixty thousand livres a year. By the treaty of 1763, the French were not allowed to maintain any troops or to construct fortifications and the settlement was exposed to attack from any quarter. It was totally

defenseless and could be compelled to surrender at the first summons. Moreover, the town being situated far inland, the inhabitants had no escape in the event of a sudden war.

From 1767 to 1769 i.e. under the administration of Jean-Baptiste Chevalier, Chandernagore again became a busy commercial centre. It was so because Chevalier had maintained friendly relations with the English Governor Veresst of Calcutta.⁴² With the sudden out break of war between England and France, Chandernagore was suddenly captured on July 10, 1778. Lt.Col. Dow was unsuccessful to seize Chevalier who by then was regarded as the most dangerous enemy of England. Chevalier was arrested at Cuttack and handed over by the Maratha Governor of Cuttack, Raja Ram Pandit, to the English envoy, Alexander Elliot.⁴³

Dependent on the chief settlement of Chandernagore were five factories at Kasimbazar, Patna, Dacca, Jougdia and Balasore. Also a few marts known as *Aurangis*, where the French agents procured supplies from weavers were a part of this settlement. According to Law's estimate the French could procure from these regions raw silk of various qualities worth 200,000 livers. Patna was famous for borax, gold, cloth, lead, iron, copper, saltpeter, opium etc. Dacca had a large commercial house of the French. It was famous for its specialty of fine cloth, known as muslin and also its embroidery. The French trade at Dacca in 1765 was valued at five to six hundred thousand livers per year. Under more favorable circumstances trade could be extended to the value of 1,500,000 livers per year provided money flow was to be kept intact. Situated close to the sea was the factory at Jougdia, this area was inhabited by weavers, "who manufactured very high quality cloth called *Hamans* and *Buffetas* . The Company could make an average turnover of goods worth 7 to 8 thousand livers. While the English take was three to four times.⁴⁴ The French factory at Balasore was

equally important centre for cloth trade. The weavers manufactured a fine cloth named *Sanas* of Balasore which was suitable for making shirts. This factory was maintained primarily for safe transport of letters from Bengal to Pondicherry by the land route.⁴⁵

iii) **Mahé:** The settlement of Mahé dated back to 1721 when the French occupied the territory from the rulers of Kadattanad one of the numerous petty states of the Malabar Coast. The origin of this settlement has been traced in detail by A. Martineau in his *Les Origines de Mahé de Malabar*. Malabar was capitulated to the English on 8th February, 1761 and restored on 20th October, 1765. Mahé, like Karaikal on the eastern coast was situated on a river sufficiently deep for navigation by medium sized vessels. The principal article of commerce was pepper which grew in abundance all along the coast. Other important articles were cardamom and sandalwood. The volume of trade here was quite modest, not exceeding eight to nine hundred thousand livres a year in normal and peaceful times. According to Law the settlement was useless and uneconomical. The political uncertainties in the neighboring areas required constant vigil and military preparedness.⁴⁶ In these political turmoil's the settlement lay in a poorly defended state. It was bordered on the south and the east by a chain of hills, where the French had built three small forts. The English demolished them in 1761. It is very interesting to note that in 1770 Law persuaded the Governor of Mahé; M. Picot to collect secret information about Karwar which he himself did not favor, and on the other hand proposed the capture of the Maratha port of Viziadroog.⁴⁷ Due to the aggressive policies of the two successive Governors of Mahé, Duprat and de Repentigny the French were nearly on the verge of war with Haider Ali. Due to the outbreak of war between the French and the English in 1778, Mahé was capitulated on 19th March, 1779 with honorable terms.

iv) **Calicut:** Subordinate to the settlement at Mahé was a small factory of the French at Calicut. It was of no political consequence and its trade was of negligible amount. The factory came into prominence for a very short period, in 1774 due to the aggressive policy of Duprat.

v) **Surat:** The factory at Surat dated 11th August 1666 by the royal firmans issued by Emperor Aurangzeb. According to the *farman* the French were permitted to establish a factory strictly for commercial trading under the jurisdiction of the Mughal court. Prior to the establishment of the factory at Pondicherry the factory at Surat was the main governing seat of the affairs of the French East India Company. The importance of the Surat factory faded with the emergence of Pondicherry as the French Head-quarter in India. Also the French trade here had to face stiff competition from the English, which hampered its growth from time to time. From 1668 i.e. the establishment of the Surat factory by Francois Caron to 1701 i.e. the transfer of the *Conseil Souverain* from Surat to Pondicherry, Surat remained as a principal French settlement in India.

According to Law, Surat offered a very lucrative market. The commodities sold here were woolen cloth, hardware articles, Lyon cloth, copper and lead. The principal commodity manufactured here was cotton which was in demand all over India. The French did not enjoy any independent status and could not even hoist their flag on the factory building. There were neither troops nor fortifications. However the factory at Surat had considerable political importance, as a convenient observation point for the French to watch the conflict between the English and the Marathas. By which they could avail advantage's against the English in times when they when they received setbacks at the hands of the Marathas. This factory also served as a base for carrying secret negotiations with the Marathas and sending information of the defense

of Bombay. The Surat factory also acted as a route open to Delhi from the west coast to establish political relations with northern *Darbars*. The reports relating to Saint Lubin's activities at the Marathas court were sent to the *Consul* of the Surat factory to forward them to de Sartine, Minister of Marine and Colonies by this route. But due to the inefficiency of the *Consul*, Anquetil de Briancourt the reports were intercepted by the English.⁴⁸

vi) Karaikal: The possessions of the French in the Kingdom of Tanjore were the most extensive ones (area wise) than any settlements in India. This settlement in spite of this remained totally aloof to the military and political activities of the French in the 18th century. The whole of the Kaveri Delta and Kingdom of Tanjore were purely agricultural in economy. It was only for this purpose that Dumas had founded this settlement and it served as a granary for Pondicherry. In 1688 on the invitation of the Raja of Tanjore the French established themselves at Kaveripatnam which they abandoned twenty years later. In 1738-39 the Raja of Tanjore was in need of money and the close ally of the French, Chanda Sahib waged a successful war against Tanjore. It was at this time the French came to acquire Karaikal, the fort of Carclangery and a large number of villages in the neighborhood which increased as the Raja of Tanjore took successive loans from the French. They also paid an annual tribute of 2,000 pagodas to the Raja.

Karaikal's importance lay in the production of rice and it served as a granary to Pondicherry. The whole of the Tanjore region was extremely fertile. As it had many small rivers, in the French possessions agriculture suffered greatly and much of the land remained uncultivated for the lack of population. In his memoiré of 1767 Law pointed out that due to the religious policy of the French the

settlement attracted less cultivators and it acted as a deterrent. Even large vessels could enter the port throughout the year. It was a good settlement which offered great commercial advantages. The principal rivals here were the Dutch at Negapatam.

Karaikal also offered political advantages, in view of not too friendly relations between the Raja of Tanjore and the English. There were no good fortifications of the French Company here. The procrastination of the company and the French Government later resulted in the evacuation of the place on 9th August 1778 with the out break of war between the English and French.

viii) Yanam : The settlement at Yanam dated from 1723. It was of considerable importance during the French occupation of Northern Sarkars. It was restored to the French in 1763 from the English.⁴⁹ The French obtained a *Parawana* from the ruler of Rajamundry who granted full liberty of trade to the French at Yanam. Also another *Parawana* was granted by Nizam Ali calling upon the Zamindars of the Sarkar of Mushtaphanagar not to hinder the French commerce there.⁵⁰ The French trade here was not negligible. According to Law's memoir of 1767, Yanam procured more than a million livres per year under suitable circumstances. This place procured teak wood, oil, rice and grains both for men and animals.

viii) Masulipatnam: - This settlement dated as early as 1669 and was the third to Surat. It was given by Muzaffar Jang to the French and yielded revenue of four and half lakh of rupees. The French lost this settlement to the English in 1765. The volume of French trade here did not exceed 100,000 livres per year here. It was a famous cloth manufacturing centre. This place was of political importance to the French as they

could carry out secret communications with Nizam Ali, Subhedar of Deccan, a first rate enemy of the English.⁵¹

ix) Rajapur:- Rajapur was a small sea port on the Konkan Coast under Shivaji's domain. It was here that the French first came into contact with the Marathas. The English Factory Records relating to the Karwar dated 16th September, 1668, states that the French have settled at Rajapur. Shivaji the King of the Marathas has granted them a *farman* to establish their factory at this place with free trading rights. Francois Martin's records in his Diary that on arriving at Calicut on 17th January, 1663 he met Messieurs Faces and J.Boureau on his way to Surat, who informed him that 'they had been to Rajapur had seen Raja Shivaji who received them well and gave them permission to trade and establish themselves in his lands.'⁵²

x) Minor settlements: - The French were also having two minor settlements on the Malabar Coast namely Mirjan and Tellicherry. The counter at Mirjan was established in 1669 and was latter shifted to Tellicherry in 1670.⁵³

VII) The Political Scene in India during the 18th Century:-

As the study is related to the French- Maratha relations during 1668-1818 a reference to the political scene in India especially in Deccan has to be pointed out. The 18th Century Indian History is been regarded by many historians as the History of the Marathas. The Marathas had carved out a big kingdom extending from the North India to south India during the 18th Century. The relation of the Marathas with different contemporary powers of 18th Century is a study with multiple dimensions. Hence it is necessary at least to have a glance of the political scene of India

in 18th Century. While giving emphasis on the French-Maratha relations and their interaction with each other with reference to the existing powers of India of those times cannot be substituted. In India during the 18th Century there were several principal powers namely...

- 1) The Mughals
- 2) The Marathas
- 3) The Nawab of Oudh
- 4) The Nizam of Hyderabad
- 5) Haider Ali of Mysore
- 6) The Nawab of Carnatic
- 7) Basalat Jang

1) The Mughal Emperor:-

Among the Indian powers the premier position was held by the Emperor of Delhi. It was not because of any real political and military importance, but only due to his shadowy claim of suzerainty over all the other Princes. After the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 the Mughal Empire started to disintegrate rapidly. The young princes were incapable to maintain the law and order in distant provinces. The Rajputs

started to rebel, many governors of the empire started to establish their personal influence on the territories they were handed for administration. The Marathas had become a constant threat to the Mughal Empire. The English were trying to interfere in the matters of the *Darbar*. Provinces like Bengal, Bihar and Orrisa had permanently into their hands. They also discontinued paying the annual tribute of 26 lakhs to the

Mughals. After the terrible shock of Panipat the Marathas again re-established themselves in the political affairs of the North. The lesser powers like the Ruhelas, Sikhs and the Jats also started to rebel.

Shah Alam was incapable to maintain the Empire intact. He was protected from time to time by Mahadaji Shinde. Finally after the defeat of Shinde (1803) in the second Anglo-Maratha war the Emperor passed under English protection and ceased to have any political importance. The failure of the Mughal Empire was mainly due to three principal factors 1) The character of Shah Alam, 2) The chronic financial difficulties, 3) want of suitable leader among the nobles and generals of the Empire.

2) The Marathas:-

The Marathas were one of the three principal powers of the South, the other two being Hyderabad under Nizam Ali and Mysore under Haider Ali. The Maratha Confederacy was the most important of there three. It was strongest from the military point of view and by the middle of the 18th century it even appeared as the power destined to seize the whole inheritance of the Mughal Empire. But by the 18th century the Marathas were not having a central authority to unify the nobles. It rather turned into a confederacy with consequent increase of power of the dependant chiefs. The united state built under Shivaji partially decentralized under the pressure of military necessity. The disaster of Panipat shattered the central government and the Peshwa rose to power. The decentralization went so far, that the chiefs of the out lying parts, the Bhosale of Nagpur,

Gaikwar in Gujrat, Holkar in Indore, and Sindhia in Gwalior claimed total control and overshadowed the central authority. It was due to this reason particularly that the Maratha Confederacy as a whole represented the strongest military factor in India. There was every possibility of an important alliance between the Marathas and French provided all the five viz Peshwa, Gaikwar, Bhosale, Holkar and Sindhia signed a similar treaty with the French. The Panipat disaster created the dispute for the headship of the state, which ultimately ruined the Maratha power. The internal disputes in the Bhat family (Peshwa) also gave advantage to the powers like Mysore, Hyderabad and the English. The signing of the Treaty by Raghunathrao with the English for military assistance, proved fatal to the Maratha power.

3) Nawab of Oudh :-

Besides the Mughal Emperor, the only other important power in Northern India in the 18th Century was the Nawab of Oudh. The Nawab ruled over a vast area from the border of Bihar to the course of the Ganges in the west. During the early half of the 18th century the Nawab had not lost his political importance. This principality was originally subject to the Mughal Emperor, it was made virtually independent by the Wazir or Chancellor of the Empire, Safdar Jang in the 18th century. He was succeeded by his son Shuja-ud -daulah in 1775. He was also appointed as Wazir of the Empire. He ruled as an independent ruler for all practical purposes with the help of his own armed forces and the vast territories under his direct control. In 1759, he helped Prince Ali Gauhar in his attempt to recover Bengal and Bihar, and in 1763 he not only gave shelter to the expelled Nawab of Bengal, Mir Kasim, but even went to war with the English in his support. The decisive battle of Buxar in 1764 made the English the supreme master of Bengal. The principality of Oudh also went under the

English control. By the 'Treaty of Allahabad', Shuja-ud-daulah was restored his territories except Allahabad and Kora which were given to the Emperor. After it he remained true to the English up till his death. In 1765 French intrigues in North India centered him as a possible ally for an invasion of Bengal. He had in his service a number of French military adventurers, Gentil was one of the prominent among them and the English dreaded his influence. Unfortunately Shuja-ud-daulah died in 1775. After which the English exerted effective pressure on his successor, Asaf-ud daulah, who was asked to dismiss all French officers in his service. After 1775 it was impossible for Asaf-ud-daulah to get rid of the English alliance and follow an independent policy. The principality of Oudh lost all real importance as a factor in North Indian politics.

4) The Nizam of Hyderabad:-

Next to the Maratha Confederacy the important power in the Deccan was the Nizam. It was not important in the military sense but for the crafty diplomacy of its ruler Nizam Ali. The power actually originated from the Mughal Viceroyalty of the Deccan. It virtually became independent under Nizam-ul-mulk in the 18th century. The connection between Hyderabad and France was so close that the French regarded the Nizam as their traditional friend and ally in India. It was in Hyderabad that for the first time Bussy demonstrated how an Indian state could be kept under effective foreign domination while outwardly preserving its independence.

Nizam Ali always tried to take advantage of any temporary weakness of the powers in South. From 1761, he had attacked the Marathas three times, first to take the advantage of the expected disorder following death of Balaji Baji Rao; second, in the alliance with Ragunath Rao; and third, in alliance with

Janoji Bhosale. But after these three incidences he grew closer to the Marathas to check the alarming position of Haider Ali. He maintained alliance with the English as well as with the French. It was Nizam Ali who first maintained a French contingent in his army. There were under him two great French captains, de Lallee, and Aumont. In 1779 on the arrival of Montigny at Poona he even tried to form a 'Triple Alliance' between him, Haider Ali and the Marathas. Nizam Ali, like the Marathas co-operated with the English in the third Anglo-Mysore war (1790-92). His alliance with the French was not directed towards the English at any time. In 1798 he signed the treaty of Subsidiary Alliance, offered by Wellesely and dismissed all French troops. He lost his political independence for a guarantee of English protection.

5) Haider Ali of Mysore :-

The third important power in the South was Mysore. Haider Ali started his career in the service of Nanjraj, the chief minister of the Raja of Mysore. He rose step by step, increasing his wealth and military strength. He in 1761 supplanted his patron and assumed the power, keeping the nominal Raja in close confinement. His rise to power in Mysore lead to Anglo-French conflicts in the Carnatic as he was staunchly opposed to the English. He came into close contact with the French during the Carnatic wars. The state of Mysore suddenly rose to become a political and military power in the south due to his efforts. Haider Ali came into conflict with the Marathas on the question of many territories lying between the Tungabhadra and Krishna. These territories remained the bone of contention between the two Powers. His ambitions were repeatedly checked by the young Peshwa Madhav Rao. The combined efforts of the Marathas, English and Nizam Ali confined his power to Mysore. He was constantly engaged in war with one or the other three powers. Tipu, who succeeded

Haider Ali in 1782, had to purchase peace from the Marathas and Nizam Ali. He got into trouble with these powers when he attacked the Raja of Travancore. The 1792 treaty imposed on him marked unmistakably the beginning of his fall. Mysore under Haider and Tipu always remained a special ally of the French. Although each side, made use of the other for its own advantage, but still they maintained a close friendship and co-operation against the English. The war of 1799, which ended in the destruction of Mysore as an independent State, was the result of the policy of maintaining the illusion of Franco-Mysore friendship, which did not in reality existed.

6) The Nawab of Carnatic:-

A brief notice of the two Princes, Muhammad Ali and Basalat Jang must be taken into consideration with regards to the political situation in the South (18th Cen). These two were of no practical importance but they played an interesting part in the tangled politics of the period by rousing the jealousy and fear of the principal competitors in the field.


Muhammad Ali was a candidate of the English. It was with the English arms he had defeated his rival supported by the French. The French had also recognized him as the lawful ruler of Carnatic. It was only in the case of Muhammad Ali that the English continued to preserve independent status as far as internal administration, including revenue, was concerned. The English even secured from the Mughal Emperor, the traditional dependence of the Nawab of Carnatic on the Subadar of the Deccan by the Treaty of Allahabad of 1765, also handed over to him the administration of the Northern Sarkars, ceded to them by Nizam Ali. The perseverance of the independence of the Nawab was due to number of factors- the initial reluctance of the English to assume administration responsibility; the garrisoning of his principal

forts by English troops and the presence of large number of English officers in his army; and finally the influence of the persons, including most of the Company's servants at Madras, who were interested in lending money to the Nawab at exorbitant rates of interest. The Nawab played with the English to gain the rich principality of Tanjore for him in 1773, but he could not retain it for long. During the second and third Anglo-Mysore War (1780-89); (1790-92) the Nawab was deprived of his administrative independence by the English. He was, however, an adept in intrigue and kept up an illusion in the minds of many about his real intentions. That was the part he played in the tangled politics of the South.

7) Basalat Jang :-


Basalat Jang was the younger brother of Nizam Ali, equally ambitious and crafty but less able. His importance in the complex political situation of the South is due to two reasons- first, occupation of the Sarkars of Gunttoor, interposed between Carnatic and the four Sarkars ceded to the English by Nizam Ali; and secondly, employment of a body of French troops in his service, commanded by Zephir and later by de Lallee. He was due to the second reason feared by the English as a danger to their power in South India. The small sea-port under his control at Motupalli kept him in regular communication with the French. The English tried their best to control Basalat Jang and persuaded him to disband the French contingent in his army. In 1779, the English became successful in the motives and totally reduced Basalat Jang.

CHAPTER II



Relations between the Chhatrapati's and the French

(1668-1698)



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I) Chhatrapati Shivaji's relations with the French.

It was in 1668, the French first came into contact with the Marathas. Rajapur a small sea port on the Konkan coast was in Shivaji's domain. The French were granted permission by Shivaji to establish a factory at Rajapur in 1668.⁵⁴ The Maratha French relations date from the very year of the establishment of the French settlements in India. But these relations have not been recorded by the French Factory record published up-till now. Information regarding these relations can only be traced from the dairy record of Francois Martin, the then Governor of Pondicherry. But these relations have been vaguely recorded by the English factory records. The Karwar, English Factory records as under....

"They (the French) have settled at Rajapur and have met Sevagy, who gave them some clothes and a phirmaund to trade freely in all his ports."⁵⁵

Francois Martin has also recorded in his diary that on the arriving at Calicat (January 17, 1669), on his way to Surat, he met Messieurs Faes and J. Boureau, who informed him that " they had been to Rajapur and had seen there Raja Shivaji who received them well and gave them permission to trade and establish themselves in his lands."⁵⁶

From the two sources mentioned above regarding the French contacts with the Marathas and the intentions behind building a relation between the two appear to be quiet indifferent to each other while recording the French contact with the Marathas the

English Factory records state a possible political confrontation from the new alliance. In contrast to this the memoirs of Francois Martin pose a purely commercial relation with the Marathas. In fact, these relations were purely commercial French side but not with political motives and intentions on the side of the Marathas.

The Siddi of Janjira carried out destructive activities from his castle of Danda-Rajapuri on the mainland, which was a Maratha country. He on numerous occasions plundered, burnt the villages of the Marathas and on several times subjected the inhabitants to inhuman treatment. Hence, Shivaji wanted to reduce the strong hold of Siddi. It was not possible for Shivaji to deal with the Siddi without the help of a European nation, as this expedition could only be carried out successfully with the help of arms and ammunition. The letter of an Englishman, Randolph Taylor dated February 1663, states “ The Raja (Shivaji) would gladly afford the (English) company any place convenient for them in his possession with several other advantages, if they would assist him in the taking of Danda-Rajapore castle.” Similarly this fact is also recorded in the dispatch from Bombay to Surat, dated 13th November 1673; “If the French have sent down so many guns and so much lead to Rajapore, Sevagee will be able to arm out a notable fleet against the Siddi.”⁵⁷

Shivaji had every reason to build up relations with the French because the other European powers were either incapable to help Shivaji or did it purposely to avoid a direct confrontation with the Mughals.⁵⁸

The Portuguese avoided a direct conflict with Shivaji, Mughals and Bijapur. Hence they followed a policy of remaining neutral with all the powers even though they repeatedly asked for assistance. The Dutch by this time had come into direct conflict with the English on the question of Bombay which had been ceded to them by the Portuguese. They had offered to assist Shivaji against the Siddi

but in return had appealed his help to oust the English from the island of Bombay. Shivaji had clearly denied this proposal of theirs.⁵⁹

Shivaji had asked the English to supply him with arms and ammunition. But for more than one reason the English were not prepared to help him. The English themselves wanted to control the stronghold of Siddi and they felt that if Shivaji would become the master of the castle, it would hamper their interests in their settlement of Bombay and finally they did not want to displease the Mughals of whom the Siddi was a close ally.⁶⁰

The French were the only European nations, who were in a position to help Shivaji with arms and ammunition. The English Factory record dispatch of 5th September, 1673 reports: "The French have sent a Pink down to Rajapore with 20,000 maunds of lead and 88 Iron guns from lbs.3 to lbs.17 weight."⁶¹

Shivaji's conquest of the Konkan from 1661 to 1670 had greatly disturbed the commercial setup. The English who had established their factories at Rajapur, Vengurla etc. had abandoned them due to these expeditions, which hampered their trade. After securing Konkan Shivaji had repeatedly sent proposals to the English to establish factories at these places, but the English were not keen in doing so. As an alternative Shivaji presented the same proposal to the French, which they accepted and established a factory at Rajapore. They also helped the former with the supply of arms and ammunition.

So it was quite natural, that the relations between the French and Marathas were cordial from the beginning. Shivaji's relations with the French were no-doubt with political intentions, but they were also economically motivated, for he wanted to restore the economy of Konkan which was disturbed due to constant expeditions. There are two correspondences of French directors which show

the generosity of Shivaji towards the French. M. Baron, Director of the French East India Company, refers to the good dispositions of Shivaji towards the French. He writes to Colbert "The Maratha Chief shows great esteem for the French Company." M. Blot, another Director of the French East India Company, mentions the same fact: he writes "If he (Shivaji) returns to sack Surat, he will have great respect to the French flag."⁶²

M. Baron had maintained good relations with Shivaji. In 1672 he entered into secret negotiations with him, probably for the cession of the port of Chaoul to the French Company to oust the English from Bombay. The negotiations did not materialize due to lack of funds.⁶³ Baron stayed at Rajapur for some weeks in 1675, while on his way to Surat from Pondicherry. During this stay he had several meetings with Annaji Datto, from whom he learnt about Shivaji's ambitions in the Karnataka.⁶⁴

Shivaji's relations with the Bijapur government were not amicable. Both the parties were constantly at war with each other. The French at Pondicherry had maintained good relations with Sher Khan Lodi, the Bijapur Governor of Wailkandapuram. M. Baron during his stay at Rajapur tried to form an alliance between Shivaji and Balhol Khan, the Commander-in Chief of the Bijapur forces and later on the Regent of Bijapur. In this connection he wrote to Francois Martin at Pondicherry and asked for his views. The latter wrote to Baron that if Shivaji strictly observes the terms of the treaty which would be concluded between him and Balhol Khan, then Sher Khan was willing to play the role of a mediator.⁶⁵ But at last Baron gave up the project when he realized the futility of the undertaking.

Shivaji took over the expedition of Karnataka in 1677. The French Governor of Pondicherry, Francois Martin had certain prejudices against

Shivaji and his troops. The Governor took the advantage of the good relations of M. Baron to safeguard and protect the interests of the French and the French settlement at Pondicherry. Even the correspondence of the French as late as 1679 state the personal relations of M. Baron with Shivaji.⁶⁶

The English from 1668 had become jealous and aware of the Maratha – French relations. The Marathas had released a French ‘Hoy’ which they had captured, but the same favor was not granted to the English. In 1675, the English had to meet with considerable difficulties to have a meeting with the Maratha King. The French on the other hand could easily obtain an audience with Shivaji. The partial behavior of Shivaji can be attributed to the difference of relation of the Marathas with the two European nations. The English had failed to abide by the terms of the treaty with Shivaji (June 12, 1674), hesitated to supply him with arms and ammunition and had also allowed the Siddi to tarry on the port of Bombay.⁶⁷

Shivaji had sacked the richest town (Surat) of the Mughals in 1664. Surat remained under a constant state of panic and was always threatened with an invasion of the Maratha King. In October 1670, Shivaji undertook the second sack of Surat. During this expedition all the European factories in Surat and also the Mughals had to suffer the damages, only the French factory was spared. Although the French were spared by the Maratha King for they had retained amicable relations with him and supplied him with arms and ammunition. They the French were quiet not sure of a proper treatment from the Marathas in the event of an attack on Surat. The French had prepared themselves for the entire defense against this rumored invasion of Shivaji. They had recruited a large number of soldiers and brought down men from their ships. This actually had weakened their commercial efforts. At the same time they had started to ingratiate themselves with the Mughal officers sent by the

Central authority for the defense of the city. The French had to contribute a larger amount of Rs.10,000=00/- to these Mughal officers as compared to their counterparts the English and the Dutch.⁶⁸ But the French were very fortunate as Shivaji informed them beforehand of his invasion and also assured them of his protection.⁶⁹

Abbe Carre has recorded that the French bravely resisted the Marathas during the sack of Surat on 3-6 October, 1670. The English and the Dutch record that the French did not move at all, although three Frenchmen were killed by Shivaji's men. The French were charged of buying the raiders for personal safety, which is almost true. They also got entangled with the Kashgar King because they gave a safe passage to the Marathas through their factory to his residence. The Surat Factors have also alleged the French of furnishing the Marathas with powder and shot during their attack on the Kashgar King's house.⁷⁰

The Marathas and the French came into close contact at Pondicherry. Pondicherry was a part of the Bijapur Karnatak. Bijapur Karnatak was ruled by two rival governors, viz Nasir Muhammad and Sher Khan who had their capitals at Jinji and Walikandapuram respectively.⁷¹

Sher Khan wanted to annex Jinji; he counted upon the assistance of the French to achieve his objective. He had also helped the French the French by advancing a loan (1674) to start a factory at Pondicherry. When Sher Khan opened hostilities against Nasir Muhammad in 1676, the French helped him by storming the fort of Valdour on September 24, 1676. Nasir Muhammad sought help of the King of Golkonda. Qutub Shah who was seeking an opportunity to interfere in the affairs welcomed Nasir Muhammad. Qutub Shah wanted to seize the whole of Karnatak for himself. The Bijapur government had been paralyzed due to internecine struggles. On the other hand Madanna Pandit, a devout Hindu, who was the minister of the Sultan

of Golkonda, thought of establishing a Hindu rule in Karnatak. He hoped this purpose will well work with the help of Shivaji. He persuaded the Sultan to make a common cause with Shivaji, due to whose help he would achieve the whole of Karnatak for himself. The conditions of this treaty between Shivaji and Sultan of Golkonda were, Shivaji would get the total spoils of the war while the territory conquered will be the share of the Sultan. Nasir Muhammad was also made party to this agreement, with the stipulation that he would receive certain amount in cash and also some territory fetching and annual income of Rs.1,00,000.⁷³

Shivaji marched with the combined forces of the Golkonda and the Marathas towards Jinji in the capacity of Commander-in Chief of this army. The French on one hand were having amicable relations with the Marathas while on the other they had captured the Fort of St. Thome (1672) and a ship belonging to the Sultan of Golkonda, also they were not in good terms with Nasir Muhammad as they had stormed the fort of Valdour (sept.1676) which was his possession. It was natural for them to fear at time point that both the Sultan of Golkonda and Nasir Muhammad would avenge for the past and attack Pondicherry. Francois Martin who was in charge of the French colony at Pondicherry sent an envoy to Sher Khan, to know what measures he had taken to defend himself. He also asked for his (Sher Khan's) permission to shift to Tegnapatam (Fort St.David) which was very close to Madras and incase of attack the French could have an easy escape by sea. Sher Khan assured the French envoy that there was nothing to fear from Shivaji as he had sufficient forces to retaliate the attack of Shivaji. He offered the French, Palamcotta instead of Tegnapatam to retreat. The Interview did not make the French feel secured; instead they became more anxious about their security. Palamcotta did not serve their purpose and on the contrary the French envoy saw Ibrahim Khan, son of Sher Khan and other men of his

camp retiring to Walikandpuram with their families and valuables from Tiruwadi. In fact Tiruwadi was in close proximity to the French settlement. Martin interviewed Ibrahim Khan on May 22, 1677 and came to a conclusion to move all articles of value belonging to French Company to Madras. This he did with the help of a Portuguese vessel which happened to be there at that time.⁷⁴

The French inspected the fort of Valdaour, as a place of retreat in case of emergency. They found it to be in satisfactory condition with some seven hundred to eight hundred soldiers in it, who could give a good resistance. The provisions and ammunition could last for a long siege. But the garrison lacked funds.⁷⁵

On May 31 the news of the fall of Jinji to the Marathas arrived and the French quickly sent their agent to Shivaji to seek his protection. The agent was briefed with all instruction regarding the complaints Shivaji probably would make against the French. The French agent met Shivaji at Vellore and was given a good reception by the King on June 17.⁷⁶

Shivaji had three audiences with the French agent and in these three meetings all the issues were settled to the satisfaction of both the parties. In the first audience the issue of the storming of the fortress of Valdaour and capture of Golkonda ship were resolved. It was agreed by the French to return the fortress of Valdaour to Nasir Muhammad as proposed by Shivaji in the second round. The French agent showed his incapability to draw sword against Sher Khan as the French had been under his obligations. Shivaji asked for French help to capture Vellore, but the French agent told that they were too small in number to give effective aid. The issue was resolved with a decision that the French should remain neutral at Pondicherry. In the final meeting Shivaji offered complete security to French at Pondicherry only if they strictly remained neutral. Shivaji also warned the French in failure to remain neutral he

would expel the French not only from Karnatak but also from Rajapur. It was admitted that Shivaji would dispatch a '*havaladar*' to Pondicherry for the administration of the French settlement. The French agent with these reasonable terms was entrusted with a letter for Martin in the form of a firman.⁷⁷

Shivaji had been informed that there were two to three hundred Frenchmen in Pondicherry and another seventy at Valdaour. He wanted to attack the French to prevent them from giving any assistance to Sher Khan. But the latter convinced him due to which he (Shivaji) raised his siege of Vellore and proceeded southwards to fight Sherkhan.⁷⁸ Francois Martin has observed Shivaji's Karnatak campaign as "a revolution which had never before been witnessed".⁷⁹

Sher Khan had under estimated the strength of Shivaji to four to five thousand horsemen. But in fact according to Martin's information Shivaji was equipped with twelve thousand horsemen and many thousand infantry. He also expected help from the Mughal Viceroy of Deccan by issuing directives to the Sultan of Golkonda for breaking alliance with Shivaji. Martin communicated Sher Khan to strengthen his fortresses and retire to the woods of Ariyalur, and reestablish his authority as soon as Shivaji turns back to his Kingdom. Sher Khan asked for the French help but Martin showed his incapability to do so because he had promised Shivaji to be neutral. He very tactfully avoided the issue.⁸⁰ The news of Sher Khan's defeat arrived at Pondicherry on 7th of July.⁸¹ The French were the most disappointed people in Karnatak due to his fall because he was the only support they relied in this part of the country.⁸²

In April 1675, M. Baron, the French Director and Sher Khan Lodi had entered into a pact to attack the Kingdom of Golkonda. Baron was to help the Khan with five lakh pagodas and one hundred Frenchmen and in addition five thousand cavalry and twenty thousand soldiers from France. Baron had serious

negotiations with Colbert and Admiral de la Haye about the matter which reflects from his correspondence with the two.⁸³

The government of Louis XIV suspended all its continental activities which disheartened the project of Baron and Admiral de la Haye. Baron remained discussing the project with de la Haye as late as February 13, 1676.⁸⁴ After the fall of Sher Khan, Martin was compelled to seek protection of the Maratha King for the French colony, he sent Sieur Germain with few presents to Shivaji, Germain was accompanied with Antonio Cattel, a Portuguese, as an interpreter.⁸⁵

Sher Khan signed a treaty with Shivaji on July 17, 1677. But the terms of the treaty, Sher Khan ceded all his territories to Shivaji and promised to pay twenty thousand pagodas in cash. As he had no money his elder Ibrahim Khan was made a hostage to Shivaji until the amount was paid.⁸⁶ On the same day Shivaji deputed two Maratha officers to administer the French Colony at Pondicherry.⁸⁷

Shivaji left Karnatak in the month of September 1677. Raghunath Narayan Hanamante was appointed to administer the newly acquired territory and was also given sufficient troops.⁸⁸

II) The Maratha Administration of Pondicherry:

The appointment of two Maratha officers for the administration of Pondicherry by Shivaji brought the French in to a day to day contact with the Marathas. But these contacts did not prove to build good relations. Martin had his own prejudices against the Marathas. While the Marathas suspected the French of having secret relations with Sher Khan.⁸⁹

During his journey from Surat to Masulipatam in 1670, Martin had traveled by another route, for the usual route from Surat to Golkonda was

infested by the Marathas. On his way he had seen large number of places ruined. Due to this, he considered Shivaji and his men bandits. This prejudice of his was further accentuated by the tyranny of the Maratha officers at Pondicherry.⁹⁰ The Marathas developed a hostile attitude towards the French because of their friendly relations with Sher Khan. Martin had been in regular correspondence with Sher Khan and had also regretted for his misfortunes. The Marathas always feared an aid from Bijapur to Sher Khan. If it so happened, the Marathas were sure that the French would assist the Khan to oust the Marathas from Karnatak.⁹¹

The Marathas were determined to expel the French from Pondicherry. They left no occasion to extort money from them in form of presents. On August 15, 1677, Timaji Keshav, the Subhedar (of the district of Maratha rule on the Coromandel Coast) visited the French colony. Germain and Cattel waited upon him, but on the pretext that Martin purposely avoided to wait on him, he ordered all the native people in the French company's service to wait upon him. He took this as a personal insult. Martin to avoid trouble went to meet him and also offered him presents.⁹²

In September 1678, the Chief of the Dutch factory at the Tegnapatam proposed the (Maratha) *havaladar* the purchase of the fortress of Tegnapatam and also of Pondicherry. The *havaladar* directed the Dutch Chief to the Governor-General at Jinji.⁹³ The French were at war with the Dutch in Europe and the Marathas were finding a cause to oust the French from Pondicherry. The Marathas at the same time were concerned of a Dutch attack. Hence Gopal Pandit, the Maratha *havaladar* of Porto-Novo and Tegnapatam reported the movements of the Dutch to Francois Martin. Martin informed this to the Governor-General at Jinji, who promised him not to worry of a Dutch attack. As he had five hundred men in the fortress of Tegnapatam.⁹⁴

The Dutch intrigues reached the Maratha Court at Jinji.

Hanamante in November 1678 called for the French agent at Jinji appointed by Martin to safeguard French interests. Hanamante complained to him that the trade at Pondicherry had decreased and the Maratha government was losing its revenue incurred from customs. The Dutch were threatening to quit Tegnapatam and shut down their trade there, which could indirectly affect the French trade at Pondicherry. The Dutch wanted to oust the French from Pondicherry, thus they had started intrigues at the Maratha Court. Due to these circumstances Hanamante told the French agent that he would only allow the French at Pondicherry for two years if they lend him a loan of ten thousand pagodas. They could recover the loan from the collection of the revenue of the villages assigned to them. The French agent pleaded the inability of the French to advance loan as they had no money. He also took a firm stand that if it was the desire of the Maratha Governor-General to oust the French from Pondicherry. The French were ready to move out. He further told Hanamante that it never could be the intention of Shivaji to do so, as he always treaded the French with due respect. The firm stand of the agent had a desired effect on the Governor-General and the latter became more reasonable.⁹⁵

In November 1678, Baron, the French Director, dispatched a letter of recommendation from Shivaji to his Governor-General at Jinji. The letter instructed the Governor to treat the French with respect. But the letter did not have the desired effect.⁹⁶ Chhatrapati Shivaji died in April 1680 and was succeeded by his eldest son Sambhaji.

III) Chhatrapati Sambhaji's relations with the French: ✓

Martin received the news of the Maratha King's death from the French Chief at Rajapur. He gives his estimate of Shivaji in the following words....

"He (Shivaji) could very well occupy a high place among the great men in India, though the conquests he made during his life time were accomplished by intrigue and cunning than by open warfare".⁹⁷

Sambhaji's reign was mainly occupied by his wars with the Siddi (1681-1682), the Portuguese (1683-1684) and the Mughals (1684-1685 & 1687-1689). Due to these engagements of Sambhaji the French trade at Rajapur suffered great losses. In 1683, there was only one clerk left in the French lodge at Rajapur. The French were thinking to close down their factory at Rajapur in 1686, which they did in November 1688.⁹⁸

There is one record of November 1681 of the French supplying the Marathas with arms and ammunition. This act of the French evoked a protest from the Mughal Governor of Surat.⁹⁹ In 1683, Chhatrapati Sambhaji marched against the Portuguese town of Chaoul. During this march he stayed at Rajapur and he obtained an assurance from the French Chief of the factory that he (the French Chief) would no more send any supplies of food and ammunition to the Portuguese.¹⁰⁰ He also secured a loan of 1,500 pagodas from the French.¹⁰¹

The only important thing to be noted between the French Maratha relations during these times is the demand made by the Mughal Governor of Surat (July 1682) that the French (along with other European nations) should supply ships and sailors in the war against the Marathas. The French excused themselves on the plea that they had neither ships nor sailors to spare.¹⁰²

The Maratha Governor-General at Jinji was put under arrest in the fort of Jinji at the orders of Chhpa.Sambhaji. The French Director, M. Baron was lying seriously ill at Surat. He sent for Martin to give charge of the affairs. M. Deltor was appointed at Pondicherry. M. Deltor carried with him letters of recommendation to the Maratha officer for giving safe passage to Martin on his journey to Surat. Martin was at Madras when he received these letters.¹⁰³

The Maratha rule at Pondicherry and the French trade went on swiftly for seven years i.e. from the departure of Martin to the invasion of the Mughals. The Mughal Emperor annexed the Kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda in 1686 and 1687 respectively and marched further south. A Mughal clash with the Marathas was inevitable. It was quite natural, for the French who had allegiance to the Marathas, feel anxious about their security. The Mughal army arrived at Wandiwash under the command of Muhammad Sadiq in April 1688. The French immediately contacted the commander and referred the good relations between the Mughals and French. They also asked for protection of French merchants and safe passage through Mughal territory. The commander complied to the French request.¹⁰⁴

Martin who had returned as Director of French establishments on Eastern Coast of India on May 20, 1686 now faced the problem of protecting his colony from attack of the Mughals as well as Marathas. He hence secured permission from the Maratha *havaladar* to construct walls and fortify the settlement. The Marathas created obstacles in his ways as usual and extorted money before granting permission.¹⁰⁵

The permission granted to the French by the Maratha *havaladar* turned to be fake one to the surprise of Martin. He was ordered by the Maratha Court of Jinji to withhold the fortification work. The work was stopped on

July 24 and a further demand of 50,000 francs was made by the Maratha Court to forward the *firman*.¹⁰⁶ Martin was disgusted due to the meanness of the Maratha officers. He hence sent an envoy to Jinji with letters addressed to Harji Raje Mahadik, explaining the affairs at Pondicherry and the need for its fortifications. As Martin directly applied for a *firman* from Jinji the Maratha officers at Pondicherry tried to harass the French.¹⁰⁷

As the work of fortification was delayed, Martin decided to send M.Germain to Jinji to negotiate with the Maratha Governor-General personally and get the issue settled (November 1688). M.Germain had a conversation with the Subhedar Timaji Keshav. Germain clearly stated that if the permission to fortify Pondicherry was not granted to them. Then the French would quit the settlement and leave to Tanjore, where a new factory was established. Due to this reluctant attitude of the French the Marathas permitted the French to fortify their settlement provided they pay 5,000 *chachars* and restrict the height of the four towers at the four corners. Germain recommended the bargain to Martin. The sum was finally dispatched to Jinji.¹⁰⁸

The *firman* was not issued to the French by the Maratha officers on some pretext or the other, as they wanted to have their own share of the bargain. The Mughals were approaching Jinji, due to which there was confusion at the Maratha Court. The French obtained the *firman* on January 9, 1689 for which they had to pay an additional sum of 600 *chachars*. The *firman* is one of the most important landmarks in the history of Pondicherry. According to Martin it gave great advantage to the Company as it offered great facilities for trade and commerce. The fortifications of Pondicherry did serve the French from their European rivals as well as of the Indian Princes.¹⁰⁹

The French were threatened by two problems at this time at Pondicherry. Firstly the impending clash between the Mughals and Marathas in the South and secondly the Dutch interventions at the Maratha Court to purchase Pondicherry. The war of the League of Augsburg had broken out in Europe at this time between the French and the Dutch. The Dutch resumed their hostilities and made efforts to attack the French colonies especially Pondicherry. The Dutch tried to persuade and also tried to pressurize the Maratha Governor-General Harji Raje Mahadik to allow them to resume their hostilities against the French in the Maratha lands. But Mahadik did not approved the Dutch designs.¹¹⁰

Even then the Dutch kept on their policy of instigation against the French. They tried to win over the Maratha officers by sending costly presents and promises, until their efforts became successful. Mahadik slowly began to give heed to the Dutch. He called for the French agent and showed the Dutch letters, which mentioned promises of large sums to him in return for the permission to attack the French. The French agent first tried to persuade the Governor-General to respect the *firman* given to them, but it did not have the desired effect. Instead Mahadik wrote to Martin about the Dutch proposal and said that as he was in need of funds. If the French could advance a loan of 5,000 to 6,000 pagodas he would not take the decision to abandon Pondicherry. Martin replied expressing his inability to pay the amount and also requested the Governor-General not to yield to Dutch pressure.¹¹¹

Martin also had to offer presents to some officers at Jinji to win them over to his side. The Dutch and the French continued their struggle for influence at the Maratha Court with vigour. Both trying to win over the Maratha officers for their cause.¹¹²

Harji Raje Mahadik the Maratha Governor-General of Jinji died in October 1689. At this time Martin wrote letters of condolence to his family and also letters congratulating the new Governor-General and his officers.¹¹³ But before this development the Maratha Chhatrapati Sambhaji was captured by the Mughals and was put to a cruel death by Aurangzeb.

The death of Chhatrapati Sambhaji was a master stroke given to the Marathas by the Mughals. The Marathas lost their second Chhatrapati only in a short time of 9 years from the death of Chhatrapati Shivaji. The Mughals thought that it could now be easy to overrun the whole of the Deccan and Karnatak. But this never happened due to the strenuous efforts of Chhatrapati Rajaram, his wife Queen Tarabai and no less the efforts of the Maratha Sardars who lived up the dream of Chhatrapati Shivaji's '*Swarajya*'. The Mughals did get initial wars with the Marathas but finally could not win over the *Swarajya*, in turn Emperor Aurangzeb lost his life in Deccan in 1707 fighting a long battle of 25 years with the Marathas.

The armies of Aurangzeb were overrunning the whole of the Maratha country and were capturing forts one after another. Due to this the seat of the Maratha government had to be shifted to Jinji. Rajaram the second son of Chhatrapati Shivaji now became the Chhatrapati of the Marathas. It was he who took the decision of shifting the Maratha capital from Raigad to Jinji. As Jinji became the headquarters of the Maratha kingdom the French at Pondicherry became more restless as the capital of the Marathas was in close proximity to Pondicherry. Also due to the changing political situations in the south the French were been placed in an unenviable position. The presence of the Marathas at Jinji brought in day to day relations of the French with Marathas. The Maratha-Mughal rivalry and the long war in the Deccan between the two brought in great losses to the French factory at Pondicherry.¹¹⁴

IV) Chhatrapati Rajaram's relations with the French:

Chhatrapati Rajaram arrived at Jinji in the month of November 1689.¹¹⁵ Immediately after the arrival of Rajaram to Jinji, Martin sent Germain with presents to greet Rajaram. Germain was given good reception by Rajaram and all the previous *firman*s issued to the French were continued in the same manner as granted earlier.¹¹⁶

Due to the Mughal invasion of the Maratha country Chhatrapati Rajaram was facing pecuniary difficulties. The state treasury was almost empty and there was a need of money for the payment of the troops. His arrival at Jinji served the Marathas as a pretext to levy contributions on the Europeans. The French paid an amount of 3,000 pagodas. Martins dairy says that even after the French had paid an amount of 3,000 pagodas as gift, the Marathas blockaded their lodge, seized cloth of the company merchants and hard pressed for money from the French.¹¹⁷

The Marathas at this time were in dire need of money due to their long and strenuous war with the Mughals, almost in every quarter of the Deccan. Due to this reason the Maratha government found out all sorts of ways to extort money from the European powers on the Coromandel Coast. While doing so the Marathas officers many a times followed harsh treatment to them. As the French were in a very close proximity to the Marathas at Jinji they suffered great losses. Accordingly the relations between the French and the Marathas were strained at this point of time.

The French at Pondicherry wanted to demolish the houses in front of the fort on the eastern side in order to have an open space, which enable them to get a clear view in case of an attack from the sea. They without taking prior permission of the Maratha officers started the demolition work. The Maratha officers obstructed the French move. Finally the matter was resolved by giving

permission to the French only to erect barricades in places which were easily open to an attack. But even after proper permissions were taken by the French from Jinji the harassment by the Maratha officers continued unabated.¹¹⁸

The French Company wanted total sovereignty in the commercial affairs of the Company. There was a dispute on this question between the Maratha Court and the Company which remained disputed for more than three years. Finally the French did not allowed the Maratha Court to interfere in its internal affairs.¹¹⁹

The French were facing with a more serious problem from their European rival, the Dutch in the South of India. The Dutch were quiet adamant to oust the French from the Coromandel Coast. They, the Dutch found an opportunity with the arrival of the Maratha Prince at Jinji. They started fresh intrigues against the French at the court of Jinji. The Dutch were ready to spend 20,000 pagodas by way of presents to Chhatrapati Rajaram and his ministers. Laurens Pit, the Dutch Governor of Negapattam (85 miles south of Pondicherry) persuaded Gopal Pandit, *havaladar* of Porto Novo, to declare French as the enemies of the Marathas. Martin had established a contact with the State Secretary in order to obtain the information about the secret meetings between the Maratha Prince and Gopal Pandit, which were directed towards the expulsion of the French from Pondicherry. On enquiry made by a French agent with Pralhad Niraji, Niraji disclosed that the state was in dire need of money and the Dutch were well prepared with money and presents to purchase Pondicherry. He also told him that they were expected in a couple of days. The only option left for the French was either to hold in mortgage or purchase Pondicherry with the lands depending upon it for 10,000 pagodas. If the French failed to execute the deal, the Marathas would finalize it with the Dutch.¹²⁰

Martin immediately realized the seriousness of the situation and dispatched Germain to Jinji. Germain tried to dissuade Rajaram from the intention of mortgage or sale of Pondicherry. But his arguments were not given due consideration. Martin sought the intervention of the Raja of Tanjore, but realizing it to be costly he gave up the idea. Gopal Pandit was ready to abandon the cause of the Dutch if the French were ready to offer him 2,000 pagodas. But the French were incapable to offer him the money. The Dutch were ready to achieve their objective of gaining Pondicherry, for this they took recourse to all types of unfair means. Rumors were spread by them that they had succeeded against the French at Jinji, thus creating a panic in the general public at Pondicherry.¹²¹

Some officers at the Maratha Court persuaded Pralhad Niraji that it would bring in permanent to the reign of Rajaram if the Dutch were to be allowed to attack the French who were established under the authority of the Maratha Chhatrapati *firmans*. Niraji now demanded a loan of a big sum from the French. By this time the Dutch realized that the Maratha Court was only trying to extract money from them without the slightest desire to concede anything. The Dutch representatives departed on June 12, 1690 from Jinji under disgraceful circumstances.¹²²

The departure of the Dutch from Jinji made things easier for the French. The French agreed to pay Chhatrapati Rajaram 6,000 *chacras* at eighteen percent interest, instead of 10,000 *pagodas*. The promissory note included the various amounts already advanced to Chhp. Rajaram, plus 1,500 pagodas, paid to Chhp. Sambhaji at Rajapur without

interest. In return Chhp. Rajaram ceded customs and all revenues of Pondicherry to the French until the final recovery of the sum.¹²³

There is a great significance to this transaction between the French-Maratha relations. It was nearly impossible for Chhp. Rajaram to repay the loan, even if he paid the debt, the French could easily obtain the renewal of the transaction as the problems of Chhp. Rajaram were increasing and the political pressure was mounting high. The French on the other hand could have achieved a sale-deed which would have liberated them from the Maratha vassalage, but would have deprived them of the protection from Chhp. Rajaram.

Martin hoisted the Maratha flag in the French colony as a measure of security from all attacks. The Dutch due to the Maratha pressure dared not to attack the colony. They remained satisfied with conducting naval demonstrations at sea in front of Pondicherry.¹²⁴

The transaction with the Marathas saved the French company more than 3, 00,000 francs in merchandise alone. Martin was quiet happy with the development as he received two *firman*s duly signed by Chhp. Rajaram on to collect revenue and the other regarding protection against all enemies.¹²⁵

The rising diplomatic pressure, the disturbed political situation in the South and paucity of funds compelled Chhp. Rajaram to sell the fortress of Tegnapatam and the land surrounding this fortress for 50,000 pagodas including the village of Cuddalore and the river. The French Governor was repeatedly contacted in this matter by the Court of Jinji explaining the importance of the place and its advantages. But the French chief was helpless as he lacked funds at this particular time. The English Governor of Madras was fully aware of the strategic importance of the place and he wanted to strike the deal. Finally in September 1690, the English concluded the bargain with the Marathas. The French repented for losing the

opportunity in the future. Thus creating a new rival near Pondicherry apart from the Dutch.¹²⁶

V) The Maratha-Mughal War and French Position:

The assassination of Chhp. Sambhaji in 1689 and the continuous hunt for Chhp. Rajaram by the Mughals had caused anxiety among the Marathas. The Marathas realized the importance of '*Swarajya*' and wanted to regain their past glory. The Mughal General, Zulfikar Khan besieged the Maratha capital, 'Raigad' in the month of September 1690. This situation seriously affected the position of the French in the south as they were under the protection of the Marathas. During the period of war between the Marathas and the Mughals the French had to maintain a neutral position as both the rivals were equally powerful. This was an enviable situation as both were certain to ask for the French assistance.

As soon as the Mughal army arrived near Jinji, the French Governor Martin took course to establish contact with the Mughal General with the help of a Brahmin negotiator; he opened negotiations with the Mughals. There were two to three rounds of negotiations, between the two wherein it was proposed that the Mughals will very soon capture Jinji and that the French should capture the Maratha prince Rajaram and hand him over to the Mughals. French help was also solicited to capture the fort of Tegenapatam with a view to trap Chhp. Rajaram.¹²⁷ It is very important to note here that Martin, in his Dairy, has nowhere hinted at having given any promise to seize Chhp. Rajaram and deliver him to the Mughals.

Martin in his Dairy says, 'Chhp. Rajaram, seized with fright, left Jinji (October 1690) towards a hill fortress, some eight to ten leagues from Jinji, despite strong resistance from his councilors'. Chhp. Rajaram wrote to Martin to

send him some cloth, for he had left Jinji without his baggage and the cold in the hilly place was bitter. Martin honoured the request. Rajaram soon returned to Jinji.¹²⁸

The Mughals were continuously demanding French assistance to seize the fort of Tegnapatam, while the French pleaded their inability to assure as they were awaiting the arrival of a French squadron. The Mughal general then asked for a supply of gunpowder and services of gunners to man his batteries. Both of the requests were turned down by the French on the pretext that the French themselves were very short of them. The Mughal officers also tried to spy the French colony on the pretext of saving the French settlement from any possible mischief. Instead according to Martin their intention was to find out if the French were sending any succour to Chhp. Rajaram.¹²⁹

The French settlement was seriously disturbed since the invasion of the Mughals. To make matters worse the sons of Sher Khan Lodi requested the Mughal general to propose to the French to seize the fortress of Valdaour as earlier done by them during the times of Sher Khan Lodi. The French took it firm to be neutral with both parties.¹³⁰

During the Mughal invasions many of the Bramhin and Maratha families had sought refuge in the French settlement. On the pretext to drive them out the Mughal troops appeared before Pondicherry in December 1691. The English and Dutch were hostile to the French and the Marathas and had joined hands with the Mughals. It was nearly impossible for the French to resist their combined armies. Hostility with Marathas could have made matters worse for them. Hence the French council only allowed the Mughals to occupy a village to the west of the French settlement. If the Mughals tried to camp then the French were to open fire. Martin had to make this concession as it was the need of the time.¹³¹

The Mughal commander threatened to enter Pondicherry by force if the demands were not accepted. But finding the determination of the French to resist with their armed force, he retired to Villenour (7 miles south-west of Pondicherry). The Maratha officer, Krishna Antaji came to know about the Mughal camp at Villenour, he marched rapidly and attacked them, giving them no time to escape and were arrested. The court of Jinji lodged a complaint with the French that they had helped the Mughals with money, ammunition and food. Krishna Antaji claimed he had rendered great service to the French by ousting the Mughals and hence they must present him with gifts. There upon the French presented Antaji a gold chain worth 100 pagodas. They also sent presents to the Mughal officers to make up their discomfiture. But these presents were intercepted by the Marathas and taken to Jinji. A report was thus filed against the French for carrying secret negotiations with the Mughals for which severe action was to be taken.¹³²

The Mughals again pressed upon the French to assist them in fighting the Maratha troops. The French reiterated their stand that they were traders and as such had nothing to do with the war between the Mughals and the Marathas, and that any act of aggression would be met with an armed force. The Marathas got intelligence that the Mughals were allowed to purchase outside the French fort. They threatened the French to blockade their supply, which was also carried out for a couple of days. But was lifted when the French gave a counter-threat to join hands with the Mughal troops.¹³³

In April 1692, Dharmaji the Maratha commander camped on a plain not far from the French Colony with 900 cavalry and 300 infantry. He persisted on the French council to give him passage into the colony which was not granted. He then pressed for a loan with interest, which too was not complied. The

French in turn advised him to camp along the palm trees west of Pondicherry with a large force. They also obliged the Marathas to fire a cannon-shot as a signal when the Mughal troops approached into the plains.¹³⁴

Here it can also be justified the other way round, that the French offer to the Marathas could also have been the same to the Mughals. It can be a possibility that the French could have offered the Mughals to signal the Maratha threat in close vicinity when they arrived in the plains. Thus, trying to please both the parties and not offending either of them.

The French maintained a position of not displeasing the Marathas as well as the Mughals. The French had refused permission to Krishna Antaji, an officer of high rank at the Maratha Court to visit Pondicherry on the other hand they had also refused permission to Rasoul Khan the second son of Sher Khan Lodi in polite terms and had presented him with 200 pagodas. Like wise when the Mughals attacked villages in Tegnapatam, the French informed about it to Dharmaji who drove away the marauders.¹³⁵

The Mughal commander, Naro Pant, was diplomatically waiting upon Rasoul Khan to attack the French settlement, where in he could secure a considerable booty. Rasoul Khan on the pretext of a quarrel with his colleague encamped near the French colony. The French were better understanding his intentions and persuaded him to vacate the encampment which he refused. To deal with the situation the French forwarded him an loan of 400 chacras which he had demanded earlier from the French and were been refused then. He at once vacated the encampment. Like wise the French informed about it to the Maratha commander. Dharmaji immediately visited the spot and the neighborhood. He also assured the French that he will very soon expel the enemy from the woods.¹³⁶

Dharmaji fulfilled his promise to the French, he attacked Rasoul Khan's camp in the woods, inflicted a heavy loss on the enemy. The Marathas, afterwards encamped near Pondicherry. Wounded cavalymen visited Pondicherry to dress their wounds. One of the wounded was the brother-in-law of Dharmaji. Dharmaji had personally requested his visit to Pondicherry, with a personal request to Martin to look after his relative.¹³⁷

In the same month, Krishna Antaji and Anandrao, two Maratha officers, informed Marin that they wanted to visit Pondicherry and expressed hope that they would be received with suitable presents. Martin replied that the French were facing paucity of funds and at the same time due to their position of maintaining strict neutrality between the two contending parties. They the French cannot receive them in their settlement. They also tried to impress the Marathas that they were instrumental in keeping up the territory which yielded revenue to the Marathas which otherwise could have gone to the Mughals.¹³⁸ In the weeks ahead the Mughals made a surprise attack and made the Maratha detachment to retreat from Villenaour.¹³⁹

Ibrahim Khan, the eldest son of Sher Khan Lodi, now arrived as commander of the Mughal troops and stationed near the French settlement. The French immediately sent an officer to pay their respects to their one time benefactor. Ibrahim Khan was very confident of Mughal victory against the Marathas. He disclosed his designs on the Marathas to the French and favoured their support in the matter. The French very clearly state their inability to do the same demanded as they were pledged to maintain strict neutrality between the two contending parties.¹⁴⁰

The Mughal camp was surprisingly attacked by Dharmaji on December 15, with a lightning speed inflicting heavy casualties. The French expressed their gratitude to Dharmaji for the action taken against the Mughals and

helping the French settlement.¹⁴¹ Dharmaji received orders from the Maratha Court to leave for Tegnapatam. Martin regretted his departure the most, for the relations between them had become quiet amicable and friendly. This relation could have helped in formulating a better relation between the two in the future. After Dharmaji, Anandrao was appointed, who was utterly ignorant of military tactics according to Martin. While the former was a man of enterprise and ability.¹⁴²

Here it must be noted that when ever there were enterprising and able commanders, councilors, directors and governors on either sides i.e. the Maratha and the French emphasis was laid to improve relations between the two which actually did benefited both of them.

A letter of great praise was sent to Martin by Chhp. Rajaram's chief minister, Pralhad Niraji stating that the French played a great part in handling the Mughals. It was also stated that now the Chhp. Had no prejudices against the French and that they were secretly helping the Mughals. Niraji also conveyed to Martin that Santaji Ghorpade had defeated the Mughal army and had captured Alimardan Khan.¹⁴³

In the initial years of 1693 the Mughal army retired their camp in the woods. Martin informed about it to Anandrao who immediately occupied the camp, evacuated by the Mughals. Martin also supplied gunpowder, bullets and a reinforcement of fifty soldiers to guard the woods on the request of Anandrao.¹⁴⁴

Martin also advised the Maratha *havaladar* to complete the fortification work undertaken by the Mughals, of the fort on the hillock. The *havaladar* was however, unable to undertake the work due to lack of funds. It is not very surprising to note a sudden change in the behavior of the French who previously had taken a stand to remain neutral. Martin was continuously getting the information that

there was a secret understanding between the Marathas and the Mughal officers. Zulfikar Khan's agents were having a free access to enter the fort and were also having secret meeting with Niraji. Martin had also received the information that Dhanaji Jadhav and Santaji Ghorphade were in Jinji and that Prince Kam Baksha was arrested by Asadkhan. This secret information which he received from both the parties helped him to decide his policy towards the two.¹⁴⁵

VI) The Sale of Pondicherry by Chh. Rajaram and the French Embarrassment:

Due to the withdrawal of the Mughals from the vicinity of Pondicherry the French felt relaxed for a moment. But their colony had to face new problems caused due to the Maratha intervention the Maratha Court demanded an explanation from the French for the levy of contributions from the inhabitants of Pondicherry and the cutting down of palm trees without prior permission of Jinji. An officer was sent to obtain the compensation from the French. Martin has attributed this resentment from Jinji due to the personal grudge bore by Krishna Antaji against the French. The French tried to please him by sending presents for a marriage in his family. This did not improved matters as Anandrao the Maratha commander at Villenaour was instructed from Jinji to demand a loan of a big sum, or for the purchase of Pondicherry with the lands depending on the settlement from Martin. He was also instructed, that if the demand was not honored he should attack the French with his troops.¹⁴⁶

Taking into consideration the seriousness of the matter Martin immediately summoned the Council's meeting wherein prominent merchants of the Company were invited. The merchants were strongly in favour of the purchase of Pondicherry. Martin explained to them the problems they the French would have to face

if they purchased the place. Firstly, he said, the Marathas would loose interest in the place and would not help the French when attacked from the European rivals. Secondly, the French were at war with the English and the Dutch in Europe. Hence they would loose the amount spent on the purchase, if incase they would have to cede Pondicherry due to defeat. Thirdly, there was a possibility of Jinji joining hands with the Mughals and then the Mughals would not recognize the transaction. Due to all these speculations Martin realized that the deal must be kept pending to gain time. Hence he and his council decided to send an amount of 250 pagodas to Krishna Antaji and another 100 pagodas to Anandrao, so as to stop them from pressing the matter further. The presents were dispatched and in return the French were given promises as usual. Krishna Antaji even advised Martin that he should station an agent at Jinji to guard the French interests at the Maratha Court.¹⁴⁷

The French colony of Pondicherry was a constant eye sore for the Dutch. They were now determined to make a final effort to remove the French from Pondicherry. As always, they took on to, spread rumours that the French fleet in Europe was been defeated by the Dutch and the English. They also held celebrations to honour their victory over the French with rejoicing and gun salutes. The English officers too were invited and a strong effort was made to impress upon the Maratha Court at Jinji that the French affairs were in a bad state. The Dutch even tried to bribe the Chief Minister at Jinji, due to which the attitude of Jinji became more indecent towards the French. Martin tried to makeup the matter by sending a person to help the agent already stationed at the Maratha Court. He made special efforts to influence Trimbak Keshav, the Subhedar of Jinji and officials of high ranks at the Maratha Court to serve French interests in the wake of trouble caused due to the Dutch. Presents were continuously sent to Jinji and fortification works at Negaptam and

Pondicherry were simultaneously been done. However the Maratha officers at Pondicherry created obstacles and made the French to stop the work in June 1693.

The Dutch left no stone unturned towards achieving their objective of ousting the French from Pondicherry. But they could not act from land and had to carry out their designs from the seas. The Dutch kept constant vigilance about the affairs at the Maratha Court by sending presents and pleasing the officer's at Jinji. The Dutch, Chief at Tegnapatam, approached Sonaji Pant, the revenue officer of the district to pursue Pralhad Niraji as he had great influence on him. The French got this news of the Marathas joining hands with their enemy, but still did whatever best they could do.¹⁴⁸

As the situation grew more alarming, Martin evacuated persons who were not required in Pondicherry. He sent his wife Mme. Martin by a Danish boat to St.Thome and he feared that the Maratha's might probably cause indignities to her during her journey.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile Chhp. Rajaram and his minister had fallen ill and demanded a French physician to visit them for cure. Martin was hesitant to do so but tried luck that this opportunity could do him some help.¹⁵⁰ The presence of the French physician at Jinji established a fresh contact with the Court. He was been told by the Maratha Court that if the French agreed to pay 25,000 pagodas towards the absolute sale of Pondicherry within a week, then the court would cancel all its agreements with the Dutch. Urgent letters were sent to Pondicherry by the physician and his interpreter for further consideration and quick action. Germain had managed to secure a copy of the agreement between the Maratha Court and the Dutch, regarding the sale and capture of Pondicherry from the French. The deal clearly stated that Pondicherry will be ceded to the Dutch with its depending territories, with an absolute control, for the payment of

25,000 pagodas in three installments from the Dutch before the final capture of the place. Chhp. Rajarm had also agreed to help the Dutch with his troops if a military resistance was given by the French. Accordingly the Dutch could enjoy absolute possession of the territory without any intervention from the Maratha Court and could coin money which would be legal tender in Maratha territory.

It seems that by now the Maratha attitude towards the French had become rather cold and that the Maratha Court was determined to sell Pondicherry to the Dutch. Germain tried his best to have an interview with Chhp. Rajaram and plead the French cause, but he was referred to Pralhad Niraji. Niraji told Germain that the matter was not in his hands as the French had taken the Maratha proposal of the sale very lightly and had deliberately used delaying tactics when the Maratha Court was in dire need of money. It was due to these reason that the Maratha Court could not rely on the French help during troubled times. Even then Germain insisted to Niraji that an opportunity must be given to the French, who could render services to the Marathas. But the argument of Germain was left unheard and he found that most of the Maratha officers were now under the influence of the Dutch bribes.¹⁵¹

As there was no alternative left the French now decided to buy Pondicherry for 25,000 pagodas. But the Marathas refrained to this as they had made up to sell Pondicherry to the Dutch. The Maratha Court now bargained the price of Pondicherry for 28,000 pagodas and another 2,000 pagodas as presents. They were to pay 15,000 pagodas immediately in cash and the remaining in two installments. Martin left with no option now decided to seek help from Zulfikar Khan, the Mughal commander. The Khan readily offered his help to the French, but as hardly anytime was left the negotiations did not materialize. Martin also tried to seek help from the Raja of Tanjore but it also turned to be futile.¹⁵²

At last he pleaded help from Dharmaji, but as it was his master's order he told Martin about his inefficiency to assist the French. The Dutch fleet arrived before Pondicherry on 23rd August, 1693. It landed Pondicherry from 25th to 27th August, 1693. The Maratha Prince ratified the agreement and finally signed it at Jinji on 27th August, 1693.¹⁵³

Pondicherry was finally, capitulated by the Dutch without much resistance from the French on 8th September, 1693. Chhp. Rajaram sent his congratulations and presents to Laurens Pit, the Dutch Governor of Nagapatam, who was the person to achieve victory over the French.¹⁵⁴

The French Council and especially Martin had kept on a policy to maintain friendly relations with the local powers in times of peace but followed a policy of neutrality, came to terms with both parties, so as to gain security and profits from any of the party emerging to be victorious. This policy of the Martin did show certain success in 1677, but it proved to be extremely fatal in 1693. The renowned scholar, J.Dubreuil has held Francois Martin responsible for the failure of the French Company.¹⁵⁵


On the other hand Martin's decisions can be justified if viewed from his position as a Governor. He was there only to safeguard French interests and act according to the State order from the French Crown. This period was essentially a period of turmoil. Many political disturbances were taking place due to the Mughal – Maratha war. The Mughals had conquered the prominent kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkonda in quick succession. Chhp. Sambhaji, was captured and executed, his wife and only son Shahu were made captives. The Mughal armies had overrun the whole of the Deccan to completely ruin the Maratha power under the statesmanship of Emperor Aurangzeb. The Marathas too under the leadership of

able Maratha aristocrats were trying to inflict severe blows on the Mughals and were driving them out of the Maratha territory. Martin had to act and serve French interest under these tensions. Hence it will not be objective to blame Martin for miscalculations. The Mughal commander, Zulfikar Khan was not exerting Full pressure on Jinji as there was a secret understanding between him and the Marathas. The Maratha Chatrapatti was facing great financial burden and was in need of monetary help. He was constantly demanding money from the French. On the other hand some Maratha officers were demanding presents and bribes which made the French suspect the Maratha Court. The information network on both sides was not good and there was a lack of communication between the two which caused major misunderstanding and distrust. The French had committed a cause for anxiety among the Maratha officers by not responding to them and on certain occasions had not permitted them to enter Pondicherry e.g. the case of Krishna Antaji. Hence it was not at all surprising that the Marathas vented their wrath on the French by selling Pondicherry to the Dutch.

Thus an episode of a long direct relation established among the Marathas and the French by Chh. Shivaji in 1668 came to a stand still with misunderstanding and distrust with Chh. Rajaram selling the most important colony (Pondicherry) of the French to the Dutch in 1693. If the Marathas had not sold Pondicherry to the Dutch and had they retained amicable relations with the French. The relations between the two could have been in a position to counter check the activities of the English, Dutch and the Mughals in Deccan.

On February 7, 1698 Jinji was surrendered to the Mughals by the Marathas (the actual fall of Jinji came in December 1697). The war in Europe came to an end in 1697 by the Treaty of Ryswick. It was under the provisions of the Treaty of Ryswick, Pondicherry was restored to the French in 1697. Francois Martin

who was in Houghly (present Chandernagore, 20 miles from Kolkotta) with his son-in-law, M.Boureau Deslandes, Director of the French comptior at Houghly, was again appointed as Governor of the French colony i.e. Pondicherry.



CHAPTER III

Franco-Maratha Relations: The Period of Power and Politics

(1698-1761)

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(1698-1761)

In the year 1698 the Marathas surrendered Jinji to the Mughals. The whole of the province came under Mughal domination. The contact between the French and the Marathas was lost for a period of forty seven years (1693-1740). The relations were however resumed in the year 1740. According to Dr.V.G. Hatakhar there was no contact between the French and the Marathas for the forty seven years, this seems quiet strange. Even if there was no direct contact between the two for five decades there was an indirect contact between the two. This indirect contact relation is highlighted from the regular correspondence between the French and the Portuguese on the west coast and the French on the Coromandel Coast. The prime subject of the correspondence between the two was the Maratha activity in the central and peninsular parts of India. This correspondence forms a regular feature for the overall five decades when a direct contact between the two was lost. In the edited works of A.B.De Braganza Pereira which came out in Portuguese in 1968 and latter translated into Marathi by Shri S.S.Desai under the title "Marathanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Portuguese Daftar Khand" Vol. 1-3, (1663-1739) we find many such correspondences between the Portuguese, Governor of Goa, King of Portugal, French Governor of Pondicherry and various Directors at Mahe, Karikal, Chandernagore, Surat, etc. The letters dated 26, January 1732, Goa and 25, May 1737, Goa read as follows....

144-Livro Das Monsoes.

Letter of the Portuguese Governor of Goa to the King of Portugal. Dated: 26, January 1732, Goa.

In this letter to the king of Portugal the Governor explains the political situation in the Deccan. He states that due to the prolonged war with the Marathas the treasury has become empty and there is also an acute need of soldiers. Due to which he had written a letter to the French Governor of Pondicherry for supply of soldiers. Accordingly a Frenchman named Lobardian from Pondicherry had brought with him 100 French soldiers. But as these soldiers were incapable of handling arms they had been sent back.

23 – Livro Dos Reis Vizinhos, No.9., FLS 16V.

Letter of the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Count De Sandomille to the Governor of Pondicherry and the Council. Dated – 25, May 1737, Goa.

In his letter he requests the French Governor of Pondicherry that in the past the French had helped the Portuguese against the Marathas. The Marathas have not kept their word as signed in the treaty with the Portuguese and have invaded the Portuguese territory. Hence he requests the French to help the Portuguese with men, money and arms. He writes that whatever help the French will offer he is ready to pay for the same, but that the help must reach Goa as early as September 1737 for he is going to start his campaign against the Marathas in October 1737. He further requests him to send the help to the port of Mahe as to save time.

However the direct contact between the two powers which resumed in 1740 i.e. after a period of forty seven years once more played a significant role in the history of the French in India. The political situations in 1740 were quite different to those in 1668-1697. Chhpr. Rajaram, the King of the Marathas died on March 2, 1700. Francois Martin the French Governor of Pondicherry died on January 21, 1701 and the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb died on February 20, 1707. Thus all the old contenders for power had died. The political setup was completely changed, thus the purpose of maintaining relations between each other had also changed.

I) The Political Set-up.

A) The Marathas:

Chhp. Rajaram died on March 2, 1700. There was an atmosphere of chaos immediately after his death but the Marathas survived under the able leadership of Queen Tarabai the widow of Rajaram and her ministers who prevented the Maratha aristocracy from joining hands with the Mughals and maintain the spirit of "Swarajya" kindled by Chhp. Shivaji the Great in them. The Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb who was in Deccan for twenty-five years to annex the whole of Deccan died in 1707, before his death he had released Shahu the son of Chhp. Sambhaji. This was done in order to create diffusion between Tarabai and Shahu. The Marathas after the death of Aurangzeb recovered all there possessions in Maharashtra and in 1719 obtained three imperial grants from Delhi.

1. The Chauth of the six Subhas of the Deccan including Hyderabad and the Bijapur Karnatak, also of the tributary states of Tanjore, Trychinopoly and Mysore.
2. The Sardeshmukhi over and above the Chauth.
3. Full sovereignty over the kingdom possessed by Chhp. Shivaji at the time of his death.

By the year 1740, the Marathas had made themselves a formidable power in India. They had become the masters of Gujarat and Malwa. Annexed Salssatte and Bassein, (22 miles and 30 miles respectively north of Bombay) from the Portuguese. Due to the weak central authority there were internal tensions between the Chhatrapati, Ministers and the Aristocracy.

B) The French:

Pondicherry was restored to the French in 1699 by the Treaty of Ryswick. On January 21, 1701 a Council was established at Pondicherry. Francois Martin again appointed as the Governor of Pondicherry. Francois Martin died on December 31, 1706. The European wars ended in 1713 with the Treaty of Utrecht, the French gradually gained from the changing circumstances and strengthened their position in India. Pondicherry was made a strong fortified town and also became the seat of Governor General of all the French possessions in India. The French established their relations with the different Princes in the south of India. Nearly five Governors were appointed from 1707 to 1735. In November 1734, Pierre Benoit Dumas was appointed as Governor of Pondicherry under whom the French obtained a *firman* from the Mughal Emperor to coin money at Pondicherry on August 17, 1736 and occupied Karikal on February 14, 1739. It was during the time of Dumas that the French again came into contact with the Marathas.

The ruler of Karnatak, Nawab Sadat dullah Khan died in 1732. His nephew Dost Ali who was also his nearest kin immediately ascended the throne with out formal sanction from the Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Mughal Viceroy of Deccan. Under these circumstances the French and Dost-Ali developed an intimate relation. Le Noir, the then French Governor of Pondicherry secured a reduction of 25% in duties on all the rupees the French coined at his mint at Alemparve (1732) from the Nawab. Pierre Benoit Dumas the present Governor of Pondicherry, through the good offices Le Noir, obtained for the French company a firman from the Mughal Emperor to coin money at Pondicherry (17 August, 1736).¹⁵⁶

Dost Ali's son Safdar Ali did not fascinate the French as his father did. But the son-in-law of Dost Ali, Chanda Sahib, who came from a poor

family aspired for a great fortune and was always in search of an opportunity to secure French support and friendship. He got this opportunity in the case of the State of Tanjore.

C) The State of Tanjore:

The French had always tried to secure some land in the kingdom of Tanjore, as this territory was very fertile in the production of rice.¹⁵⁷ Shahaji the Raja of Tanjore had offered the French some territory, if they would aid him to recover his lost kingdom. Dumas without hesitating had accepted the offer. But at the last moment the ruler of Tanjore intimated them that there help was not required. The French hence were awaiting a favorable opportunity, which they found in Chanda Sahib who offered them his help to capture the port of Karikal, fort of Kirkangadhi and the adjacent territory.¹⁵⁸

The Muslim domination of the south of India was disturbing the Marathas. Safdar Ali and Chanda Sahib were harassing the Hindu Rajas and extracting huge tributes from them. Pratap Singh the new ruler of Tanjore had recently suffered at the hands of Safdar Ali and Chada Sahib. He hence pleaded to Chh. Shahu to send an army to his relief. Chh. Shahu had always maintained high regards for the house of Tanjore. He immediately sent Raghuji Bhosale with 50,000 troops to invade Karnatak.¹⁵⁹

The Maratha army routed Dost Ali and his troops at Dalamcheruva pass on May 19, 1740 (this pass is 90 miles north north-west of Madras). The Nawab and his younger son were killed and the whole army was routed.

D) Safdar Ali and Chanda Sahib:

The French were now in a similar situation to that of 1677 when Sher Khan Lodi was defeated by Chhpa Shivaji. During 1677, the French relied on Sher Khan to protect them but this was not the situation now in 1740, Pondicherry was in a better position to offer resistance. But Dumas was fully aware of the limited force he had at his disposal which even after being well armed, trained and disciplined could not match the Maratha number. In spite of the alarming danger he personally supervised the arrangements at Pondicherry and got prepared to meet the worst. At the same time he formed a body of 12,000 French infantry which was reinforced by 5,000 Musalmans, drilled in the European way.¹⁶⁰

The Maratha troops were over running the whole of Karnatak. The wife of Dost Ali and family had to find shelter and they preferred to place themselves in the stronghold of Pondicherry. They arrived at Pondicherry on May 25, 1740. The French now found them in an embarrassing position. If they denied admission to the royal family the wrath of Safdar Ali was sure to fall on them and on the other hand if admission was granted, the Marathas were sure to attack the French colony. Dumas was in a dilemma as he had to take a very important decision which was to affect the interest of the French company. Dumas finally to avoid sheer disgrace to the French company in the eyes of Indians on ethical grounds preferred to receive the Nawabs family and preferred the wrath of the Marathas. A similar cordial reception was given to the wife and son of Chanda Sahib on their arrival at Pondicherry. On September 1 both Chanda Sahib and Safdar Ali visited Pondicherry. The French Governor, fully aware of the political conditions and the consequences of their visit to Pondicherry, gave them a reception and honored them according to their ranks.¹⁶¹

The French were very sympathetic towards Chanda Sahib as he had helped them in securing the port of Karikal and the adjacent territory in the kingdom of Tanjore. Dumas, the French Governor of Pondicherry had definite information that the Marathas were sure to attack Karnatak, immediately after the rains.¹⁶² The French, aware of the seriousness of the situation, left no time on the fortification and provisions of there settlement. They also forwarded a loan of 50,000 pagodas to Chanda Sahib on his demand to prepare himself for defense. Dumas had received intelligence of the secret clause of the treaty between Safdar Ali and the Marathas which he had told Chanda Sahib due to which the latter left Pondicherry, leaving behind his treasury and family with the French.¹⁶³

Dumas now to get exact information sent M.Bausset, a Councilor and Attorney General of Pondicherry, to Trichinopoly. Chanda Sahib had become master of Trichinopoly in April 1763, which is about 112 miles south-west of Pondicherry. Despite the repeated warnings from Dumas, Chanda Sahib sent his brother Bade Sahib with an army of 10,000 to invade Madura a place 185 mile south south-west of Pondicherry. The Marathas all of a sudden took over Chanda Sahib who was having no resources at hand for defense was made prisoner. Trichinopoly surrendered to the Marathas on March 26, 1741.

II) Raghuji Bhosale and the siege of Trichinopoly:

It was under the statesmanship of the Maratha general; Raghuji Bhosale the siege of Trichinopoly was completed in March 1741. But even prior to this, Raghuji Bhosale had dispatched letters to the French, warning not to support the enemies of the Marathas. In his letter, dated January 10, 1741 he had complained that the French Governor had not replied his several letters due to which he

believed that the French were allied with Chanda Sahib. It was due to this inclination of the French towards Chanda Sahib, the Maratha general was obliged to send an army against the French. However the action was not taken due to the mediation of Appaji Vitthal who assured Raghuji that the French were a trustworthy people. Raghuji reminded Dumas that the French since the confirmation of their settlement by late Chh. Shivaji had not paid any tribute to the Marathas and that it now amounted sixty lacs of rupees.¹⁶⁴

In his letter dated January 22, the Maratha general pressed his demand for the tribute and also in addition demanded that the family of Chanda Sahib and his treasury must be handed over to him or hence they the French will have to face similar consequences as the Portuguese had faced during the conquest of Bassein.¹⁶⁵ A reply was immediately sent by Dumas to Raghuji, where in he strongly opposed the demands made by the Maratha general. Dumas rejected that the French had to pay any tribute as stated, regarding the family and treasury of Chanda Sahib he clearly stated that they were under the protection of the French Crown, further he stated that if the Marathas would attack them then the French will surely defend their esteem. He also said that France did not produce gold and silver, but soldiers and iron. He also rejected to negotiate with Vitthal Nagnath.¹⁶⁶

The Maratha general replied to Dumas on February 3, 1741. In this letter he said that if produced soldiers and iron, the Marathas had the power to reduce them to powder with their hammers and steel. He also dispatched Gopal Anand, his own envoy to Pondicherry with full powers to negotiate with the French Governor.¹⁶⁷

Raghuji was almost preoccupied with his siege of Trichinopoly and due to this he was unable to deal with the French. He had dispatched a

force of about 15,000 to control the coast. This army marched on Porto-Novo an important depot of all European settlers. The French lost goods worth 3,900 pagodas but this loss did not amount much as they had removed most of their property before the arrival of the Marathas. The army also marched against Cuddalore the English settlement, 12 miles south of Pondicherry and pillaged it. They also ravaged the neighboring country and threatened the French settlement.

The military activities of the Marathas were so severe that all trade and commerce came to a standstill. The French commerce received heavy losses. The merchants were not in a position to collect various manufactured goods from the units as industry was a cottage industry. Most of the country side was been deserted by the craftsmen.¹⁶⁸

The fall of Trichinopoly came on March 26th, 1741 after which Raghuji shifted his attention towards the French. The French by this time were prepared for the Maratha onslaught. But on the other hand they had kept all chances for negotiation. Dumas had dispatched a *vakil* to the Maratha camp, to the surprise of the French a Maratha envoy arrived at Pondicherry with a '*sarpech*' for Dumas. The envoy conveyed to Dumas that taking in to consideration the reputation of the French in India, the Maratha general wanted to live in close amity with the French.¹⁶⁹

The sudden change in the attitude of the Maratha general was not understood by the French. Various reasons are attributed for this change. The French regarded this change as a reaction to the firm and resolute stand taken by Dumas and the display of the French arms and disciplined soldiers to the Maratha officers on their arrival at Pondicherry for negotiations.¹⁷⁰

The other reason for the sudden change stated by the French is that Raghuji was been presented ten bottles of French liquor and it had impressed his wife, who demanded for further supply. Raghuji was impressed by both the valor of the French as well as the golden produce France's vineyards.¹⁷¹

Yet another source says that due to the rumor of an invasion from the Nizam on the Maratha capital, Raghuji retreated hastily, concluding peace with the French.¹⁷² The real cause for the rapid withdrawal can be traced in a letter of Nilkantha Raghunath, one of Raghuji's subordinates, from the Maratha camp at Kolar which is addressed to Vishwanath Bhat Vaidya at Satara, dated April 26, 1741. It says....

"Unfortunately, a severe attack of rheumatism has seized Raghuji since the capture of Trichinopoly. All kinds of remedies are been constantly tried, but they have so far failed to effect a cure. For some time even all hope of life was given up. During the last week, however signs of improvement are distinctly visible."¹⁷³

The gallant stand of the French at Pondicherry is one of the most significant events in the history of the French in India. It enhanced the reputation of Dumas as he defied the redoubtable Raghuji Bhosale. Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Mughal Viceroy of Deccan, wrote a letter of thanks and sent robe of honor. Safdar Ali sent Dumas a jeweled armour of his deceased father, as a mark of his esteem. The Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Shah, conferred upon Dumas the title of '*Nawab*', with the rank of *Mansabdar* of 4,500 horses.¹⁷⁴

Dumas returned to France, after the withdrawal of the Marathas from the Karnatak. He had laid a foundation for the French company to prosper in the Karnatak. It was only due to the untiring efforts of Dumas that the French were recognized as a formidable power in south India.

III) Dupleix becomes Governor of French East India Company

Dupleix is remembered as the greatest and most ambitious man ever sent by France to India. Prior taking charge as Governor in January 14, 1742, Dupleix had worked for the company as a Councilor at Pondicherry in 1722 and then as a Director at Chandernagore in 1735. He had arrived in India on August 16, 1722. Dupleix had been in India for nearly twenty-one years and was well acquainted with the political situations and developments. The Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Mughal Viceroy of Deccan had grown old and his death could be expected to create general disruption in south India, Dupleix had decided to take the fullest advantage of this situation.¹⁷⁵

He was very keen to revive French relations with Chanda Sahib, from May 1742 to February 1743, Dupleix had advanced Rs. 21,000 from his private purse to finance the affairs of Chanda Sahib.¹⁷⁶ Dupleix wanted to control Chanda Sahib as a puppet King and install him on the throne of Arcot (65 mile west of Madras) to secure special advantages for the French company. It was Dupleix who first showed the way indulging into the political affairs of a state and create puppet kings in India. By doing this he wanted to achieve three main goals....

- 1) Ensure greater security for French trade.
- 2) Enhance French prestige in India in general and Dupleix in particular and
- 3) To become real master of the province of Arcot with Chanda Sahib as his faithful agent.¹⁷⁷

But the greatest hurdle for Dupleix to achieve this goal was to obtain the release of Chanda Sahib from the Marathas. Chanda Sahib was now in Berar, as a prisoner to Raghuji Bhosale, who would release Chanda Sahib only after a heavy ransom, was paid to him.

On the other hand Chanda Sahib had stated to make adjustments to procure money through negotiations with some bankers at Satara. He had also succeeded to get an amount from a banker named Ramchandra Malhar Barve. This banker promised to advance Rs.4, 50,000 to Raghuji Bhosale to take charge of Chanda Sahib. The total amount to be paid by Barve was 7,50,000 out of which the remaining 3,00,000 were to be paid for the release of Abid Ali the son of Chanda Sahib who was kept hostage for the payment of Chanda Sahib. Barve was given total charge of Chanda Sahib, but as Chanda Sahib being a person of high stature, Barve asked Chh. Shahu's secretary, Govindrao Chitnis to confine him in the fort of Satara. This is how Chanda Sahib was moved from Berar to Satara and made a State prisoner.¹⁷⁸

In a letter written by Chanda Sahib to Dupleix immediately after his arrival at Satara, he informed to Dupleix that a Maratha banker was ready to pay him any amount he needed either to satisfy the Nizam, the overlord of Arcot or for his personal expenses.¹⁷⁹ Ramchandra Malhar Barve did not charge any interest to the money advanced to Chanda Sahib, but he would not release him until he received back Rs.4,50,000.¹⁸⁰ The reason for his not charging any interest is not known.

The French council and especially Dupleix in the mean while had sanctioned a sum of Rs.1,00,000 to be advanced to Chanda Sahib. This decision was taken in the Council's meeting at Pondicherry on May 4, 1745. The Council had great confidence in Chanda Sahib that he would repay his loan.¹⁸¹ But due to the war of Austrian Succession between the French and the English this amount was not released.

A regular correspondence was maintained between Chanda Sahib and Dupleix and Chanda Sahib and Raghuji Bhosale. Chh. Shahu was greatly concerned with the affairs of the State of Tanjore and he wanted that the King of

Tanjore must be helped to recover his lost territory. Hence, on March 30, 1746 he sent Keshavrao an envoy to Pondicherry with a letter to the Governor. In this letter he requested the French to help the King of Tanjore (Shahaji) to recover his territory. He offered to cede Devikottah and the adjacent territory to the French for this favor. He also promised to give due consideration to the French at the Maratha Court and also in all the provinces of the Marathas. However Dupleix replied that Devekottah was not favorable for the French interest and he would consider the matter in due course. Keshavrao was treated with due respect. The question of release of Chanda Sahib was discussed by Dupleix and by the wife of Chanda Sahib. The envoy clearly stated that after the payment of the debts, Raghuji Bhosale will personally accompany Chanda Sahib to Arcot and put him in the possession of Trichinopoly.¹⁸²

Dupleix was trying hard to initiate the release of Chanda Sahib. He sent letters to various Maratha leaders at Satara, the Peshwa Balajirao and even King Shahu. He had also dispatched letters to Amanat Khan (Nizam's employee) requesting the release of Chanda Sahib (19-11-1746).¹⁸³ He also willingly stood as a personal security to Chanda Sahib's liabilities.¹⁸⁴

Ali Akbar, an agent of Chanda Sahib and an employee of Nizam-ul-Mulk came to Pondicherry on January 24, 1747 with a letter from the Nizam. The Nizam was displeased with the Nawab of Arcot i.e. Anwar-ud-Din due to his defeat at the hands of the French. He the Nizam thus wanted to appoint Chanda Sahib to the post. On the other hand the Peshwa Bajirao had agreed to march with 30,000 troops against Anwar-ud-Din and install Chanda Sahib to the throne of Arcot. Chanda Sahib had request Dupleix to send Rs.50,000 to meet his debts at Satara and also a draft of the balance Rs.50,000 to be cashed at Cuddapah on his arrival. The French council had sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,00,000 to Chanda Sahib in 1745.¹⁸⁵

The French Governor, further promised an advance of Rs.3,00,000 for the expense of the troops which were to accompany him while his return to the south. The French had also promised to pay Rs.10,000 to Jayaram Sadashiv, an agent of Raghuji if he succeeded in bringing back Chanda Sahib safely to the Karnatak. In his letter to Dupleix written in July 1747, Chanda Sahib had expressed his deepest gratitude to the French Governor for his act of co-operation. The Rs.3,00,000 advance promised by the French to Chanda Sahib was to be paid in three installments. One-third of the amount was to be paid immediately on the arrival of Chanda Sahib at Satara, the second at Cuddapah and the last when he reached Arcot.¹⁸⁶

As soon as Chanda Sahib was released he intimated the Nizam, the overlord of Karnatak, that he wanted to pay him his respects in person, but the Nizam denied him this favour.¹⁸⁷ Chanda Sahib could not reach Arcot as his road was blocked by Nizam-ul-Mulk and his son Nasir Jang.¹⁸⁸

Nizam-ul-Mulk died on May 21, 1748. As the news reached Chanda Sahib he immediately set out to south. While leaving Satara he promised to pay Rs.2,10,000 sent in form of jewels by his wife from Pondicherry. This amount was sent to Chanda Sahib to meet his expenses during his captivity at Satara.¹⁸⁹

The French in general and Dupleix in particular only took the responsibility of guarantying the Marathas that Chanda Sahib would fulfill all his promises as soon as he ascends the throne of Arcot. In a letter written by Dupleix in December 1746 he had given stress on the very fact that Chanda Sahib would not be able to repay his debt without the help of the French and that he, Dupleix took the responsibility of the money.¹⁹⁰

In a letter sent by Chhpa.Shahu to the French Governor dated November 5, 1749 a demand was made by Shahu to Dupleix to urge Chanda

Sahib to fulfill his promise.¹⁹¹ The captivity of Chanda Sahib at Satara, established direct contacts between the French and the Marathas. This served to have a regular correspondence and exchange of envoys from Satara to Pondicherry and vice-versa. The French victory at Adyar over the army of Nawab of Arcot on November 4, 1746 had created a great impression on the Marathas. Chhpa. Shahu greatly admired and praised the French nation for their courage and valour. Raghuji was greatly impressed by the French arms and their disciplined warfare. He hence invited them to co-operate with the Maratha army during their military expedition in the south. In his letter to the French Governor he wrote....

"Our great King, has commanded me to march to the Karnatak. I shall communicate with you immediately on my arrival there, for I am anxious to speak to you about my great King. If you combine your forces with ours, we shall perform of feats of which posterity shall speak for ever."¹⁹²

The Maratha power was growing due to there constant political activities. The death of Muhammad Shah in April 1748 and that of Nizam-ul-Mulk in May 1748 made the Marathas virtual masters of Indian politics. They were quiet close to step into the place of the Mughal Emperor. Dupleix has referred to this growing paramountacy of the Marathas to his Dubasha, (translator) Ananda Ranga Pillai, thrice.

The death of the Mughal Emperor, came on June 5, 1748. While expressing his grief over the death the French Governor said.... "Then there will be war and the Marathas will emerge all the stronger" a month later he said.... "I think that the Marathas are the real masters of India."¹⁹³

The French Governor sent an envoy to Satara to acquaint the Marathas with the happy news of the raising of the siege of Pondicherry by the English (October 17, 1748).¹⁹⁴ Dupleix also tried to subdue Chanda Sahib on

his actions against the State of Tanjore, as Chhp. Shahu belonged to the Same Family. He also warned Chanda Sahib that his actions against the State of Tanjore would cause harm to his friendship with the Marathas. The French now took a neutral stand on the issue of Tanjore. Chhp. Shahu died on December 1749. It was after his death the French resumed their activities against Tanjore.¹⁹⁵

IV) The French Factories in Bengal:

The French had established factories in and around Bengal . These factories were acquiring heavy profits from there trade and commerce. The French had factories at Chandernagore, Kasimbazar, Jugdia, Dacca, Balasore and Patna. The factory at Chandrangore was the richest and most flourishing of the French establishments in India. It had made lot of progress under the Directorship of Dupleix from 1731-41. This factory alone used to dispatch two to three shiploads to Europe annually and used to make a turnover of two million francs. Apart from this it also used to equip ten more ships for the Indian ships with a cargo worth three to four lakhs francs.¹⁹⁶

The Maratha inroad into Bengal and their repercussions on the French factories disturbed the prosperity of these establishments. There incursions paralyzed all the commercial transactions. The flow of money dropped drastically and the future these factories became perilous and uncertain. There was every cause for the French to blame the Marathas for there losses because the Marathas had initially promised them not to disturb there settlements and factories.¹⁹⁷

The French were in a very disturbed condition as concerned to there commerce. Even the news of the Maratha invasion into Bengal used to cause anxiety in them. This anxiety can be clearly stated from the letter dated

February 5, 1742 written by the Council of Pondicherry to the Syndics and the Directors of the French Company in Paris.... "The Marathas give us a cause for anxiety. We do not know from what direction they will burst forth. There are constant alarms about there invasion, and everyone thinks of his own safety. We are afraid that the production of goods is likely to suffer and we shall not be in a position to load the company's ships as promised."¹⁹⁸

After the death of Shuja-ud-daulah, Nawab of Bengal, his son Sarafraz Khan succeeded as a Nawab; but in 1740 Ali Vardi Khan, the Governor of Patna, contrived to defeat and kill him, and usurped the Nawabship of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Murshid Kuli Khan, son-in-law of Shuja-ud-daulah, rebelled against Ali Vardi Khan but had to flee the country. There upon, Mir Habib, Diwan of Murshid Kuli Khan, invited into Bengal Bhaskarram Kolhatkar, Commander-in-chief of Raghuji Bhosale to invade the country. The French observed strict neutrality between Ali Vardi Khan and the Marathas. Ali Vardi Khan was pressing on them to assist him against the Marathas.¹⁹⁹ In October 1742; the Marathas pillaged the province, but did no harm to the French colony at Chandernagore.²⁰⁰

Even after observing neutrality the French were under an impression that the Marathas would make advance against their factories. Hence they formed a defensive and offensive alliance with the Dutch Company in Bengal. The English did not join as they were contemplating a war with the French in Europe. Dupleix took all the repressive measures to defend Chandernagore. Troops were reinforced from Pondicherry. The construction of the fort Orleans was stopped and instead two bastions were erected, a ditch was also dug around the colony to prevent from a direct onslaught.²⁰¹

Due to the Maratha inroads and constant threat of the Maratha army the French settlements in Bengal remained under permanent insecurity. The communication between Chandernagore and Casimbazar was totally paralyzed. Among the European settlers the French were the greatest sufferers of the Maratha invasions in Bengal. The task of restructuring the entire shattered trade was difficult as there was lack of funds with the French and no aid could be expected by the Company from the French Crown. As a result these French colonies had to stand on their own.²⁰²

Ali Vardi Khan had paid a huge tribute to the Marathas in 1743, for their retreat from Bengal. But the Marathas reappeared in Bengal in 1744. This inroad was made through Orissa, Cuttack and Balasore were captured. The French had to evacuate their comptoir at Balasore with haste because of a sudden attack by the Marathas. The onslaughts of the Marathas made the French to undertake costly measures to defend their settlements. As a result most of the capital to be used for trade got fixed into the fortification work. They also took precautions to protect the port of Chandernagore.²⁰³

The fourth invasion on Bengal of the Marathas was carried on the very next year i.e. 1744. This time the inroad made by Raghuji Bhosale was from Patna and by Mir Habib from Cuttack and Balasore. The defenses of the French settlement were in a deplorable condition at this time but the French contingent gave a stiff resistance. There were only 116 soldiers at the comptoirs of Patna, Casimbazar and Balasore. Pondicherry could not send reinforcements as it was engaged at war with the King of Tanjore. But the Maratha inroad was not at all directed towards attacking French settlements. It just moved on from Balasore to the north to join Raghuji Bhosale.²⁰⁴

Raghuji Bhosale retired to Nagpur in 1746 due to which there was an invasion into Bengal. But to make up the losses from 1742 to 1745, the Nawab of Bengal subjected the whole province to heavy taxation. The Europeans actually regretted the absence of the Marathas.²⁰⁵ The Marathas invaded Bengal again in 1747 and 1748. This time they established themselves along the river Ganges. The French vessels were not molested as they had paid the transit duties to the Marathas. In 1748 the Marathas were at the borders of Chandernagore, but they did not disturb the French settlement.²⁰⁶

The Maratha invasions into Bengal from 1742 to 1748 literally paralyzed the trade and commerce of the French company from which it could not recover for a long time. The comptoirs at Balasore and Casimbazar were closed down, after 1745. Even the establishment at Patna was in a sorrowful state.²⁰⁷

V) The French Maratha Conflict. (1749-1752):

The French factories and settlements had suffered a huge loss at the hands of the Marathas in Bengal. The political equations had changed forces rapidly after the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk. The Nawab of the Karnatak, Anwar-ud-din died at the battle of Ambur (August 3, 1749). Nazir Jang, the second son of the late Nizam, proclaimed himself Viceroy of Deccan, was assassinated on December 16, 1750. Chanda Sahib became the Nawab of Karnatak and Muzaffir Jang, grandson (son of a daughter) of Nizam-ul-Mulk, became the Viceroy of Deccan. These two princes had achieved these titles only due to the assistance of the French and were quite loyal to them. While his march towards Aurangabad, under the command of Bussy and the French troops, Muzaffir Jang was killed by his Pathan nobles on February 14, 1751.

Bussy hence proclaimed Salabat Jang, third son of the late Nizam as Viceroy of the Deccan.

The proclamation of Salabat Jang as the Viceroy of the Deccan by the French created a rift between the French-Maratha relations. The Marathas were trying to promote the cause of Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of the late Nizam, to the Viceroyship of Deccan. Ghazi-ud-din through the mediation of the Malharrao Holkar was pressing upon the Peshwa to assist him in his cause. The Peshwa was also personally interested into this matter as he wanted to gain a large portion of the Nizam's territory.²⁰⁸

Ghazi-ud-din had promised the Marathas to cede the districts of Aurangabad and Burhanpur if they would support his cause. The Marathas were also having a secret and regular correspondence with Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Governor of Aurangabad who also favored the cause of Ghazi-ud-din. The district of Aurangabad was invaded by the Peshwa in February 1751, to avoid a direct conflict the Governor, Sayyad Lashkar Khan paid a tribute of seventeen lakhs and bought peace. Actually this payment was made to the Peshwa to help him in his enterprise against Salabat Jang. Immediately the Peshwa with an army of twenty thousand proceeded to meet Salabat Jang and the French contingent under the command of Bussy at Hyderabad. Bussy was totally aware, that the position of Salabat Jang was weak as compared to the Maratha troops, also he did not wanted to mess with his fortunes before consolidating his authority in India. Hence he requested Salabat Jang to buy peace by paying an amount of seventeen lakhs. The Peshwa had to return to Satara, post-haste as the situation there was alarming. He there upon concluded a treaty with Salabat Jang. This treaty is known as the "Treaty of Pangal" signed in April 1751.²⁰⁹

On May 22, 1751 an embassy was sent to Pondicherry by the Peshwa with presents to the French Governor. The Ambassador, Shamrao Yadav, was received by the French with all the honors befitting his rank. The presents were received by the Governor with a salute of fifteen guns at the French port. In return Dupleix complimented by supporting the claim of the Peshwa to Rs.40,000 *Chauth* from the Karnatak, due to him since his father's time.²¹⁰

Dupleix feared a Maratha invasion of the Karnatak. Believing that the Peshwa's move was in support of the cause of Muhammad Ali, the French Governor made preparations to meet the eventuality by concluding an alliance with Murarrao Ghorpade, whose relations with the Peshwa were not amicable. By this understanding between them, Murarrao was to ally himself with Chanda Sahib, either openly attacking the enemy or by joining them and secretly working against them.²¹¹

Due to the presence of the French contingent in the army of Salabat Jang his position became fairly consolidated in August 1751. The matter for the Peshwa was going from bad to worse as his enemies joined Tarabai as their head, were trying to dispose him with the help of Ramdas pant, the Diwan of Salabat Jang.²¹² Tarabai, wife of Rajaram, second son of Shivaji, hated the Peshwa for his father and grand-father had helped Shahu, son of Sambhaji and grand-son of Shivaji, to become King as against her own son. Further, the Peshwa, a Brahmin, had increased his own power and prestige to such an extent that the royal family had slowly fallen in the background.

On September 1, 1751, Tarabai's agent met Bussy to seek the additional support of the French in her cause. The French general, without committing himself, promised to write to Dupleix on her behalf. Raghuji Bhosale had actually agreed to join the Mughals with 20,000 horses. Dumaji Gaikwad though a

prisoner of the Peshwa, had secretly enlisted several other Maratha chieftains in support of Tarabai.²¹³ Tulaji Angre also made proposals of friendship to the French at this time. He offered to give them facilities to open a factory in one of his ports, and also engaged to cease all piracy against French vessels.²¹⁴ Tulaji Angre not only regarded himself independent of the authority of the Peshwa, but even rebelled against him.

The Peshwa also had friends in the Mughal camp. They were Sayyad Lashkar Khan, the Raja's Janoji and Sultanji Nimbalkar.²¹⁵ At this time his ablest general, Malharrao Holkar and Tayappa Shinde were occupied with the affairs at Delhi. The French were determined to take full opportunity of this situation and avenge the humiliation at Pangal. Bussy wrote to Dupleix on September 23, 1751 "It is true that his Maratha (Balajirao) is begging on his knees for peace, but only to burst forth with a greater force when he has settled his affairs at Satara. It is certain that such a favorable opportunity could never be found again to destroy him and this is what I have communicated to the Diwan (Ramdas pant) who sought my advice on this subject."²¹⁶

The intention of Dupleix to reduce the Maratha was all together different. He wanted to avenge the destruction of the French factories in Bengal by the Marathas and now was very keen to again establish a firm footing in Bengal by installing a man of their choice on the Governorship of the Bengal. He wanted to overthrow, Nawab Ali Vardi Khan and find a best substitute who would be more docile and amenable to the French influence. Salabat Jang was the person whom Dupleix wanted to be appointed to the Nawabship of the Bengal. In this matter Dupleix wrote to Bussy on August 4, 1751, that the moment had arrived for the French to avenge the insults offered to them by Ali Vardi Khan at Chandernagore and that, with the aid of the French force, Salabat Jang would triumph without any difficulty.²¹⁷

Bussy was to lead this operation. He was of the opinion that without destroying the power of the Peshwa it would not be healthy for the French to carry out the expedition on to Bengal, for as soon as Salbat Jang moved out of Deccan the Marathas would try to subjugate the whole of the Deccan. In his letter September 11, 1751 written to Dupleix he says... "We cannot think of this expedition (of Bengal), until and unless, peace and order is restored in Deccan by reducing Balajirao. It would be unwise to leave the Deccan to this Maratha. It has, therefore, been resolved in the Council of the Nawab to march upon Poona as soon as fair weather begins."²¹⁸ The French were very determined to reduce the Maratha power before their expedition into Bengal.

There was an internal rivalry between the Marathas, especially between, the old aristocracy formed by the Chhatrapati's and the Peshwa, and the new aristocracy formed by the Peshwa. Ramdas Pant had started to make preparations by gathering a strong army; at the same time he had sent Janoji Nimbalkar to the Peshwa to engage him into friendly negotiations.²¹⁹ Dupleix, welcomed this opportunity of perpetuating the glory of the French arms in India by striking the most invincible power in India. Tarabai had agreed to pay for the expenses of the Mughal army as soon as it crossed the river Godavari. She had also promised Salabat Jang to restore his territory which was seized by the Peshwa at the death of Nizam-ul-Mulk. Bussy too was expecting further concessions from Tarabai such as the surrender of the right of Chauth in the Karnatak and a promise that the Marathas would never invade the Karnatak.²²⁰

The French Governor also tried to get help from the Portuguese at Goa. Dupleix negotiated with the Viceroy of Goa in September 1751 to form an alliance with Salabat Jang and the French against the Marathas. He requested

the Portuguese to send a force of 300 men to co-operate with the French contingent. The French in return for this favor had promised the Portuguese the fort of Bassein and all places seized by the Marathas from them. The Viceroy of Goa agreed to the proposal of Dupleix for the fort of Bassein was of great importance to them. He agreed to attack the Marathas, from the sea, while the Mughals and the French attacked them from the land, thus creating an ambush to reduce the Marathas. The plans of the French actually worked out in November, which was too late, the Portuguese by this time became hostile and did not participated in the military expedition.²²¹ ✓

The French paraded with their troops on October 14, 1751. This was done in order to create an atmosphere among the Mughal army that with the help of the French army it was not at all possible to crush the Marathas.²²²

A grand '*Darbar*' was held on November 23, 1751 to declare war against the Marathas. Bussy pressed on Salabat Jang that if he was not ready to wage war against the Marathas, the French were determined to do it. Due to which they agreed and gave an official sanction to war against the Marathas.²²³ The Mughal army had marched from Aurangabad towards Poona, in the direction of Ahmednagar. On November 26th they were only sixty miles from the Maratha capital.²²⁴ *

The Peshwa made an advance with 40,000 troops to defend his boundaries. The two armies met each other face to face at Jamgaon on December 1, 1751. The Maratha army used the usual tactics on the Mughal army by sending the cavalry, but did not had the desired effect. On the other side the fire and shot by the French guns and cannons made

the Maratha army to move behind. The Marathas then used their guerilla tactics by rushing into flanks and creating disorder. Bussy was not familiar with this military tactic and he found himself exposed to the on coming Marathas. Ramdas Pant immediately warned Bussy about the art of Maratha warfare, he then made fresh arrangements of a cover for the French contingent and fired from a distance on the Marathas. A little later the French were joined by Salabat Jang with his troops. He congratulated Bussy on his brilliant tactics. At the end of the day the Mughals realized that with out the French help they surely would have lost to the Marathas.²²⁵

Sensing the seriousness of the situation and the on coming French assault, the Peshwa made offers for negotiations, but the offer was rejected.²²⁶ There was an eclipse of the moon on the night of December 3, 1751. Ramdas Pant was aware of the fact that the Peshwa and his ministers would be engaged in their devotional services on the night. He advised the French to attack the Maratha camp by surprise as they would not get another better chance to create chaos in the Maratha camp. Accordingly they attacked the camp by surprise. All the Marathas had to flee as fast as they could due to this attack. The French did not secure much booty as expected. Kerjean , write to Dupleix ... "The enemy had completed disappeared, the boldest among them, before fleeing, fired a few shots, set fire to their tents and other equipments, with the result that the booty was not considerable." After the incidence, Bussy was received by Salabat Jang like a hero. Ramdas Pant embraced him and showered coins on his head. Kerjean, Vincent, Muzaffar Khan and Sheikh Ibrahim were conducted in the same manner.²²⁷

While the Mughals continued their march towards Pune, the Marathas attacked them. The Marathas were led by Mahadji Purandare, supported by Dattaji and Mahadji Shinde. The Maratha attack was so vigorous that the army of

Salabat Jang was left surprised and were about to retreat when the troops of Vincent and Aymard arrived with 50 Europeans, 2,000 *siphai's* and two pieces of cannon to their rescue, they were saved. Due to the mixing of the Maratha and Mughal troops, it became impossible for the French contingent to use their artillery. After giving a tough resistance the Marathas retired, carrying away with them Salabat Jang's '*howdah*', four elephants, seven hundred horses and a cartful of ammunitions. The heroic deed on this day were performed by Konherrao Ekbote, he was conferred with the title '*Fadke*' the hero by the Peshwa.²²⁸

The Mughal troops were only sixteen miles away from Poona at Koregaon on December 14, 1751. But due to lack of provisions they did not moved further and retreated towards Ahmednagar. While on their way they got intelligence that a crore of rupees were buried at Talegaon-Dhamdhere, they sacked and destroyed the place under the orders of Bussy, but they found no hidden treasure.²²⁹ On December 31, 1751 the Mughals reached near Valki-Rangangaon, situated near the river Mula and Bhivara. Due to the rugged terrain it was impossible to carry the French cannon for them. The Marathas took advantage of this position of the Mughal army and under the command of Raghunathrao (Dada) attacked from the rear, they could carry away with them two French cannon guns after a severe fight.²³⁰

The Peshwa had left his capital and was now carrying out war in the enemy's country to save his capital. His troops had captured the fort of Trimbak and Raghuji Bhosale was over-running the eastern frontiers of the Nizam's territory. The camp of Salabat Jang was by this time facing serious problems such as jealousy, treason etc. The rear guard of the Mughal army which was in the charge of Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Nimbalkar's had purposely not moved during the surprise attack of the Marathas. Even Tarabai and her chiefs had not dispatched troops as

promised. The provisions in the Mughal camp had exhausted and there were clear signs of mutiny in the camp.²³¹

The Peshwa was totally not ready for the war as his ablest generals Holkar and Shinde, were occupied with the affairs at Delhi. The war, if continued, would have not favored the Peshwa because the enemies at home would take the advantage.²³² Hence it was now a necessity for both sides to make peace.

The Nizam sent Hanmantrao Nimbalkar and his brother Janoji with a proposal for peace to the Peshwa's camp on January 15, 1752. On 17th January, 1752 Raghunathrao had a interview with Ramdas pant and peace was concluded. By the treaty the Peshwa agreed to the following...

- 1) Agreed to restore all forts, towns and villages taken by him since the death of the Nizam to Salabat Jang.
- 2) Agreed to recall his agent from Delhi and station him at the Nizam's court.
- 3) Agreed not to undertake any expedition in the south without the consent of Salabat Jang.
- 4) Consented to renounce his claim on the Rs.15 lakhs promised to him in bills at the treaty of Pangal (April 1751) and
- 5) Salabat Jang was to collect the revenues of the Karnatak, but it was agreed by him to cede to the Peshwa a territory worth Rs.5 lakhs as *jahgir*, in return the Peshwa had to keep a Maratha contingent of 2000 men in Salabat Jangs army.²³³

The treaty did not last even for six days, as the Peshwa made fresh demands on the Mughals. He demanded the surrender of Senapati Dabahade, no action to be taken against Raghuji Bhosale and permission to retain the fort of Trimbak for two months. Ramdas pant out rightly rejected the proposal and its

conditions. There was a fight between the Mughals and the Marathas on the question of fort Trimbak. A second peace was concluded on February 10, 1752. Dhabade was asked to leave the Mughal camp. The French contingent rendered yeoman service to the Mughal again for which Bussy was presented with jewels by Salabat Jang.²³⁴

Dupleix had instructed Bussy not to conclude peace with the Marathas, before reducing their capital. He also complimented him for showing restraint and moderation while dealing with the Peshwa and also hoped that the friendship with the Marathas would help the French in their war against Muhammad Ali in the Karnatak.²³⁵

The French could not correctly analyze the whole situation in comparison to the Marathas. Most of the time the French imagined that it was only due to their disciplined army and arms they were victorious. Their victories over Anwar-ud-din Khan and Nazir Jang had blinded them. They had not taken into consideration that there were dissensions among their chiefs. Also the battles with these two princes were not decided by war but by a single action. The position of the Marathas was quite different. The French analysis of the Maratha strength was wrong, this can be clearly seen in the letter of Bussy to Dupleix written on September 23, 1751 which says that "the position of the Marathas is same as that of Nazir Jang, and that most of the principal Marathas have left the Peshwa to join hands with Tarabai and some are waiting to join Salabat Jang as soon as he attacks".²³⁶

The French calculations to create division among the Marathas as done in the case of Nazir Jang proved to be wrong. Dupleix and even Bussy were disappointed to find that the Maratha chiefs united together while fighting a foreigner. (The only exception was Senapati Dhabade). Raghuji Bhosale gave his apology to Bussy in these words... "I can give you several reasons to support my

conduct, but I shall content myself with giving you only one, viz., that I am a servant of the house of Shahu Raja for three generations. I could not help obeying the orders of Tarabai who asked me to support Balajirao".²³⁷ Raghuji Bhosale always kept his jealousy for the Peshwa within bounds and never turned traitor to his mother country.

The French were totally ignorant of the Maratha warfare tactics, known as 'Guerilla Warfare'. The Marathas rarely faced the enemy on open fields, if the enemy was superior in number and arms; they preferred to attack by surprise. It was with this military technique they had reduced the all mighty Aurangzeb for 25 years. The French took the fleeing of the Marathas as retreat but in reality it was an ambush in combat method of fighting. Letters of Bussy, Kerjean and many others give glorious accounts of heroic exploits of the French. While on the other hand the letters of Ramdas Pant, who was aware of the Maratha tactics, says how he had to check the over-enthusiasm of the French officers and prevent them from falling into the Maratha trap.²³⁸ The French thought that the fall of the Maratha capital would reduce the Marathas, but this did not matter the Marathas as they had evacuated it. This disappointed the French a lot.²³⁹ The Marathas were in a habit to destroy everything before leaving the base, which would create difficulties to the enemy.

The Mughal officers were jealous of the French influence and hence did not co-operate with them. The French thus attributed them of treachery against their master. The provisions in the Mughal army were exhausted and the army had not received several months pay. The French were unaware of these conditions in the Mughal camp.²⁴⁰

The condition of the French contingent was deplorable as it hardly had hundred soldiers fit for active service. All officers except Bussy and Kerjean were unfit. The French depending on Tarabai and her friends had carried very

little ammunition with them i.e. only 36,000 cartridges and 5,500 cannon balls.²⁴¹ The major consequence of this French-Maratha conflict was that it completely upset the French schedule regarding Bengal. The expedition was to be undertaken immediately after the termination of the war with Marathas. Bussy was confident that he would conclude the war early and then pass into Bengal in December 1751 or early in January 1752.²⁴² But things did not go smooth as estimated by Bussy, there was a state of mutiny in the Mughal army. The nobles of Salabat Jang became jealous of the French influence at the court of Aurangabad. It finally resulted in the assassination of Ramdas Pant, Diwan of Salabat Jang and the strongest supporter of the French against the Marathas.²⁴³

VI) Treaty of Bhalki:

Dupleix the French Governor was a *Nawab* and a *Mansabdar* of the Mughal Emperor and now he had also become a close ally of Salabat Jang. In this capacity he thought that he had every right to interfere in the affairs of Delhi. Ahmad Shah Abdali had once again crossed the rivers of the Punjab, and with the intrigues going at the Mughal court, it was feared that the Emperor would knuckle under the upheaval resulting from Abdali's invasion. Dupleix was thinking of uniting with the Peshwa with a view to re-establishing the Emperor on the throne of Delhi, or failing that, checking the further progress of the invader. Dupleix knew that the Peshwa was interested in this matter because after the capture of Delhi, Abdali was sure to make advances into the Deccan and the Maratha country. Dupleix was thinking of getting many concessions at a single stroke i.e. from the Mughal Emperor and also from the Marathas.²⁴⁴

The French still hoped to reduce the power of the Peshwa because they wanted to become the masters of the Deccan and it was possible only after destroying the Maratha power. In this connection the French had started negotiations with the Portuguese and plans were being formulated for a future joint operation against the Marathas. Dupleix had promised Salabat Jang to send 300 Europeans and 6,000 *sipahis* with necessary ammunition. Bussy with this reinforcement felt confident that within six months, he could destroy the Maratha army and cease all their possessions. In this connection Bussy wrote to Dupleix on March 7, 1752... "I have three things in view, of which the execution becomes incumbent, viz., the destruction of the Marathas, a march towards Delhi and the capture of Surat."²⁴⁵

There was a crisis between the Peshwa and Ramdas Pant over the issue of the fort Trimbak. This issue was settled down by the mediation of Sayyad Lashkar Khan. The Peshwa was quiet adamant not to give away the fort unless his demands were accepted. The Peshwa had requested Bussy, through his Vakil to act as a mediator to resolve the issue. Bussy, in this regards has written to Dupleix in the following words on April 17, 1752.... "The *Vakil* of Balajirao says that his master wants me to act as a mediator between him and the Nawab, but I think the best way is to box his ears for the second time."²⁴⁶

The assassination of Ramdas Pant on April 30, 1752 changed the attitude of Bussy towards the Peshwa. He now understood that the Mughal nobles were jealous of the French influence at the Mughal court and were friendlier with the Peshwa. Bussy, thus realized that the French would not achieve their cause by remaining hostile towards the Marathas, but if they initiate friendship with them, then they would help to keep Salabat Jang on the throne of Deccan. Hence to develop friendship with the Peshwa Bussy now complained that Ramdas Pant was the main

obstacle towards establishing friendly relations with the Marathas. Bussy also wrote to Dupleix to write a letter to the Peshwa congratulating him on his recent treaty with Salabat Jang.²⁴⁷

The other reason of this change in the attitude of the French towards the Peshwa was a departure of Ghazi-ud-din Khan to Deccan with the two Maratha generals Holkar and Shinde. The Mughal Emperor had granted the *firman* of the viceroyalty to Ghazi-ud-din, due to the Maratha pressure and that Salabat Jang must abide by it.²⁴⁸ The power-politics in the Karnatak changed its course by February 17, 1752 as Nand Raj, Commander-in-chief of Mysore army, Murrarao joined Muhammad Ali. The trio now posed a potential threat to the superiority of Chanda Sahib and his army. The French had lost their course for Salabat Jang, now they did not want to lose their influence with the destruction of Chanda Sahib. Dupleix planned to isolate Muhammad Ali from Nand Raj and Murrarao. To achieve these ends, he thought of an alliance with the Marathas. He suggested Bussy to persuade the Peshwa to send a cavalry of 6,000 to destroy Nand Raj and Murrarao. He also stated that if the Peshwa is not free to proceed to the south, in that case Bussy must convince Raghuji Bhosale to march to the Karnatak.²⁴⁹

Dupleix had an interview with the Peshwa's wakil, Shamrao Yadav on July 23, 1752 when he was returning to Poona. During this interview Dupleix laid stress on the fact that the French were of the opinion that it was due to Ramdas Pant the relations between them had strained and now he was quiet interested to re-establish friendly relations with the Marathas. He persuaded Shamrao Yadav to use his good offices to restore friendly relations between the two powers.²⁵⁰ Shamrao Yadav in his way also met Bussy at Hyderabad and had discussions with him to form joint alliance to invade Mysore.²⁵¹

The French were now pursuing the cause of Salabat Jang by soliciting the support of the Peshwa. Ghazi-ud-din had left Delhi with Holkar and Shinde towards the Deccan and his presence was expected anytime. Understanding the seriousness of the situation, the French entrusted this mission of persuading the Peshwa to recognize Salabat Jang's claim on the Deccan to Sayyad Lashkar Khan. It was believed that the withdrawal of the support by the Peshwa to the cause of Ghazi-ud-din would surely stop his march towards Deccan. If this tactic failed, it was decided to convince Ghazi-ud-din through the Peshwa to give him the *jahagir* of Hyderabad and an annual tribute by Salabat Jang. The Peshwa had not decided on this matter as he wanted it to be discussed thoroughly with Sayyad Lashkar Khan in person. He also expected Ghazi-ud-din to arrive at Barhanpur, so as he could also consult him in this matter. Bussy tried his best to win the favor of the Peshwa by negotiating the matter with his wakil but they did not yielded anything hence he thought that the arrival of fresh reinforcement from Pondicherry would help the French to decide the matter in favor of Salabat Jang.²⁵²

The French were feeling a great anxiety about the situation in the Deccan. It was a clear equation, the loss of Deccan meaning the loss of everything else in India for the French. Dupleix was trying hard to keep up the French authority and esteem. Muhammad Ali could claim himself to be the legitimate Nawab of the Karnatak in such condition, hence to avoid this to happen, Dupleix thought of certain remedies.

1. To suggest Ghazi-ud-din Khan to allow Salabat Jang to remain Viceroy of the Deccan on payment of an annual tribute.
2. If Ghazi-ud-din refused the proposal, in this case to convince him for a partition of Deccan between him and Salabat Jang.

3. If this too was rejected, convince Ghazi-ud-din Khan to appoint Salabat Jang as his lieutenant.
4. If all proposals were rejected, then the French would either have open war or withdraw from the Deccan.

Dupleix had strictly advised not to desist from his efforts to form an alliance with the Peshwa as he had realized that the Marathas were capable of maneuvering the politics at Delhi and also of the Deccan and Karnatak. This friendship would also help the French in subjugating both Murrarao and Nand Raj.²⁵³

The Peshwa wanted to establish his authority on a large area especially in the western region of the Deccan as it constituted the native land of the Marathas. He was determined to achieve this objective and it actually did not matter for him to support the cause of any of the two brother's viz. Ghazi-ud-din or Salabat Jang. If Salabat Jang was ready to accept the proposal of the Peshwa, he was ready to abandon the cause of Ghazi-ud-din.²⁵⁴ But as Ghazi-ud-din was installed by the Peshwa, there was every possibility of him to accept the terms dictated by the Peshwa.²⁵⁵

On the arrival of Sayyad Lashkar Khan and Janoji Nimbalkar at the Maratha camp on August 18, 1752 the Peshwa made a counter proposal to them stating that the French should abandon the cause of Salabat Jang and join with Ghazi-ud-din. Salabat Jang should be given a territory worth forty lakhs and the Peshwa should be given, the entire territory west of Berar from Tapti to the Godavari and a sum of sixty lakhs in cash. The French did not accept the proposal, while Dupleix suggested that Ghazi-ud-din should grant Salabat Jang the territory south of river Krishna i.e. the province of Arcot and solve the problem. If this was done then Muhammad Ali and also the English would be compelled to accept the arrangement as

it was been done by the legal heir of the late Nizam-ul-mulk who also had the Mughal Emperor's *firman* with him. This would also bring peace to the region.²⁵⁶

The arrival of Ghazi-ud-din at Barhanpur on September 20, 1752 with the Mughal and Maratha troops made the French and Salabat Jang weary of the situation. On October 16, 1752 the mother of Nizam Ali, the fourth son of Nizam-ul-Mulk and step mother to Ghazi-ud-din invited to dine with her. He accepted the invitation and expired the same night.²⁵⁷ The death of Ghazi-ud-din brought relief to Salabat Jang and the French. The Marathas now claimed the confirmation of the cessions made to them by Ghazi-ud-din from Salabat Jang. They also threatened him, to install the son of Ghazi-ud-din Khan, with a *firman* from the Mughal Emperor. Salabat Jang took the Maratha threat very lightly, there upon the Marathas surrounded the whole army of Salabat Jang and reduced them to the last extremity. Now realizing the seriousness of the situation Salabat Jang decided to make peace with the Marathas. The Peshwa demanded that Bussy should be made the mediator, which was agreed by Salabat Jang.²⁵⁸

After the discussion, the Peshwa sent one of his *sardars* to receive Bussy as soon as he left the Nizam's camp. When he had proceeded half way the Peshwa's brother greeted him and when he reached the Maratha camp, the Peshwa himself came out of his tent to receive the French general.²⁵⁹ The Peshwa gave Bussy an elephant, a horse with silver trappings, a *sarpech*, a pendant, a pearl necklace, a pair of pearl earrings and four jewels, and to the nobles who accompanied him he gave dresses of honour.²⁶⁰

The terms of the treaty were then discussed. This treaty is known as 'Treaty of Bhalki' and the terms were as follows...

- 1) Salabat Jang was to cede to the Peshwa the district of Khandesh, the district of Balgan and territory worth two lakhs in the Ahmednagar district. He was also to pay to the Peshwa the Chauth for the province of Arcot and Hyderabad.
- 2) The Peshwa was to relinquish his right over the 60 lakhs promised to be paid to him in cash by Ghazi-ud-din Khan, he was to forbid all Marathas from entering the Nizam's territory, to protect the Nizam's interests at the Imperial court and finally to defend the Nizam against all his enemies.²⁶¹

The treaty of Bhalki was signed on November 24, 1752.

The Peshwa recognized Salabat Jang as the legitimate Viceroy of the Deccan and swore an inviolable friendship towards him.²⁶² The Peshwa on one end was insisting that Bussy should mediate between him and Salabat Jang. On the other hand Dupleix had been insisting upon Bussy to form an alliance with the Peshwa at all costs, so he could get help of the Maratha cavalry for his expedition on Mysore. In his letter to Bussy, dated January 1, 1753, Dupleix himself admits: "I see the reasons which impelled you to solicit Balajirao, viz., his joining you for the execution of your plans against Mysore and other parts of south India."²⁶³

A treaty of alliance was also signed between the Peshwa and Bussy (as a representer of the French nation in India). By this treaty the French were to observe Salabat Jang and make him to abide by the terms of the treaty of Bhalki. The Peshwa in return for this service of the French was to promote French interests in India; help French with troops whenever they demanded; offer protection to French merchants against Maratha pirates; and give them facilities for trade in Maratha territories. It was also agreed by the Peshwa, not to claim Chauth from the territories occupied by the French in India and not to charge custom duties on goods belonging to the French.²⁶⁴

The Mughals had come to know, the alliance between the French and the Marathas. The growing influence of the Marathas on the west coast and its adjoining provinces was creating serious harm to the Mughal interests and hence it had become necessary for them to check these Maratha incursions. The Marathas were carrying out an expedition in Gujarat under Raghunathrao and needed men and ammunition. A request was thus made to Bussy to supply these needs. Bussy informed the French agent at Surat, M.Verrier to help the Marathas with their demands. M.Verrier under a very pressing situation supplied the Marathas gun-powder hidden in bails made of cotton thread. Also he did not demand any money for this supply, only to impress upon the Marathas the generosity of the French.²⁶⁵

VI) Revival of amiable relations:

The long survived friendly relations between the French and the Marathas from 1668 to 1700 and from 1741-1750 had been seriously damaged due to rapid change in the power politics of the Karnatak and the Deccan. By 1750 the Marathas had emerged as a mighty power in the whole of India. It was also been recognized as a centrally located power, who had the potential of maneuvering the politics in the North as well as the South of India. At this particular juncture in 1752 the French were facing a difficult situation. It was rather difficult for them to sustain there position in the Karnatak without the active support of the Marathas. They had recognized the Maratha strength in both incidences i.e. Chanda Shahib and that of Salabat Jang. The most dangerous element for the French was the friendship of the English with the Peshwa, as he was on intimate terms with them. Dupleix in his letter to Bussy, date November 28, 1752, warns against an impending Maratha- English alliance

and urges him to come to terms with the English who, he says, are bound to induce the Peshwa to espouse the cause of Muhammad Ali.²⁶⁶

The French governor did not understand the behaviour of the Peshwa. The Peshwa had written a letter to him in December 1752, informing him that he was dispatching a 30,000 strong army to settle the affairs of Karnatak and Dupleix must assist the force in all possible ways. On the other hand Dupleix had received information from his spies that the Peshwa had sent his *vakil* to fort St. George with presents to the English governor and also that the Peshwa had kept a friendly correspondence with Muhammad Ali.

The Peshwa had sent a *vakil* to Madras as well as to Bombay to ask for English troops to assist Ghazi-ud-din against Salabat Jang. The government of Madras had pleaded their inability to comply with the request, firstly because Salabat Jang's army was lying between them and the Maratha territory; secondly, because of the great expenditure which this expedition would cost them. But they had replied the Peshwa that they had informed the Governor of Bombay to see if he could send a detachment to help the Peshwa.²⁶⁷

The French desired for a permanent Franco-Maratha alliance. This intention was also been stated by Dupleix to the Maratha ambassador, Shamrao Yadav at Pondicherry. He was been requested by Dupleix to convey this to the Peshwa at Poona. The presence of Muhammad Ali had made the French to suffer heavy losses in men, money and territory. The Peshwa had sent a strong recommendation for Muhammad Ali and also asked French not to indulge in hostilities against him. This proposal was not acceptable to the French and Dupleix expressed surprise that, even after the treaty of friendship signed with the French the Marathas were maintaining a relation with Muhammad Ali. Dupleix was ready to pay Rs. 4,00,000 to the Peshwa if

he was ready give up the cause of Muhammad Ali also he was ready to stand as surety for the regular payment as tribute from the province of Arcot. A secret mission was sent by the French Governor to Poona with presents for the Peshwa, his cousin Sadashivrao Bhau and Gopikabai, the Peshwa's wife.²⁶⁸

The Peshwa had realized the importance of European artillery and the art of trained personnel. He was interested in the same and made a special request to the French Governor to supply him French soldiers and ammunition with some pieces of ordinance. As the French were engaged with Muhammad Ali they told the incapability on their part, but promised the Peshwa that as soon as fresh reinforcement arrives from France they would spare some 500 to 600 Frenchmen and train the Marathas in the art of handling European artillery. The promises made by Dupleix in this matter, were never fulfilled even after repeated requests from the Peshwa.

It was mentioned in the terms of the treaty of Bhalki that the Peshwa, Salabat Jang and Bussy would invade the kingdom of Mysore. The Peshwa in this regard was pressing hard on Salabat and Bussy to take immediate action. Salabat Jang at this moment was facing a mutiny in his army and was unable to join the Peshwa. The French requested to the Peshwa to reconcile their differences with Nand Raj, Dalvay of Mysore with his influence. They also suggested the Peshwa that if differences are settled with Mysore, then they could co-jointly attack Muhammad Ali and destroy him. The Peshwa was determined to attack Mysore because he wanted to collect the arrears of the tribute due from the province also he hoped that the counsels and the Raja would find means to satisfy him. The Peshwa was ready to help the French, to settle the affairs of Karnatak, only if, Dupleix kept his promise to pay him the amount of Rs.4,00,000.²⁶⁹

Dupleix wrote to Nand Raj and advised him to meet the demands of the Marathas or else he would join the Peshwa.²⁷⁰ He wanted the Peshwa's mere presence to subjugate Muhammad Ali.²⁷¹ Nand Raj had hoped that Dupleix and Murarrao would unite and prevent the Peshwa from entering the Mysore territory.²⁷² This was, not possible due to the recently concluded Franco-Maratha alliance. The Maratha invasion, however, enabled Dupleix a little latter to get astonishing, good terms from Nand Raj. Nand Raj agreed to pay the expenses of the French troops if they helped him in reducing Trichinopoly. He also agreed to pay Rs.3,00,000 annually to the French Company.²⁷³ The Raja of Mysore had offered one crore rupees to the Peshwa, if he obtained the fort of Trichinopoly for him. However the Peshwa declined the offer.²⁷⁴

The Peshwa's growing influence was a serious threat to the French interests in the Deccan and also in the Karnatak.²⁷⁵ Dupleix was of the opinion that if Bussy continued to serve as a French agent at Hyderabad it would serve as an effective check on the Peshwa's ambitions. Bussy fell seriously ill in the month of January 1753 and his charge was given to Goupil, his second in command. Bussy proceeded to Masulipatam to recover his health. At the time of handing over his charge, Bussy gave him instructions to maintain regular correspondence with the Peshwa and to take utmost care not to violate the treaty made with him. Being the most redoubtable power in India, it was only proper that all possible regard must be shown to the Marathas. He also told that it was in the interests of the French to preserve friendship with such a nation.²⁷⁶ Bussy in his long memoire to his friend, Marion de Mersan, dated December 18, 1753, says that the Marathas have faithfully observed the terms of the treaty and have not given any cause for grievance to the French.²⁷⁷

Sayyad Lashkar Khan was waiting for a suitable opportunity to create bad blood among Salabat Jang and the French. The absence of

Bussy from Hyderabad was a golden opportunity and he tried his best to persuade Salabat Jang against the French. As the news reached Dupleix he immediately ordered Bussy to return to Hyderabad and take control of the alarming situation. Bussy returned to Hyderabad on June 15, 1753. Dupleix sent instructions to Bussy to try and compel the Peshwa to return the nine fortresses to Salabat Jang which he had agreed to restore in accordance with the treaty of Bhalki, which he had not fulfilled for long. The Peshwa returned these fortresses in September 1753.²⁷⁸

Bussy conveyed his plan of action to Dupleix after his arrival at Hyderabad. Accordingly he intended to proceed to Aurangabad at the first opportunity. If Salabat Jang had come under the influence of Sayyad Lashkar Khan then he was thinking of forming an alliance with the Peshwa by secret intrigues. In this case he wanted the Peshwa to give threats to eradicate all officers in the Nizams court who were hostile to the French. The Peshwa was also to warn that if things were not solved with the French, he would place all the authority in Bussy's hand. By doing this Bussy wanted to administer the affairs of the Deccan in consent with the Peshwa and Mughal officers of his choice. This was the only possible way according to Bussy to retain Salabat Jang on the throne.²⁷⁹

If in case the threats of the Peshwa failed to have the desired effect, then Bussy had thought to direct his forces with Peshwa's against Salabat Jang without declaring war against him. The Peshwa was to invade the Nizams territories from Aurangabad while Bussy was to seize Golkonda and Hyderabad, he was also thinking of annexing the '*Circars*' to the French district of Masulipatanam.²⁸⁰ The Emperor at Delhi had sent an urgent call for the Peshwa to send an expedition to Delhi against his own *vazir*. The Peshwa was thus making preparations for Delhi. The French were suspecting the Peshwa of invading the Deccan under the pretext of going to Delhi

as the Nizam at Deccan was not in a position to resist an attack from the Marathas and also he was not having enough resources to help him. In a letter written by Bussy to Dupleix dated July 29, 1753 he shows his readiness to join the Peshwa. He writes.... "One cannot stop the course of revolution which has already advanced to far. Let as then allow the Marathas to replace the Mughal government in the Deccan, and since we cannot remain silent spectators of this revolution, we must be a party to it and secure from it advantages for ourselves. After all, the Mughals have but to thank themselves for their misfortunes, which are the direct result of their internal quarrels."²⁸¹ In reply to this letter Dupleix has approved of Bussy's plan whole-heartedly and also thanked him for suggesting them.²⁸²

The French were also interested to form an alliance with the Marathas as they wanted to capture the port town of Surat. The French wanted a safe passage from the Maratha territory to reach Surat which was the only possible with signing an alliance. The possession of Surat on the west coast would facilitate the French to block the whole of the peninsula.²⁸³ The success of this great enterprise was solely depended on the co-operation of Marathas in this respect.

It seems that the French, especially Dupleix and Bussy always underestimated the diplomatic talents of the Marathas, the Marathas were shrewd diplomats and right from the time of Chh. Shivaji they had never supported a foreign power to make conquests in India and especially in a territory which had an important strategic location. The French Company also did not approved of Dupleix's plans in this respect as it could create serious problems to their interests in India in the future.²⁸⁴

Muhammad Ali had become a constant sore for the French in the Karnatak. According to Bussy, Salabat Jang had conferred (after the death

of Chanda Sahib) the 'Nawabship of the Karnatak on Dupleix.²⁸⁵ The French had received intelligence that the Marathas were supporting the cause of Muhammad Ali. They persuaded the Marathas, that their support to Muhammad Ali was against the terms of the friendship treaty signed at Bhalki. Bussy on the otherhand proposed to the Marathas that if Muhammad Ali had no faith in the French they (Marathas) should mediate on his behalf. He also suggested that the Marathas should send an ambassador to the King of France. Bussy thought that such a step would further enhance the relations between the two dominant powers and bring in a reign of peace and prosperity in the Karnatak. The French had agreed to pay to a regular collection of Chauth and *Sardeshmukhi* from the Karnatak. The French general also recommended Murrarao Ghorpade to the Peshwa for special favor as he had rendered good service to the French at Trichinopoly.²⁸⁶

The French had got the right to conduct the affairs of the Nizam's court. Sayyad Lashkar Khan had sent two Maratha envoys viz. Raghunathrao Dada and Malharrao Holkar to discuss the expedition to Delhi. The Nizam at his time got an undertaking from Holkar not to bring any prince from Delhi to the Deccan and especially the son of late Ghazi-ud-din Khan. The Maratha intervention in the Nizam's court was not favored by Bussy and he wrote to the Peshwa that he should not conduct any affairs at the Nizam's court without his presence and consent.²⁸⁷

Sayyad Lashkar Khan resigned from his post as a Diwan in November 1753. Bussy arrived at Aurangabad by the end of November. He was reinstated to his former position. The Nizam as a reconciliation had to cease the four districts of Mustafanagar, Ellore, Rajmundry and Chicacole, popularly known as the four 'Circars' to the French, in order to have an independent income for the maintenance of their troops in the Deccan.²⁸⁸ The French had now got total control over

the Nizam and his affairs, hence felt there was no longer a need to have an alliance with the Marathas against the Nizam.

The Maratha power by this time had been recognized as the most important and powerful power in India. The alliance with the Marathas would have proved to be beneficial for the French, for the Marathas could handle Muhammad Ali, a constant threat to the French interests and this alliance was also a warranty of security to the French against the English.²⁸⁹ The interests of the French and the Marathas clashed on the issue of the possession of Nizam Ali and Basalat Jang, brothers of the Nizam. They had been made captives by Sayyad Lashkar Khan in the fort of Daulatabad. After the fall of Sayyad Lashkar Khan, Bussy decided to release the two state prisoners and make them realize his caring attitude towards them. The Peshwa also wanted control of them as he wanted to use them to intervene in the affairs of the Deccan to consolidate his power. He was ready to pay the cash worth three lakhs and an equal amount of *jahgir*. Bussy immediately acted and informed the Nizam of the on coming danger on him and with his consent Bussy obtained the release of the two princes in January 1754.²⁹⁰

The Peshwa had become the most powerful person in the Maratha kingdom. It was now a difficult task to challenge the authority of the Peshwa. Bussy, hence now thought of consolidating his position by establishing a friendly relation with the Peshwa. Bussy always felt proud and honored as the Peshwa had kept his *vakil* at the French camp. This honor was reserved only for the Mughal Emperor and the Nizam.²⁹¹

The month of February 1754, saw a dispute among the Maratha- Nizam relations over the issue of the Karnatak. The Nizam was facing serious economic crisis as his treasury had become empty. There was a state of mutiny in his

army as there were not been paid there salaries. Hence the Nizam wanted to levy tribute on the Karnatak. As a deputy of the Mughal Emperor and the Viceroy of the Deccan he had the right to do so. But the expeditious activities of the Marathas were preventing from doing the same. The Marathas had been constantly collecting Chauth from the Karnatak and hence it was impossible for the Nizam to levy a fresh tax on the people. To compel the Peshwa to return to Poona from the south, the Nizam announced his intention to march on Poona. He hoped that if the Peshwa leaves south, it would be possible for him to deal with Karnatak all alone.²⁹²

To dissuade the Nizam from his intentions the Peshwa sent an express message to Bussy and stated his intention to proceed to Arcot and mediate between the French and the English. He also proposed to give the possession of Arcot to them while that of Trichinopoly to Muhammad Ali. Bussy understood the plan of the Peshwa but was not taken by it. In this regard he wrote to Dupleix on February 26, 1754.... "I refuse to believe that he (Peshwa) will go to Arcot to help the French." But as he wanted to maintain good relations with the Marathas, he did not march upon Poona, he also informed the Peshwa's wakil Raghunath Ganesh that the French had no intention to march on Poona and they will also try to dissuade the Nizam from carrying out his threat.²⁹³

The Peshwa's march to the south created great anxiety for Nand Raj, the Dalvay of Mysore. The financial position of the kingdom of Mysore was in worse condition. The last expedition of the Peshwa had costed Mysore a tribute of eighteen lakhs. The French were waiting for an opportunity to reduce Nand Raj and extracting a tribute of three to four lakhs for Murrarao and ten lakhs for them. But this did not materialize because the Peshwa returned to Poona half way from Mundalge.²⁹⁴

The French Governor wanted Bussy to march to the south with the forces of Salabat Jang in order to collect tribute from the Karnatak for the Nizam and also to keep a firm check on the activities of the English and Muhammad Ali. This expedition could not be carried out because at this time there was a sudden invasion by the troops of Raghuji Bhosale into the Nizam's territory i.e. in February 1754. The invasion did not bear any fruit to Raghuji as he had to sue for peace as the Nizam's army was only twenty five kos from Nagpur his capital. The Nizam very diplomatically dictated the terms for peace with Raghuji. He did not altogether destroy Raghuji as he knew that he was not on good terms with the Peshwa and that Raghuji could be used against the Peshwa in the future. The French rather believed that the Peshwa was happy with the subjugation of Raghuji by the Nizam.²⁹⁵

The French suspected that there was a secret understanding between the Peshwa and Raghuji to invade the Nizam's territory as the latter threatened to invade Poona. On the other hand the Peshwa had written to Bussy regretting the actions of Raghuji, and stated that it must not be considered as a violation of the treaty of Bhalki, also promising that he would punish Raghuji at a proper time.²⁹⁶

The French as well as Salabat Jang were very much concerned about the new developments taking place in Delhi. Shahabuddin, the son of the late Ghazi-ud-din Khan had firmly consolidated his position in Delhi. He was the only potential threat to the position of Salabat Jang and the French interests in the Deccan. Holkar had earlier promised Salabat Jang that he would not bring any prince to the south and especially Shahabuddin. The relations between Holkar and Shahabuddin had grown to be very intimate by this time as Holkar regarded him as his son. Shahabuddin, wanted to visit the Deccan but Holkar prevented him from visiting the south. He actually had decided to make Shahabuddin the Vazir, co-jointly with Mansor

Ali Khan at Delhi. The Peshwa too had given a word to Bussy that in any case Holkar thought of bringing Shahabuddin to the Deccan, he would instruct his brother Raghunathrao to prevent him from doing so.²⁹⁷

July 1754 witnessed a revolution at Delhi. Ahmad Shah was replaced by Alamgir II, with the help and support of Shahabuddin and the Marathas viz., Holkar and Shinde. In such a situation the Nizam and his Diwan felt that Shahabuddin would now claim his right over the Deccan with the support of the Marathas, hence they immediately request Bussy to return to Hyderabad and negotiate with the Marathas. The French also discussed the issue of an invasion on Mysore with the Marathas.²⁹⁸

Godeheu arrived in India as the Kings Commissioner and Commandant-general of all the French establishments in India on August 2, 1754. He did not support the policy of Dupleix of interference in the affairs of the Indian Princes laid since 1749. After taking review of the political conditions of the Deccan and the Karnatak, he came to conclusions that the French must not support a weak and suspicious ruler as Salabat Jang and also not rely on the Maratha friendship even though there a formidable power because he suspected there trustworthiness.²⁹⁹

The Maratha forces left south in September and proceeded to capture the Siddi's strong hold of Janjira. The Peshwa wrote to Dupleix and reminded him to send men and ammunition to help him in this expedition in accordance to the treaty of Bhalki.³⁰⁰ But due to the arrival of Godeheu, Dupleix was not at the helm of the French affairs in India. He was been called back by the Crown of France. Dupleix left the Indian shores on October 15, 1754.³⁰¹

VIII) Bussy, Godeheu, de Leyrit and their relations with the Peshwa:

After Dupleix, Bussy is been recognized as the most important and efficient French general and administrator in India. At the time of Dupliex's departure Bussy was stationed at Hyderabad the Nizam's Court. The Nizam was the most important ally of the French. The arrival of Godeheu as the King's Commissioner and commandant general of all the French establishments in India did affect the equations of the south. Godeheu did not approve the policy of Dupleix and also did not relied on Salabat Jang, Marathas and the Nizam. He signed a treaty with the English on January 11, 1755 and regulated the affairs in the '*Circars*'. The Raja of Mysore had now become a close ally of the French. On the other hand the Nizam was planning an expedition on Mysore. This situation placed Bussy in a difficult situation as both the powers were allies of the French and maintaining relations with both of them was essential for the French. Bussy faced this situation boldly. He accompanied the army of the Nizam on one hand and on the other he informed the Raja of Mysore that he must come to terms with the Nizam and try to protect his interests. He also assured him that he would do his best to protect his interests by using his good offices with the Nizam.

Bussy had made proper arrangements of the expedition and had informed the Mughal troops not to cross Shirpi. This was actually done by him to paralyze the resistance of the Mysorian's and immediately make them to come to terms. But suddenly the Raja of Mysore got the news that a large troop of the Marathas, 35,000 to 45,000 strong was about to attack his north west frontiers. Taken up by the panicky situation the Raja invited the Nizam's troops to camp into his capital. The Nizam very happily accepted his proposal and arrived before Srirangapatan. This move of the Nizam compelled the Marathas to retire. The Raja of Mysore gave Salabat Jang

rupees fifty lakhs as a tribute.³⁰² This actually displayed the brilliant diplomatic moves of Bussy for which he was recognized with by the Nizam, French and the Raja of Mysore.

On behalf of the French, Bussy had remained as a guarantor to the terms and conditions of the treaty of Bhalki, to the Nizam and the Marathas. According to the treaty the Nizam had agreed to pay a Chauth for the province of Arcot to the Peshwa and subsequently it was not paid by him. Instructions were given to Mahadji Purandare, the Maratha general sent in charge for the expedition of the south, to get definite explanation from the Nizam and Bussy in this matter. The Peshwa also threatened to invade the province to collect the tribute if a satisfactory reply was not sent immediately. Bussy was quiet upset with this threat of the Peshwa for it would disturb the understanding between the French, the English and there allies.³⁰³ The Peshwa had also written a letter to the French commissioner Godeheu in May 1775, and requested him to take care of the interests of the kingdom of Tanjore.³⁰⁴

In June 1775, the Peshwa wrote a letter to the Governor of Pondicherry M. de Leyrit demanding the Chauth of Arcot. A dress of honor was presented to the Governor and he was also informed that he could seek all type of services from the Maratha general, Mahadji Purandare campaigning in the south. The treaty signed between the French and the English had caused a matter of concern to the Peshwa. The Peshwa was solicitating French help in his expedition against Tulaji Angre. He also requested the French to release the wife and children of Muzaffar Khan to enable them to attend a marriage ceremony in the

Khan's family.³⁰⁵ The French had detained the wife and the children of Muzaffar Khan as he had deserted them and accepted service with the Peshwa.

The French Governor wrote to the Peshwa and regretted for his inability to help him in the matter of collection of Chauth from the province of Arcot as the province was now under the control of Muhammad Ali and the English. He also stated that due to the conditional treaty between the English and the French for eighteen months, it was impossible for him to take up the issue. He suggested that the Peshwa must wait till the differences between the French and the English are solved.³⁰⁶

A secret conspiracy was been hatched by the French, Tarabai, the Nizam and Murarrao Ghorpade against the Peshwa. Murarrao Ghorpade was a very ambitious person and wanted total control on the tributes collected from the Karnatak. He wanted the Peshwa to recognize him as the sole authority to levy and collect tribute from the Karnatak. But the Peshwa had engaged himself in collecting tribute and had thus belittled the importance of Murarrao. Murarrao hence proposed to the French that they should use their good offices with the Nizam to secure for him the *jahgir* of Shirpi and prevent the Peshwa from intervening and invading the province of Arcot. Tarabai, also an enemy of the Peshwa offered her support to the projected league with army an amount of two crores. Bussy was waiting for a cause to foment the dissensions among the Marathas for the advantage of the Nizam. He willingly accepted to play a mediator between the two and try to keep the Marathas away from the French settlements i.e. Orrisa and Bengal. But all the moves of the league were well informed to the Peshwa by his efficient spies. The Peshwa hence threatened the French and the Nizam that he would break the treaty of Bhalki if Murarrao's wakil was entertained at their court.³⁰⁷

The Angre's belonged to the old aristocracy of the Chhatrapati's. The Peshwa on the contrary i.e. after the death of Chhp. Shahu in 1749 had started to form a new aristocracy which would support him in all his cause and

recognize him to be the most important figure in the Maratha confederacy. The aristocrats of the old regime did not recognize the authority of the Peshwa and defied him. The Peshwa on the other hand wanted to reduce them one by one by playing with each other and at times taking support from other powers. The existence of the Great Maratha Navy under command of Tulaji Angre, had become a sore for the Peshwa. He was determined to reduce him and eventually take control of the Konkan coastline and the waters. Tulaji controlled the whole of the Konkan sea-board from Bankot (about seventy miles south of Bombay) in the north to Vijaydurg or Gheria (one-seventy-five miles south of Bombay) in the south. To subjugate Tulaji the Peshwa had also made a truce with the English and was also solicitating help from the French. The naval strength and exploits of Tulaji Angre had also become a serious cause of concern to the interests of the English, the Mughal's and the Siddi of Janjira. The Peshwa had raised his own navy but had not succeeded to match the power and excellence that of Angre. Murarrao when turned over by the French and the Nizam, joined with Tulaji Angre and now openly defied the Peshwa. The combined expedition of the reduction of Tulaji Angre began in March 1755. It became impossible for Tulaji Angre to single handedly face the combined overtures of the Peshwa, hence he asked for help from the French with whom he had always maintained a friendly relations.³⁰⁸

Others who joined the league against the Peshwa were Muzaffar khan, Nawab of Savnur, Nawab of Cudappa and Kurnool. A manifesto was prepared against the Peshwa which stated.... "Balajirao intends to dethrone the King (of the Marathas) and usurp his place. Orders are, therefore, being issued in the name of the Emperor to all the chiefs (Mughal as well as Marathas) to expel him and recognize Tarabai as Queen of the Marathas as before. Those who would obey the orders would receive special favors from the Emperor."³⁰⁹

The Peshwa also sought the assistance of the French. In this regard he wrote to Bussy in December 1755 and reminded him of the terms of the treaty of Bhalki in which it was clearly mentioned that the Peshwa and the French will help each other in any of their expeditions. He also wrote to Bussy that if the French were not ready to help him then he had received an offer from the English who were anxious to help him in this expedition against Tulaji. But as he did not want to spoil his relations with the French he needed a help of one hundred European soldiers with a squadron of five hundred Indian soldiers commanded by a French officer. Bussy was very much offended by this letter of the Peshwa as he had mentioned the English. He also knew that the English had helped the Peshwa in the campaign of March 1755 against Tulaji Angre. Bussy very diplomatically replied to the Peshwa saying, "I have received your letter and noted its contents. The forces you demand are to inadequate for the great designs you intend to pursue. You will at least require eight hundred Frenchmen and two thousand *sipahi's* for your purpose. Our reputation is a treasure which we shall never allow to be tarnished in anyway. It is not our practice to engage in any undertaking with such a small number of men as we would not like to go against our traditions." By this reply, Bussy saved himself with dignity from an awkward situation. Bussy in the first case was not ready to support the Peshwa in an expedition which had to be carried in alliance with the English and on the second part he was confident that his offer of such a large army would not be acceptable to the Peshwa in consideration to the costs of its maintenance.³¹⁰ The French thus did not participate in the Peshwa's expedition against Tulaji Angre conducted in February-April 1756. The conspiracy of the league against the Peshwa did not achieve its goal to oust the Peshwa, due to lack of unity among themselves.³¹¹

The French Governor M. de Leyrit was very much disappointed due to the failure of the league. In his letter to Bussy dated June 28, 1755 he wrote.... "Let us hope, that the plan of the confederation of all the Maratha chiefs against Balajirao materializes. I think it will lead us to our goal, viz, that of protecting the interests of Salabat Jang. I am impatient to know the result." It is really surprising that a man of experience in Indian affairs like Leyrit ignored the capacity of the Peshwa and believed that Murarrao could defeat him. In his letter to Bussy dated July 7, 1755 he writes.... "I have pondered over the plan of the confederation, of which Murarrao is to be the leader, if the plan materializes and Murarrao succeeds in lowering the high reputation of Balajirao, will he not himself become a terror? Elated with success, will he not demand, by force of arms, satisfaction of his claims against the French?"³¹² The Peshwa again threatened to break the treaty of Bhalki, if the Nizam listened to Murarrao.³¹³ The French Governor also implied that he regarded the power of Nizam superior to that of the Peshwa.

The Peshwa wanted to punish Muzaffar Khan and the Nawab of Savnur as they had deserted him and had joined the league. He had also asked for help from the French against the two, but the French regretted their inability to send any help. The matters between the Peshwa and Murarrao had gone from bad to worse in 1756. The French were playing as the sole mediators between the two. The two armies i.e. of the Peshwa and the Mughal had arrived before Savnur by April-May 1756. The three chief Maratha *jahagirdar's* of Salabat Jang were friendly to Murarrao and the Pathan Nawab's to the Nawab of Savnur; Mir Muhhamad Hussein Khan, one of the principle noblemen of the Nizam's court, supported the Peshwa, while Malharrao Holkar sent his agent to Bussy to convince him to save Murarrao.³¹⁴

The French had supported the cause of the Peshwa but Bussy had given a word to Malharrao Holkar that he will give proper attention to the interests of Murarrao. Hence he used delaying tactics in the siege and had a direct action with the Nawab's which lasted only for two days. The French action though a very short one had the desired effect and the Nawab of Savnur sued for peace.³¹⁵ A peace treaty was concluded among all the parties to end the differences between each other at the end of April 1756.³¹⁶

After the conclusion of the treaty Murarrao visited the French camp. Bussy honored him with a dress and both of them affirmed their friendship to the Peshwa. Bussy also asked his help against the English. It was only due to the mediation of Malharrao Holkar that Bussy secured the rupees fourteen lakhs bond back from Murarrao, which was given by the French to him for his services at Trichinopoly.³¹⁷ The whole incidence was profitable to Bussy on personal grounds as it helped him to win the friendship of the great Maratha general Malharrao Holkar.

The secret arrangement between Bussy and Murarrao about the bond of fourteen lakhs did not remained concealed for a long time from the enemies of Bussy. The news was communicated by Shah Nawaz Khan to Salabat Jang. Salabat Jang accused Bussy of sacrificing the interests of the Nizam to the interests of the French nation. He severely dealt with Bussy, this time, by dismissing him and his corps from his service, and directing the French contingent to quit his territory without delay.³¹⁸

The dismissed Bussy and the French contingent from the Nizam's service has been attributed with different approaches by various sources viz....

1. It is said that the Peshwa supported the scheme of Shah Nawaz Khan for the dismissal of the French general.³¹⁹

2. Other source says that the Peshwa, evolved a plan by which he hoped to paralyze the French, drive Bussy from the Nizam's service and employ him in his own service.³²⁰
3. Yet another source says that the Peshwa and Shah Nawaz Khan were collaborators in the enterprise which was aimed at 'compelling the French to quit the Deccan.'³²¹
4. The envoy of the Bombay government at Poona, Mr. Spencer alleges that 'Bussy was dismissed by Slabat Jang as a instigation of Nana (the Peshwa) and that the intrigue about Bussy's dismissal was managed by Amritrao, a trusted counselor of the Peshwa.'³²²
5. Orme says that it was in the interest of Balajirao to join hands with Shah Nawaz Khan in the intrigue against Bussy, because the latters departure would facilitate future Maratha designs against the Nizam's kingdom.³²³
6. The Peshwa's letter to Vasudeo Dixit, dated May 1756, does not give the slightest hint of the complicity in the plot. On the contrary, he expresses his regret that the Nizam should have dispensed with the services of 'such trustworthy persons.'³²⁴
7. Bussy himself devices the fact that the Peshwa had a hand in the intrigue against him.³²⁵

The eighteenth century in India is characterized by two critical transitions which changed the structure of power and initiated important social and economic reconfigurations. The first was the transition in the first half of the century from the Mughal political-economy to regional political orders. The second was the transition in the period following the battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764) in the polity, society and economy as the English East India Company steered its way to a

position of political prominence in north India. Both these phases have been extensively studied by historians, who debate not only the nature of change in the eighteenth century but also its implication for the establishment of early colonial rule in India.³²⁶

Considering the political scenario in the Indian politics of the eighteenth century, the powers who had the potentials of controlling the changing situations were the Marathas and the English. The English had gained success to a certain amount in the north of India. But the Maratha Confederacy was the only power which was of central importance and it controlled the politics of both the north and the south of India. It was also recognized by the indigenous and also the foreign powers as the only formidable power in India. On logical grounds if an analysis is done regarding the dismissal of Bussy and the French contingent from the Nizam's services then it appears to be quite clear that the English were to benefit from this act rather than the Marathas. It must be noted that the English had not acquired success in the southern parts of India except only in Madras. The French had become a source of discontent and anxiety for them as they had not given a chance to the English to penetrate into the south and consolidate their position. On the other hand the French were the most trusted ally of the Nizam, and they had strengthened the power of the Nizam. The English could not get on terms with the Marathas as the Marathas distrusted and were well aware of the English tactics to get them involved into the Deccan and the Karnatak. Hence there is every reason to believe that the English had started to play against the French at the Nizam's court and make every effort to oust them. The English became recognized power after the battles of Plassey and Buxar. The Nizam is also seen to be the most trusted ally of the English in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

At this critical situation, Bussy found it better to meet Malharrao Holkar, as Holkar had become a good and trusted friend during the campaign

of Savnur.³²⁷ The Peshwa visited Bussy and reassured of his friendship to him. During this meeting Holkar on behalf of the Vazir, made a proposal to Bussy demanding under his control, twelve hundred Frenchmen, five hundred *sipahi*'s, one thousand cavalry, fifty cannons and four mortars. He was ready to pay the French rupees two lakhs per month and the jahgir of twenty-five lakhs, to this the French were also to get confirmed the possession of the *Circars*, given to him by the Nizam in December 1753. Bussy did not accept nor reject the proposal, but sent it to M.de. Leyrit for his consideration.³²⁸ The Mughal Emperor needed the French troops to carry out expeditions in the north. But it appears that the French troops could not be divided in India in view of the impending war between France and England. This proposal, therefore, came to nothing. The proposals caused great surprise to M.de Leyrit, who had all the time believed that the various overtures to the French directed against the Marathas. He now admitted that the Marathas were certainly the most redoubtable power in India.³²⁹

The new alliance now formed by Bussy after his dismissal by the Nizam became a cause of great anxiety to the English at Bombay. Thinking that the government of Madras would at once seek this opportunity to occupy the position the French had held at the Nizam's Court, they feared that, incase any differences arise between the Nizam and the Peshwa, of which there was every likelihood, and the moment the English troops took up arms against the Marathas, the latter would certainly ruin the Company's affairs on the side of Bombay. Moreover, the danger of the French allying themselves with the Marathas could not be ruled out. The committee, therefore, repeatedly recommended to the Government (of Bombay) to enter into the fresh negotiations with the Peshwa for the delivery of the sea-fort of 'Vijaydurg' to the Marathas. This move, they hoped, would not only appease the Peshwa, but also obviate the possibility of his alliance with the French.³³⁰

On his return to Masulipatnam, Bussy remained at Hyderabad for three months. His presence here helped to restore the order in the 'Circars'. During the absence of Bussy, the intrigues of Shah Nawaz Khan, again brought the affairs of the Deccan to the verge of a revolution. The Peshwa was ready to co-operate with Shah Nawaz Khan in his plan, to confine Salabat Jang and place the government in the hands of Basalat Jang. The plan succeeded and the disposition of Salabat Jang was just a matter of time. Salabat Jang now realizing the seriousness immediately sent message for Bussy's help. Bussy without any delay, with a strong force immediately proceeded to Aurangabad. His arrival in February 1758 melted the conspiracy.³³¹

Bussy paid his respect to Salabat Jang and immediately went to see the Peshwa who received him half way from his tent, thus honoring him.³³² Bussy got the possession of the fort of Dulatabad and made Shah Nawaz Khan a prisoner. The Peshwa wanted the possession of the fort which Bussy unable to give. But the Nizam offered the fort to the Peshwa on the condition that he should help him in his cause to get the Viceroyalty of the Deccan. The Peshwa was well aware of the character of the Nizam and hence the idea.

A series of events took place in the year 1758. Basalat Jang was made the Chief Minister by Bussy while the activities of Nizam Ali were kept under check. Bussy's, Diwan Hyder Jang was assassinated on May 11, 1758. In the baffle that followed the incident, Shah Nawaz Khan was killed and Nizam Ali had to flee to Burhanpur.³³³ Bussy returned with Salabat Jang to Hyderabad, where he received a letter from Comte de Lally. Comte de Lally was now appointed the new Commander-in-chief of all the French forces in India. In the letter he had ordered Bussy to return to Arcot with the contingent immediately. Bussy left to Pondicherry to Hyderabad on July

18, 1758. The departure of Bussy, marks the end of a lasting seven years relationship between the French and the Marathas in the political sphere.

Bussy has been regarded as the ablest commander the French ever had in India after Dupleix. The three major incidences where he displayed his courage and valour i.e capture of Jinji, march on Poona and the defense of Char Minar are been justified to be remarkable achievements for the French. He was a great diplomat and most of the times solved battles by his wits rather than arms, for this he was respected greatly by the Nizam and the Marathas. Bussy's distinct contributions do find a honorable place in the history of the Marathas.

IX) The Fall of the French in India.

The French who had established themselves in India at Pondicherry since April 1674 (Francois Martin) received a crushing blow in 1761. The prime position which was been enjoyed by the French in India faded away after 1761 only to remain as a Minor player in the politics of south India. The French lost their glory after 1761. The Seven Year's War broke out in Europe between France and England. The conditional treaty signed between the French and the English in India became nullified. Both the English and the French, now to strengthen there positions in India, made every effort to get the support of the Marathas. An invitation was sent by the Madras Presidency in June 1757, inviting the Marathas to assist them in the expulsion of the French from the Karnatak.³³⁴ The Marathas demanded the arrears of the Chauth of the province from Muhammad Ali and ally of the English. The English invited the Marathas for a meeting to solve the issue. The Marathas thereupon informed the English that the French were ready to pay an amount of rupees four lakhs to Balawantrao Mehendale, the Maratha general in the south, to form an alliance with the

French. The Marathas hinted that if they joined the French then it would mean the ruin of the territories in the possessions of the Nawab and the English. Muhammad Ali agreed to pay two and half lakhs of rupees to the Marathas on July 30, 1757. The Maratha plan of obtaining money from Muhammad Ali succeeded admirably.³³⁵

Both the English and the French were pressing hard upon the Maratha general to send in reinforcement to their respective camps. They were also ready to pay all the expense incurred.³³⁶ The Peshwa at this instance had realized that the English-French conflict would trail for a long time and hence sent instructions to the generals in the south not to make any commitments to any of the powers.³³⁷

The English as a measure of safety informed Gopalrao to be ready with his cavalry in case of a sudden attack from the French. Gopalrao was closely watching the movements of both the armies. But very soon the French army retreated, this situation embraced Gopalrao and he now demanded rupees twelve lakhs from the English as he was kept on waiting with his troops. The English were now not ready to pay anything to the Maratha and had also got news that Gopalrao had given the same promise to the French. Hence the English asked him to attack the French contingent if he wanted the money. Gopalrao was very much annoyed with this reply of the English and he now sent a troop of five hundred strongmen of his to join the French army. M.de Leyrit had advised Comte de Lally that he must not engage the Maratha men as they were not reliable and could cause trouble and disappear. The French attitude towards the Maratha troops surprised Gopalrao and now he decided to capture the hill town and temple of '*Tirupati*' to cease the revenues incurred by the French during the April festival.³³⁸

The French were still persistent on getting the Marathas on their side. The letter written by Comte de Lally to Bussy on June 13, 1758 says....

“Balajirao is a person to be interested in our conflict.” In another letter written in September 1758 he writes.... “This name forces me to respect the governor. I here that the English, are soliciting Balajirao and the latter is even preparing for an expedition into the Karnatak. You are the only person who can enlighten me on whether this proximity (of Balajirao) would be advantageous or disadvantageous to French interests.”³³⁹ In his reply to Lally, Bussy discouraged any alliance with the Marathas. He wrote.... “It is dangerous, to call to our aid this men whose only object is to plunder and who can thereby augment our difficulties. Not only would they demand a high price for their assistance, but faithless as they are, they would sign the treaty, receive money and presents. From the French, and would then, without any scruple, join our enemies – the English.”³⁴⁰

It is very surprising to see the sudden change in Bussy’s attitude towards the Marathas. In his memorandum summated to Lally on October 28, 1758 Bussy states that he wished to return to Hyderabad as he could then check the activities of the Marathas and eventually break the alliance between Balajirao and the English and stop them from invading the Karnatak.³⁴¹ The year 1759, showed internal dissensions among the French camp. Comte de Lally did not give head to the advice of Bussy and kept on negotiations with Gopalrao. The Maratha was using his tactics of bargain to extract money from the French. He had also sent a message to him that the English were ready to pay him seven lakhs if he helped them with four thousand strongmen in their war against the French. Lally on the other hand, complains that Deroute, Bussy’s A.D.C. had spread rumours that Gopalrao had accepted four lakhs from the English and was very shortly going to ravage the French troops and territory. This news had demoralized the army of Lally. To make matters more worse for the French, Gopalrao disclosed to Lally that Bussy did not bothered to inform Lally about

his correspondence with the Peshwa and the Nizam.³⁴² The Maratha Vakil had expressed surprise that the French commander had not sent a present to the Peshwa, a custom which was observed by all the French Governors on their arrival in India.³⁴³

In March 1759, the French Council decided to negotiate with the Marathas for the supply of two thousand troops. Accordingly the Council entrusted the job to Bussy. But the drafts prepared by Bussy were rejected by Lally as he felt that he could negotiate with the Marathas and secure better terms than Bussy. He also dismissed the Marathas Vakil who had been invited for negotiations without informing it to Bussy.³⁴⁴ The internal dissensions between Comte de Lally, M.de Bussy and M. de Leyrit had by now become a matter of great concern for the French affairs in India. The English could benefit from this as the reports sent by all the three Frenchmen to France on the French affairs in India were contradictory to one another. It was only due to this reason that the French Crown did not immediately approve of the demands made by the generals and directors of the French Company. As help from France in form of money, men and ammunition delayed the French had to rely on the Marathas to keep up their existence.

In the year 1759 the Peshwa started an expedition against the Siddi of Janjira. He captured Underi on January 28, 1759, but the task of reducing Janjira was a tough one and hence the Peshwa sought help from the English. The English refused for any such help to the Peshwa as they feared the reduction of Janjira could in future cause danger from the Marathas to their flourishing settlement of Bombay. The Peshwa then negotiated with the French to help him in his enterprise. But the French informed him that they were not in a position to spare any ships for the Maratha conquest of Janjira. The Peshwa latter dropped the idea of the reduction of Janjira as he had to pay attention to the affairs at Delhi.³⁴⁵

Visaji Biniwale, a Maratha Sardar in the south made a proposal to the French, the proposal contained the same terms and conditions proposed by him to Muhammad Ali and the English. The proposal contained the following items viz....

1. The French were not to assist the Mughal Emperor.
2. They were to help the Marathas to subjugate the Siddi of Janjira and other enemies.
3. To pay twelve lakhs, five in cash and the remaining in two installments within eight months.
4. They were to cede to the Marathas half the territory which would be conquered from the English, in particular, Jinji, Tirupati and Chandragiri (75 miles north-west of Madras).
5. To pay on the bankers on lakh rupees to Visaji Krishna and Gopalrao Patwardhan.
6. To supply to the Peshwa cannon, elephants and horses.
7. To send assistance to the Marathas, if as a result of this agreement the English attacked them.
8. and to share with them half the plunders.

The French Council took nearly nine long months to reciprocate to the proposal made by Visaji Biniwale and finally decided to cede the petah of Thiagar (about 45 miles west-south-west of Pondicherry) and Jinji to the Marathas. But the quick move of Muhammad Ali, turned the tables on the French as he agreed to pay to the Marathas an amount of twenty lakhs in cash, half of which was to be paid in twenty days and the remaining in next nine months. Visaji finally broke away from the French in January 1761. Pondicherry was capitulated by the English on

January 16, 1761. The fall of Pondicherry was a serious blow to the French enterprise in India. The French were restored with their colonies in May 1763 after a peace treaty was signed between England and France. The colonies when restored were in total disaster and rebuilding them was a challenging task. The French Company never revived its lost glory after 1761, but remained in India for a long time.

Among the three competitors for the succession of the Mughal Empire- the Marathas, the French and the English – the first two sustained crushing defeats almost simultaneously. The Marathas were defeated in the third battle of Panipat (about 55 miles north of Delhi) in January 14, 1761, while Pondicherry surrendered on the 16th of the same month. The third battle of Panipat, (Jan. 14, 1761) ended the Maratha attempt to succeed the Mughals as rulers of India and marked the virtual end of the Mughal Empire. The Maratha army, under the Sadashivrao Bhau Sahib, was trapped and destroyed by the Afghan chief Ahmad Shah Abdali (Durrani). This began 40 years of anarchy in northwestern India and cleared the way for later British supremacy. The Marathas had been definitely checked by the disaster at Panipat, while the French never recovered from the blow dealt to power by the English in 1761.

CHAPTER IV

Franco-Maratha Relations: The Period of Anarchy and Interdependency

(1761-1818)

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Franco-Maratha Relations: The Period of Anarchy and Interdependency

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I) The Seven Year's War and its Aftermath:

The failure of the French in India in the Seven Year's War is generally attributed to a number of factors, the rashness and arrogance of Comte de Lally, the violent discord between Lally and the Company's officers at Pondicherry, the acute want of money which crippled the French military operations, the recall of Bussy from the Deccan, the bad choice of officers, the timidity of d'Ache which deprived Lally of naval support at every critical moment, and many others. The French government shaken by the intensity of public opinion, found a scapegoat in Lally, who was sentenced to death for "betraying the interest of the nation." Voltaire has condemned it as "One of those murders which are committed with the sword of justice."³⁴⁷ Voltaire has also rightly diagnosed the real cause of the French failure in the Seven Year's War. He says.... "The real cause was the same as in other parts of the world; The superiority of the English fleet, the carefulness and perseverance of that nation, its credit, its ready money and that spirit of patriotism which is stronger in the long run than the trading spirit and the greed for riches."³⁴⁸

The war in the latter stage proved so disastrous to France in every theater of conflict that by 1762 the French government was forced to the necessity of seeking peace at any cost. The preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau on the 3rd November 1762, followed by the conclusion of a definitive treaty signed in Paris on the 10th of February 1762. The terms of the Treaty of Paris were almost crushing for France. "France had lost the flower of her navy, her vast

dominion in North America, the remains of the conquest of Dupleix and Bussy, her best possessions on the western coast of Africa and several in the Antilles.” England had acquired an enormous increase of territory and an overwhelming arrogance of tone. It was for the first time England since the middle ages defeated France and it was only achieved on the superiority of her government.

The French colonies in India were restored to France by the Treaty of Paris in 1763. But in reality a profound change had come over in positions of England and France in India by the steady expansion of the English power, and when the French returned to India in 1765 they found the old balance of power completely upset. In 1749 both the nations were on a footing of equality in Bengal and the Coromandel Coast, while neither of them had any political influence in the interior of the country. In 1765 while the French position remained nearly the same, the English had obtained the mastery of Bengal and the Carnatic; Oudh was at their mercy; they were in occupation of the Northern Circars, wrested from the French and the ruler of Hyderabad had been reduced to a subordinate ally dependent on their protection; even the Mughal Emperor was living as their pensioner. The dream of Dupleix had come true, but for the benefit of his adversaries.³⁴⁹ The French colonies were in an utterly deplorable condition. Pondicherry in particular, had crumbled into a ruin. The treaty had also stipulated against any possible fortification of these places.³⁵⁰

The Frenchmen in India whether officials or adventurers in the services of the Indian Princes, were full of hopes and believed that they could still retrieve the position of their nation by building up alliances with important country powers. The French Company became completely moribund after 1763 and was suppressed in 1769 as the attention of the French government was fully absorbed by

internal troubles and European complication, gave little inclination to their distant possessions in India. The disastrous battle of Panipat crippled the Maratha Confederacy. Peshwa Nanashaheb died of its shock, while most of the Maratha aristocracy was ruined. The strength of the combined Maratha power was totally exposed to the major and minor powers in the North and the South. In Karnatak the State of Mysore rose to power under Haider Ali and his son Tipu Sultan. Haider Ali gained mainly from the Maratha ruins at Panipat and started to consolidate his position and power which later saw his son Tipu Sultan becoming the de-facto ruler of Mysore. In the north the English were benefited from the Maratha ruins. They first brought Bengal under their sway with an effective administrative policy and started to subjugate the Nawabs of the Mughal Empire by playing them against one another. They had extended their dominion to the east of Benaras (420 miles south-east of Delhi) After the battle of Buxar (October 23, 1764), the Emperor had place himself under their protection. (Buxar is 65 miles east-north-east of Benaras) and in August 1765, they had also acquired the Diwani of Bengal. Thus they had become a power to be recognized. They had also became virtual masters of the Karnatak as far as south as the Cape of Comorin, as Muhammad Ali was been made a puppet by them. Pondicherry was now under the dependency of Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Karnatak, who was an inveterate enemy of the French. He could at will, cut off all the communications and reduce Pondicherry to a state of starvation. The French could not even cross its borders without his prior permission. But they still feared the Marathas as they were aware of their strength and diplomacy. The Marathas, very shortly started to recover their lost glory under the leadership of Peshwa Madhavrao. They forced Nizam Ali to complete submission and inflicted severe defeats upon Haider Ali of Mysore.

In January 1765 Jean Law de Lauriston arrived in India. He was appointed as Commissioner of the King of France to take possessions of the French settlements in India. It was under his stupendous courage and hard-work, that the French were successful to gradually rebuild the prime settlement of Pondicherry. The great exploits of the young Peshwa Madhavrao gave a new encouragement to the Marathas. The French were waiting for a situation wherein they could destroy the English. Jean Baptiste Chevalier, Chief of the French settlement of Chandernagore found this opportunity in the Marathas. His report sent to the French government in March 1769 mentions, that the Marathas were the only power on whom the French could rely in case of a war between France and England. He had great faith in Janoji Bhosale, the Maratha chieftain of Nagpur.

II) The Maratha occupation of the North:

The Maratha disaster at Panipat had weakened the Maratha influence in the north; hence Peshwa Madhavrao in 1769 sent a large force under the command of Visaji Krishna and Ramchandra Ganesh. These two commanders were later joined by Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar in the north. The combined forces of the Marathas subjugated the whole of Rajputana and the Jat territory. Mahadji and Tukoji crossed the Yamuna and defeated the Rohillas. The entire Doab (region between Yamuna and Ganga) was now controlled by the Marathas. The Marathas obtained rupees on crore as prize money and in addition gained the right to obtain Chautai from the whole province. They forced all the Governors and Princes to owe them allegiance and tribute. A deputation was also sent to Calcutta to demand all the arrears of tribute from Bengal. In his letter to Monseigneur de Terray, French Minister for the Navy, Chevalier writes that he is aware about the negotiations going on

between the Marathas and the Emperor as he had posted his agents at Allahabad and Calcutta.³⁵¹

The English were not ready to accept any demands of the Marathas; rather they had started to prepare for war against the Marathas, which they thought was now inevitable.³⁵² The English domination of the province of Bengal had now become an eyesore for the Marathas. They were very anxious to oust the English from there, but to achieve this objective the Marathas needed European artillery and troops. The Maratha's especially the three important generals viz Ramchandra Ganesh, Mahadji Shinde and Tukoji Holkar thought of having an alliance with the French. On the other hand Chevalier was waiting for a proper opportunity to lower the English prestige and avenge the humiliation of the French nation by the Treaty of Paris. Chevalier had also come to conclusion that the Maratha's, were the most dominant power in India and that there was every possibility of a clash between them and the English. Chevalier however was not able to satisfy the demands made by the Maratha's, for the want of advance instructions and preparations at the Isle of France. In his letter to the Minister, dated January 6, 1771, Chevalier suggested an alliance with the Marathas, who were well disposed to the French and had also made an initiative. He also proposed that the French should furnish a corps of two to three thousand soldiers to the Emperor; the Maratha's would be a party to the agreement and would supply an escort to the French troops from their port of landing to Delhi. He thought it would be possible to train fifty to sixty thousand sipahis with the help of these three thousand French soldiers. It was his master-plan to create a revolution in India to destroy the power of the English.³⁵³ In his reply to the plan of Chevalier, the Minister in January 24, 1772 gave instructions that he must not give a slightest cause to the English to complain against the French.³⁵⁴

The Governor of Pondicherry, Law de Lauriston, was of the same opinion that the Maratha's were the only power in India whose alliance would be beneficial to the French. In his letter to the Controller General, dated October 13, 1771 he has stated that in possibility of war breaking out between the English and the French, the English would block the entrance to the Ganges; the best entrance to the French would then be only Bombay. Hence the French must first reduce Bombay rather than Bengal. The port of Bombay would surely benefit the French in all there future activities in India. He also stated that the Marathas were the neighbours to Bombay and they would help the French in every enterprise. He hence proposed that an immediate alliance be formed with the Marathas. The combined forces of the two could also capture Surat, another port of strategic and commercial importance.³⁵⁵

III) The French and Haider Ali:

The State of Mysore had come to prominence after 1761 that is after the ruin of Marathas at Panipat under the able leadership of Haider Ali. This enterprising youth hated the English and had also displayed his wrath against them on several occasions. The French Minister had been informed about him and the Minister strongly recommended an alliance with Haider Ali as he thought him to be an potential ally in the long-run. Haider Ali was controlling a very strategic region which was of prime importance to the French to reduce the English. The French desired to cultivate an intimate friendship with him and help him with three hundred to four hundred soldiers. They thought that with such service Haider Ali would protect the French establishments in India.³⁵⁶

The understanding between Haider Ali and the French caused a embarrassment between Hugel and Law. Hugel was of the opinion of

supporting Haider Ali against the English. Law did not approve of this move. The Marathas were not on good terms with Haider Ali and there was war between the two. The joining of the French contingent with Haider Ali was now surely to make the Marathas their enemies. Hence Law wanted to avoid the situation. He therefore, recommended Hugel that he must now persuade peace with the Marathas through the Nawab's good offices.³⁵⁷

The government in France however gave suggestions that the attachment which Haider Ali had shown towards them must be given due respect and consideration. But the French government was not sure about such friendly dispositions with the Marathas. Some cases of piracy done by Marathas at Mahe on the Malabar Coast had also reached France. Regarding the Marathas, Law advised not to give any cause for complaint, for the aim of French policy in India was to keep good terms with all the Powers in that country, without taking part in their internecine struggles, to see that they are disposed to help the French when such an occasion would arise.³⁵⁸

IV) The Administrative change in the French East India Company:

Sharp changes were been made in the military and civil administrative structure in 1770. The Company was suppressed in 1770 and all its possessions in India were taken over by the Crown. There were no major changes from 1770 to 1773, But with the appointment of Focault as *Intendant* and *Commissaire Ordonnateur* and his arrival at Pondicherry in October 1773, the administrative system underwent a complete change. The possessions in India were brought under the same form of government as existed in the other colonies of France. The executive power was divided into two hands, the Governor and the *Intendant*, each supreme in his own

sphere and not dependant on the other. The former was entrusted with political and military affairs. Relieved of administrative duties his sole concern was to deal with the country Powers. The *Intendant* was entrusted with the whole civil administration, including finance, police, justice, shipping and commerce. Neither the Governor nor the *Intendant* was fettered in his sphere of action by the majority opinion of the *Conseil Superieur*, since that body was deprived of all administrative power and converted into a purely judicial tribunal with the Intendant as the President.³⁵⁹

The defects of this system of government and the complications it gave rise to are stated in detail by Law in his lengthy *Memoire* dated January 21, 1776.³⁶⁰ Law had sent a proposal to France for the establishment of a small consultative committee in the place of the old *Conseil Superieur*, with power to the Governor to over ride the decision of the majority if he thought it necessary. In 1773, he had objected to the introduction of a colonial form of a government in India, But his warning about the possible difficulties that might arise were not paid attention in France and the change was effected in October of the same year with the arrival of the first *Intendant* and *Ordonnaetur*.³⁶¹

Law has criticized the new administrative system on several grounds in his *Memoire* of 1776.

- 1) The Colonial form of government was wholly unsuitable to India possessions, since the circumstances in India were entirely different and it was necessary for the government to deal with a large alien population and maintain political relations with country powers.
- 2) The division of authority between the Governor and the *Intendant*, with little interconnection between them, was bound to lead to confusion, since many of the functions given to both were allied and could not be performed in isolation.

In case of a difference of opinion between the Governor and the *Intendant* there would be a complete dead-lock, which could be resolved only by a positive order for Paris, but that would time and much harm might be caused during the interval. The danger would be especially great in time of war, and military operations would be paralyzed if the Governor had constantly to dispute with the *Ordonnateur* for money and supplies.

- 3) In the division of authority the Governor had to be relegated for all practical purposes to a position of secondary importance. He was not given any share in the civil administration and had thus no control over the administrative personnel. All branches of civil government, like justice, police, finance, shipping and commerce, were exclusively under the control of the *Intendant*. Even in the sphere of jurisdiction of the Governor the *Intendant* had effective power of control since finance was in his hands, and by simply refusing to supply money he could prevent the Governor from pursuing a policy in political and military affairs not liked by him.
- 4) The possible intention for the introduction of the administrative change was to increase the importance of the governor in the eyes of the country powers by giving him full authority in political and military affairs unfettered by any committee and reliving him of the cases of ordinary administrative duties. But in reality the effect was just the opposite, as the country powers were shrewd enough to detect the powerlessness of the Governor and the real importance of the *Intendant*, thus giving them full opportunity to exploit the division of authority to their own advantage. Law has concluded his *Memoire* by stating, "the manner in which the machine is setup today does not make it possible in a

country like this, for two brother's even twins, to work in concert, unless one of them is determined to pass ever blindly whatever the other wishes."³⁶²

There was acute financial distress after 1770 at Pondicherry; there was no money even to pay civil and military employees and to purchase provision for the inhabitants. The payment of salaries was often in arrears, and even the construction of fortification was held up for lack of funds. But the Frenchmen in India, whether officials or adventurers in the service of the Indian Princes, were full of hopes and believed that they could still retrieve the position of their nation by building up alliances with important country Powers.

V) Peshwa Madhavrao seeks French assistance:

Peshwa Madhavrao took the reigns in his hands and very shortly established recognition for himself as an able administrator and a skillful statesman. Even after the severe blow of Panipat, Madhavrao made untiring efforts to revive the lost glory of the Marathas. The English had now become a great cause of concern to the Marathas and hence they wanted to expel them out of India. Peshwa Madhavrao had by now realized that in his efforts to tackle the English it was only the French who would assist him whole heartedly as they were the common enemy of the two. The rise of Haider Ali in Mysore was also a cause of concern to the Marathas. They were determined to destroy the power of Haider Ali even before that of the English.

Peshwa Madhavrao was keen to get into negotiations with the French to seek assistance against Haider Ali. In 1772, he had instructed Trimbakrao Pethe, his

general operating in the south to negotiate with the French Governor at Pondicherry.

His proposal to the French was as follows....

1. The French should bring into India and pass into the service of the Marathas ten thousand men who were stationed at the Isle of France, with arms, ammunition and artillery necessary for the conduct of the different campaigns in which they would partake.
2. The Marathas promised to cede to the French all the territory that to Haider Ali beyond the (eastern), ghats and fetching annual revenue of thirty to forty lakhs.
3. They would pay in cash all the expense of the French troops and also of those stationed at Pondicherry until the French became undisturbed possessors of the said territory.
4. The Marathas would also cede to the French, Bassein and its dependencies on the Konkan coast.
5. They would help the French to re-establish themselves in Bengal and in other parts of India as they liked.
6. The Marathas would consider the enemies of the French as their own and as such would render them assistance when ever they needed it.
7. As long as the French were at peace with the English, the Marathas would not force them either to attack the latter or disturb them in any manner; but in the eventuality of a war being declared between the two, the Marathas, from that moment, would consider the English as their enemies.
8. Finally it was also concluded that the Marathas would compel Nizam Ali to engage French troops in his service and to cede to the French, districts in the neighborhood of Masulipatam. Which fetched an annual revenue of twenty lakhs for the maintenance of the troops.³⁶³

9.

The Marathas had inflicted crushing defeats on Haider Ali but were unable to destroy him completely. To attain this goal it was necessary for them to reduce the strong holds of Bangalore (185 miles west of Madras) and Srirangapatan. The Marathas to achieve this purpose had to possess European artillery without which they could not defeat Haider Ali. The Peshwa was also aware that the English, who were now a dominant power in India, would not fail to play the divide and rule policy, which was so much to their interest.³⁶⁴

Peshwa Madhavrao thought that the mere presence of ten thousand French soldiers in India would certainly neutralize the activity of the English, whose settlements in India would be in danger by an attack by the French. The port of Bassien would prevent the Government of Bombay from doing any mischief in the Maratha territory and the French contingent in the Nizam's service would counter check English activities in Bengal. Madhavrao was of the opinion that only after the destruction of Haider Ali he would try to drive out the English out of India. This treaty proposed by Peshwa Madhavrao to the French, reveals his great genius. But the untimely death of the young Peshwa brought in a greater calamity to the Marathas than even the disaster of Panipat.³⁶⁵

The English to counter the growing power of the Marathas in the North, carried out intrigues with Shuja-ud-daula, the Nawab of Audh a close ally of the English East India Company. They were also trying to win over the Rohillas against the Marathas. The Rohillas wanted the control of the fertile districts of Kora (260 miles south-east of Delhi) and Allahabad (355 miles south-east of Delhi) which were in the possession of Shuja-ud-daula. Peshwa Madhavrao in his letter written to Visaji Krishna Biniwale in June 22, 1772 had expressed his desire to oust the English from Bengal at the first suitable opportunity.³⁶⁶

The Marathas as well as the French were keen to maintain contact with each other. The French had also stationed Sieu Dujardy at Delhi to maintain contacts with the Emperor. Mahadji Shinde, one of the most important generals of the Marathas had also entered into a treaty with the French chief of Chandernagore. The treaty had the following terms....

1. As soon as the war broke out between France and England, the Marathas would ally the French.
2. The combined forces of the two would expel the English from Bengal.
3. Mahadji Shinde would supply an escort to the French forces arriving in India either at Cuttack or in Gujrat.
4. If the territory, through which the French troops would pass, belonged to another Indian Prince, Mahadji would have to give them safe passage.
5. Mahadji Shinde was to supply bullocks and other provisions they would require on the way to their destination.
6. The French were to satisfy the Maratha claims on the Chautai of Bengal.

The treaty was to become effective as soon as it was ratified by the heads of the two nations. Chevalier had sent it to France for further discussions and finalizations, for he thought this alliance would bring the greatest advantage to the French interests.³⁶⁷ The proposal met the same fate as that made by Peshwa Madhavrao himself to Law in 1772. Peshwa Madhavrao died on November 18, 1775. His death was followed by a period of great confusion in Maratha politics from which Haider Ali was the only person to derive the greatest benefit.

VI) The Ambitious Plans of Peshwa Narayanrao

Narayanrao succeeded Madhavrao, as Peshwa, at a very young age. The energetic Peshwa was very ambitious and believed in military reputation. He had a grand plan to invade the whole of the Karnatak. Narayanrao desired to have an alliance with the French, firstly to expulse Muhammad Ali, the Nawab of Arcot and secondly to oust the English. This desire of the Peshwa was communicated by the Maratha commandant of the fort of Gurumkonda (90 miles north-east of Bangalore) to Law. Law immediately sent a pair of pistols and a costly gun as a present to the Peshwa. The Peshwa too sent '*a sarpech*' with a friendly letter. Unfortunately before the letter reached Pondicherry the news of the assassination of Peshwa Narayanrao arrived at Gurumkonda. Narayanrao was murdered in broad day light in the palace of the Peshwa i.e. '*Shaniwarwada*', Poona on August 30, 1773 by the *Gardis*. The assassination was planed by his uncle Raghunathrao alias Raghoba Dada. Raghunathrao succeeded as Peshwa immediately after the death of Narayanrao. Raghunathrao withdrew the letter and the present sent by Narayanrao from the Commandant of Gurumkonda. The commandant of Gurumkonda regretted and expressed his inability to send the letter and presents which Narayanrao had desired to offer the Governor. He also assured him that Raghunathrao his new master was also anxious for the friendship of the French.³⁶⁸

VII) The Transformation of Power from the Peshwa to the Karbhari:

The Maratha State had witnessed a transformation of power from the Chhatrapati to the Peshwa in 1749. The power of the Maratha kingdom was vested into the hands of the Peshwa from 1749 to 1773 i.e. for 24 years, which was represented by six Peshwa's, rule of the Chhatrapati's being 119 years i.e. from 1630-

1749. The second transformation of power took place in 1773, this time the power was taken over by the Karbhari i.e. servant of the Peshwa. The rule of the Karbhari lasted from 1773 to 1818 i.e. for 45 years, till the end of the Maratha State. The Maratha rule under the Chhatrapati initially started with a strong central sovereign authority. This kingdom of the Marathas was gradually transformed into a Confederacy during the times of the Peshwa with a weak central authority and remained to be so till it finally exhausted in 1818.

The assassination of the Peshwa Narayanrao divided the Marathas in two factions, one party supporting Raghunathrao and the other rallying around the infant son of Gangabai, widow of the late Peshwa Narayanrao. Raghunathrao now realizing his hopes of becoming Peshwa would not be achieved due to the successful intrigues of the '*Barbhai's*' opted to negotiate with the English at Bombay for help. The overtures of Raghoba gave a golden opportunity to the English to fulfill their cherished dream of becoming the supreme masters of western India.

The *Poona Darbar* under rule of the *Barbhai's* thought of securing French assistance, the inveterate enemies of the English. Haripant Phadke, the Maratha general in his letter written in 1775 to Nana Fadnavis, the top brass leader among the *Barbhai's* advised to seek French aid to curb the ambitions of the English. Phadke also felt that the French would surely accept such an invitation.³⁶⁹

VIII) The Barbhai Council's proposals to the French:

The Barbhai Council had sent a Maratha agent, Govind Raghunath, to the French Consul at Surat, M. Anquetil de Braincourt in 1775.³⁷⁰ According to the proposal made by the council; the Marathas were ready to cede to the French a port of their choice on the Malabar Coast. The condition mentioned for this

proposal was that the French should supply two hundred soldiers from Pondicherry to subjugate Raghoba and also check the English activities on the coast. The French consul did not react instantly to the proposal and promised the Maratha agent that he would communicate their regret to the Minister in France and also to the Governor of Pondicherry. The French were interested either in Gheria (Vijaydurg) of Bassein. The Poona Darbar also promised to extend total co-operation and assistance to the French troops landing on the Maratha shores. However these assurances did not completely satisfy the French consul and he had to suspend his negotiations in wake of the growing suspicions of the English.³⁷¹

The Council after realizing that their proposals did not materialize with the French consul at Surat, took recourse to the Chief of the French settlement of Mahe. The record of Janrao Dhulap, a Maratha naval officer in the Diary of the Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao, dated April 13, 1775, mentions that a secret mission was sent to Mahe. The letters of the proposal were entrusted to Janrao Dhulap and instructions were sent to Balaji Ganesh of Devgad and Anandrao Shinde of Revadanda (Chaoul) to assist him with a swift passage.³⁷² According to the proposal

1. The Marathas were eager to form an alliance with the French against the English.
2. They offered to the French all the establishments occupied to the English on the Malabar Coast.
3. They were ready to pay thirty to forty lakhs as expenses for the French troops

The Chief of Mahe, Colonel Repentigny was greatly thrilled by the proposal of alliance made by the Marathas towards the French. But since he was not entrusted with powers to conclude alliance's he directed them to

Pondicherry.³⁷³ Law forwarded the Maratha proposal's to France through a French officer M. Beylie, leaving for France in June 1775.³⁷⁴

The treaty of Purandhar signed on March 1, 1776 had again shattered the ambitions of Raghunathrao of becoming the Peshwa. He by now realized the English help to be futile, hence he approached Briancourt. In his secret letters dispatched to Pondicherry he promised the French Governor that he would reward the French services offered to him in equal proportion. Briancourt realizing the seriousness of the matter and the events taking place at the Maratha Court did not encourage the proposals of Raghunathrao. Briancourt promised Raghunathrao that he would not let the English know about his correspondences with them until he remains in their custody.³⁷⁵

The relations between the Poona Court and the French consul at Pondicherry again resumed in March 1777. 'Le Brillant' a French vessel arrived at the port of Surat in March 1777. The Marathas thought that the vessel had arrived with French troops sent a message of joy to Briancourt at the safe landing. The French now demanded that the Marathas should hand over the cession of Gheria and Baroda (235 miles north of Bombay) to them in return of French troops. The Marathas offered Gheria, Baroda, Bassein or Ghoga (190 mile north of Bombay) to the French at their choice, if they could send four hundred troops to Poona.³⁷⁶ It was at this juncture that M. de Saint Lubin, landed at Chaoul as French envoy with a mission of negotiating a treaty with the Poona Darbar on behalf of the Government of France.³⁷⁷

IX) The Embassy of Saint-Lubin at the Maratha Court:

The embassy of Saint-Lubin and Montigny were the two important embassies among the many projected by the French Crown in India after

1761. The efforts of both the agents, St.Lubin and Montigny, were concentrated principally on forming an alliance with the Maratha Confederacy, and although they did not bear fruit, they are of great importance towards the study of French-Maratha relations of the 18th century. The alliances formed during this period clearly show the trend of the French policy in India during the 'War of American Independence' and the reactions it produced on the Southern powers and the English.

Pallebot de Saint-Lubin, was the French diplomatic agent who has gained the greatest notoriety in the eyes of the English even more than Chevalier. His mission to Poona was viewed with great alarm by the Governments of Bombay and Calcutta. The extent of their panic is best illustrated by the large mass of documents relating to St.Lubin's activities preserved in the Bombay Archives and published by Forrest in his 'Selections from Letters, Dispatches etc', Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series. It is rather surprising that the English, who were so much alarmed at Saint-Lubin's activities felt little concern about Montigny, who remained at Poona for a longer period and whose diplomatic net was cast wider. Saint-Lubin was actually an imposter and could not have done any material damage to the English interests in India. Among all the Frenchmen in India it is only Comte de Modave, who has expressed a high opinion about Saint-Lubin. Bellecombe, Governor of Pondicherry considered him as a mere unprincipled adventurer, who had for a time successfully imposed on the credulity of the Minister of Marine and Colonies, M. de Sartine. Bellecombe has made a violent and sarcastic attack on him in his Memoire dated 24th January 1778, noticed already, even though he knew that Saint-Lubin enjoyed the favour of the Minister and has been sent out to India by him.

The contemporary estimate of Saint-Lubin's character is fully borne out by his own letters and narratives, presented in the Archives Nationale

under the French Colonial Ministry, dealing with his exploits in India at different times, which throw a great deal of light on his activities. There is no doubt that most of the French adventurers in India in the second half of the 18th century were not remarkable for the integrity and moderation. Most of them were prone to exaggerate things, either out of self interest or prompted by an undue zeal for the national cause. But none of them distorted facts and gave false predictions as done by Saint-Lubin.

The Embassy of Saint-Lubin forms a very important episode in the history of the relations between the French and the Marathas in the later half of the 18th century. Saint-Lubin has been considered to be an imposter by certain historians viz....

1. Grant Duff, write about him "A cheat in the character of a European gentleman was new to the Marathas, but the discernment of Nana Furnuwees could not have been even temporarily obscured by such superficial artifice."³⁷⁸
2. P.R.Roberts says "This man (Saint-Lubin), however, proved to be an imposter unauthorized by the French government."³⁷⁹
3. G.S.Sardesai observes "Nana well knew that Lubin was not an accredited ambassador but used him as an instrument to intimidate the English."³⁸⁰
4. Martineau too does not believes in the role of Saint-Lubin as French plenipotentiary, as he observes: "Nana nad Haripant Phadke listened to the proposals of the French adventurer, Saint-Lubin, who claimed to have been interested by the French government with powers to conclude a treaty with them against the common enemy."³⁸¹

Saint-Lubin was not a stranger to India. He had served as third surgeon on the vessels of the French East India Company before 1761. He had also been in the service of Haider Ali. When war broke out between Haider Ali and the

English, Saint-Lubin had found means to win the favour of Mister Call, an influential member of the Council of Madras and had played not an insignificant part in causing the debacle of that Presidency. During his stay in India i.e. after 1769, if we are to believe his statement, he had entered into negotiations with the Maratha Chiefs and with the Peshwa Madhavrao himself to form a Franco-Maratha alliance.³⁸² On his return to France, he had briefed to the Minister of Navy, the political situation in India and the different means to oust the English. He had also on January 10, 1775, submitted a plan for concluding a treaty of alliance with the Marathas. These plans and Memoires of Saint-Lubin are not traceable.

The contents of his Memoires are recorded in a document entitled "Criticism of the Memoires of Saint-Lubin", it consists of a treaty with the King of the Marathas. Its contents are as follows....

1. The French would furnish a two thousand four hundred corps of artillery troops.
2. These troops were to be divided into two regiments, one of them composed of one thousand two hundred men and called as 'The Regiment of Alliance', would serve the Marathas and would always maintain its full strength.
3. The other would be stationed at Pondicherry and would be utilized for recruiting the regiment of alliance.
4. The Marathas would meet all the expenses of these corps, incurred from its leaving in Europe, transport to India, maintenance, pay, etc.

Due to the fear of hostility with the English, circumspection was required, so it was suggested by Saint-Lubin that the troops could be dispatched to the Marathas secretly, or under the pretext of desertion.³⁸³ Saint-Lubin's letter dated April 7, 1775 urged upon the Minister to execute his plan as it did not incur great expenditure or need much preparation. He was also ready to take the

responsibility of 'concluding an alliance with the Marathas under the pretext of signing with them a treaty of commerce and securing admission into their ports'. He also appealed to the Minister to rely on his skills in negotiating with the main with whose interests, language and principles he was well conversant.³⁸⁴

By the time the Maratha proposals reached France in 1776 war had broken out between England and her American Colonies. The American War of Independence broke out on July 4, 1776. France had now got an opportunity to avenge the humiliations of the Treaty of Paris (1763). The Court of Versailles had not declared war against England. Vergennes, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, advised Sartine, the Minister for the Navy, to establish contact with the Government of Poona.³⁸⁵ Sartine after carefully scrutinizing the proposals of Saint-Lubin decided to entrust him with the important mission.

Sartine, the Minister for the Navy communicated to Saint-Lubin on 26th March 1776, that the King of France was pleased to employ him as an envoy of France to negotiate a treaty of commerce with the King of the Marathas. Accordingly Saint-Lubin was to be entrusted with two letters. In his letter to the King of the Marathas the King of France had announced his intentions of only establishing commercial relations between the two and that he was not interested in making any territorial gain in Hindustan. The second letter was addressed by Sartine to Nana Fadnavis, the First Minister of the Marathas. Saint-Lubin was briefed with instructions about his mission on April 22. The treaty of commerce contained four articles viz....

1. There should exist between the two nations a perpetual friendship whereby the French would render all possible service to the Marathas who, in their turn, would guarantee protection of French possessions in Hindustan against any enemy who so ever.

2. Maratha traders would be exempted from custom duties in all the French dominions, present and future, and vice-versa.
3. Maratha vessels would have free access into all French ports, and vice-versa.
4. Finally, Maratha vessels would be under French protection at all times in all the ports under the rule of that government, and vice-versa.

He was also instructed that while framing the treaty he should take care that he should not depart from any motive of the four articles and that verbally he may give any connotation which would be favourable to the interests of the two nations. He was to explain article I in particular that as the King of France was at present on peaceful terms with all nations he would not enter into any alliance with the Marathas; but if any power, by infraction of existing peace forced him to obtain justice by force of arms, he would then unite his troops with the Marathas in order to punish the common enemy.³⁸⁵

Saint-Lubin was to negotiate a conditional treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between the two Crowns against any nation which would start hostilities against France he was to negotiate proposals from the Maratha Court and forward them to the Minister of Navy. Likewise he had the additional responsibility to impress upon the King of Marathas the liability and necessity for protection of French possessions in India. In return for this favour the King of France would grant permission to his ship-owners to deal in arms and ammunition with the Marathas, also trade could be envisaged between the two under the bond of friendship and by common interest.³⁸⁶

He was also to demand the grant or use of suitable sites in the Maratha ports not only for the establishment of commercial purpose, but also for construction of vessels. He was to collect detailed information of all sorts viz. price of

wood, labour, cost required for all types of vessels constructed at Maratha ports, statement of Naval stock, number of workers to be sent to Europe for construction of vessels, time span required for construction, bearing of ports, roadstead's, anchorages, channels, mouths of rivers and draw up plans of the same with his observations, particularly on the conditions favourable to navigation therein.³⁸⁷

The treaty of commerce was to be executed immediately. Saint-Lubin was to land at the port of Chaoul and install a consul, a secretary and an interpreter either at Chaoul, Gheria or Rajapur and seek recognition from the Maratha Government.³⁸⁸

Saint-Lubin left Paris on June 5, 1776, to board the steamer at Bordeaux. On August 10, the Minister sent him final orders for departure wherein he enjoined upon him prudence and secrecy. It said "Let not the thought and love of glory which I see seething in you, prompt you to take steps which I can neither avow nor support and which will overthrow the whole edifice the foundation of which I have entrusted to your hands."³⁸⁹

Chevalier de Mouhy, writes about the character of Saint-Lubin, says "An enterprising man, whose intelligence and experience qualify him for some delicate mission, but whose character and conduct perhaps render him more dangerous than useful."³⁹⁰

Saint-Lubin set sail on September 19, 1776, in the vessel 'Le Sartine' and reached Mahe on February 12, 1777. After a weeks halt at this port, the vessel preceded to the Konkan Coast and arrived at Chaoul on March 16. Saint-Lubin did not land the port immediately as the Commandant of the port awaited instructions from Poona to receive him. The Commandant personally received Saint-Lubin on March 25 and conducted him to the residence specially furnished for him, with all the

honors befitting the dignity of the envoy of the "King of France". As soon as he landed at Chaoul Saint-Lubin sent a letter with M. de Santy to Poona for Nana Fadnavis and expressed his wish to meet him in person as to deliver him the letters of the King of France. He had brought with him a heavy stock of ammunition which he had stored at the fort of Revadanda. He left for Poona on April 11 and arrived at the Maratha capital on April 22.³⁹¹

After a stay of two days at Poona he set for Purandhar on the 24th as the infant Peshwa and his Ministers were at Purandhar (90 miles south-east of Bombay and 16 miles south of Poona). On his way he met Bhimrao Phanse, Commandant of the Maratha artillery. On 4th May he had an interview with Minister Sakharambapu and Nana Fadnavis. At this occasion he handed to Nana Fadnavis the letter by Sartine. He also informed that, he had a letter from the King of France for the infant Peshwa. The initial meeting was formal and nothing political was discussed.³⁹² Saint-Lubin was given a audience with the Peshwa on 8th May. At this time he was received with great honour and ceremony. Sakharambapu and Nana Fadanvis personally received Saint-Lubin as he dismounted the elephant and introduced him to the Darbar. Saint-Lubin then delivered the letter of the King of France into the little hands of the Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao along with the presents.³⁹³

On the other hand the English resident, Mr. Mostyn, was received by two subordinate officers and with much less ceremony. This difference in treatment to the two representatives of the two European nations naturally evoked a protest from the Government of Bombay to the Poona Darbar. Krishnarao Ballal Kale was appointed as officer in-charge of French affairs. Kale meet Saint-Lubin and requested him to translate the letters himself to avoid any introvert incidence. Saint-Lubin complied, he also added the translations of the four articles of the permanent

treaty. The Maratha Council then unanimously accepted the treaty and its contents. Liberty of trade was granted to all Frenchmen in accordance with the proposed terms and conditions. It was also resolved to demand French officers and soldiers to train Maratha troops who would then fight side-by-side with the French troops when such an occasion would arise.³⁹⁴

The treaty of the four articles was signed on June 18, 1777 and the alliance was solemnized on the 23rd. Saint-Lubin in order to give publicity to this act called all the Frenchmen residing in Poona at the Maratha Court and swore by the Holy Evangel on behalf of the King of France, a perpetual alliance between His Very Christian Majesty and the King of the Marathas in accordance with the terms of the treaty concluded between the two Crowns. Nana Fadanvis too handed him the oath of the Peshwa, pronounced at the altar of God and wrote on a paper sanctified by the sacred powder.³⁹⁵ The publicity given to this act was against the instructions of the French Minister who had enjoined upon Saint-Lubin prudence and secrecy. This may be one of the reasons why Saint-Lubin failed in disgrace on his return to France.

The Peshwa's reply to the King of France was handed over by Nana Fadanvis on the 27th to Saint-Lubin. The Peshwa had expressed his great pleasure in accepting the Kings friendship and gave him an assurance about his own. The Maratha Government assistance in all matters was also reaffirmed and assured by the Peshwa. The Peshwa at the same time made it clear that he too expected the same kind of help and co-operation from the French Government whenever it was required. Finally, the Peshwa also informed him his decision to retain Saint-Lubin at his Court as a Minister on behalf of His Majesty. Nana Fadnavis also wrote a reply to Sartine's letter.³⁹⁶

M. Pascal de Santy, Captain of Saint-Lubin's guards was furnished with the necessary passport and conveyance to proceed to Surat (July 7, 1777). He was entrusted with packets containing replies from the Maratha Government to the King of France and his Ministers and also Saint-Lubin's reports of his activities at the Maratha Court. He could not leave Poona immediately due to rains and arrived at Surat on September 1, 1777. As there was caravan at the moment proceeding to the Persian Gulf his journey was delayed.³⁹⁷ Pascal wanted to proceed to Europe via Suez. At Surat, he obtained a passage in a dingy bound for Muscat where he arrived towards the end of January 1778. Instead of waiting for a caravan which was just then preparing to setout for Aleppo, Pascal, accompanied by another Frenchman, went to Basara, thence to Haifa and Seuz.³⁹⁸

According to the conditional treaty, the Marathas promised to place twenty five thousand men of there cavalry at the disposal of Saint-Lubin in-case of hostilities against the French establishments in India. It appears that the French, in their turn, were to dispatch a force two thousand five hundred strong, to assist the Marathas, as soon as war was declared between France and England in Europe. Saint-Lubin had made arrangements for the landing of these troops in Portuguese harbour. In his letter to the Captian General of Goa, dated April 26, he wrote: "I lay before you the true motives which induced me to request of Your Excellency and your Supreme Council leave to bring thorough your dominions two regiments which were sent by His Christian Majesty to the Most High Bramhin Ministers of this Darbar of Poona to put a stop to the disorders resulting from the death of their sovereign, and as the granting of these succor redounds to the credit of my King in giving his protection to those who solicit it."³⁹⁹

This correspondence was intercepted and the Bombay Government made representations to the Government of Goa, requesting them 'Not in any shape to interfere or take any measures that may tend to promote the success of the French schemes.'⁴⁰⁰ Saint-Lubin obtained the approval of the Maratha Government for the establishments of the Consulates at Chaoul as well as in other important places, but for want of suitable persons to fill the posts, this clause could not take effect. He terminated his report to the Minister with a request to dispatch his reply by a frigate directly to Chaoul with presents from the King of France to the Peshwa and his Ministers.⁴⁰¹

Regarding the workmanship of the Maratha ship builders Saint-Lubin has written: "Maratha ship builders are much better workman than their French counter part; there are slower no doubt, but heir planking is so perfect that a vessel can last thirty to forty years without being given a stroke of a pump."⁴⁰²

Saint-Lubin had thus fulfilled his mission; contact had been established with the Marathas in accordance with the instructions of Vergennes. Saint-Lubin also dispatched a letter to Bellecombe, the Governor of Pondicherry (August 10), furnishing him with all the details of the transactions.⁴⁰³ The French Governor, however, did not find any advantage in the treaty signed between Saint-Lubin and the Maratha Government, for he was one of those who subscribed to the few that the French would desire greater advantage from an alliance with Haider Ali.⁴⁰⁴ Bellecombe also betrays jealousy for Saint-Lubin. He felt that as Governor-General, he was the plenipotentiary of the King of France with powers to enter into negotiations with the Indian Princes. Thus Saint-Lubin's arrival at Poona to conclude, independently of him, a treaty with the Marathas compromised his position and dignity.⁴⁰⁵ The French Governor was perfectly right when he said that if the French hoped to succeed in their

goal of expelling the English from India, they must have both Marathas and Haider Ali on their side.⁴⁰⁶ The French Minister for the Navy was quite aware of this fact and encouraged Bellecombe to pursue his efforts in this direction.⁴⁰⁷

As many new developments took place between the Poona Darbar and the French Government, the English, especially the Bombay Government became more restless and now registered their protest with Nana Fadanvis. Nana Fadanvis being totally aware of the new diplomatic alliances declared to the English that “theirs being a sovereign state, every power desirous of sending ambassadors to cultivate its friendship and seek its connection; to refuse admission to the ambassadors of the French Monarch or other powers charged with proposition of friendship from their masters would be highly improper, and not to hear their representations would be inconsistent with the credit and dignity of the State. It was the duty of the rulers of the State to make themselves acquainted with the affairs of every stranger, for it was necessary to admit the French Vakeel to an audience, and he was treated in becoming manner.”⁴⁰⁸

In addition Nana Fadnavis also informed Warren Hastings that the French agent had already arrived at the Poona Darbar. The Maratha alliance with the French was strongly protested by the Governor-General and by the Bombay Government, they were also surprised to know that the Marathas had ceded them with a port near to Bombay. The Government went to the extent saying that the conduct of the Marathas was not in keeping with the mutual agreements concluded between the English and the Maratha Government.⁴⁰⁹ Hastings complained to the Maratha Vakil in Calcutta, Lala Sevakram, that the Poona Darbar were amusing the English Government. “They write to us to observe the terms of the treaty and warn the

Bombay Government, but at the same time, enter into agreement with the French and give them an establishment near Bombay.”⁴¹⁰

The Bombay Government instructed Mr. Mostyn “to expostulate with the Ministers on the impropriety of their giving encouragement to the natural enemies of the English, after the peace so latently concluded by Colonel Upton.” To counter the combined activities of the French and the Marathas, the Bombay Government requested the Government at Calcutta to send in immediate reinforcements so as to deter the two from any designs on the English at Bombay. Mostyn lodged a complaint with the Maratha State saying that the friendship with the French would certainly cause a breach of trust between the English and the Marathas and that the behaviour of the Maratha Court had injured the honourable Company. This protest was lodged by him with Sakharam Bapu in person.⁴¹¹

There was a strong rumour at this time in Maharashtra that the port of Chaoul and the fort of Revadanda had been ceded to the French by the Poona Darbar. A letter from Bhiwandi near Purandhar, dated August 3, 1777, mentions that the French agent had proposed to open a factory Revadanda, but that no agreement had as yet been reached on this point.⁴¹²

The Bombay Government after much protest found that their concerns were not registered, hence they now took a difference course. Fortunately they found in Moroba Fadnavis, the uncle of Nana Fadnavis as an instrument to achieve their goal, as Moroba was quiet ambitious of becoming the Chief-Minister of the Maratha Government. Moroba conspired with Tukoji Holkar and finding an appropriate opportunity with the help of forty thousand men of Tukoji Holkar took over Poona all of a sudden on March 25, 1778. Raghunathrao was proclaimed as Peshwa and Nana Fadnavis had to run for his life to take recourse at the fort of Purandhar with his guards.

According to the report of the gentleman, who Bellecombe had sent to Poona to collect information about the activities of Saint-Lubin at the Maratha Court, the people knew about Moroba's conspiracy.⁴¹³ The gentleman informed Bellecombe that a part of the guard, which the Maratha Government had given to Saint-Lubin, had been withdrawn and that even the latter's movements were restricted; further that Saint-Lubin had not much credit at the Maratha Court, from where he had withdrawn himself. This is true, but it must be remembered that it was the period when Moroba's stars were in the ascendant and Nana himself had retired, though temporarily, from the administration. On the other hand, Mostyn's assistance Lewis, wrote from Poona on November 29, 1777: "M. de Saint-Lubin still resides in Poona, and from the behaviour Nana Furnese, on a late occasion, seems to have greater influence than ever."⁴¹⁴

Sakharam Bapu had a meeting with Moroba Fadnavis and Tukoji Holkar, accordingly the matter was reconciled and the two rebels went to Purandhar to pay their respects to the infant Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao. Moroba was allowed to take charge as the Chief-Minister; Raghunathrao was not entrusted with the Peshwa office but was offered the Regency. Thus Nana Fadanvis gained time to reconsolidate his power and position.

It was at this time Saint-Lubin appealed to the Peshwa and the Maratha Council that the English were making designs to attack the Marathas by creating divisions among them, trying to infuse jealousy and discord and were also trying to foment the relations between the Marathas and Haider Ali. He hence expressed concern and pleaded to the Maratha Ministers to cease war Haider Ali temporarily and combined their forces to attack the common enemy i.e. the English. The Peshwa replied to Saint-Lubin that he had now ceased war with Haider Ali to make peace and was going to declare war against the English. He also added that in such a position he

needed the total assistance of the King of France so as to jointly reduce Bombay, Salsette, Surat and Bhadoch (190 miles north of Bombay). The Peshwa would cede to the French, Bombay and Surat in return for their services, while Salsette and Bhadoch would remain with the Marathas. Saint-Lubin was invited to Purandhar to finalize the agreement.⁴¹⁵

Saint-Lubin had received an important piece of communication from a Portuguese copyist working in the office of the Secretary of the secret committee of the Government of Bombay who he had bribed for supplying him with secret information. This person used to furnish Saint-Lubin with copies of the deliberations of the committee and of the correspondence of the Council of Bombay with that of Calcutta. Saint-Lubin had always forwarded such secret information to the Maratha Court through memoirs addressed to the Peshwa in his Council. As Moroba had become the Chief Minister it had become impossible for Saint-Lubin to forward information to the Peshwa. Hence he requested the Peshwa to send Krishnarao Kale to Poona, as he had to disclose important news. Saint-Lubin showed to Krishnarao Kale the copy of the letter which Moroba had written to the Governor of Bombay and in which he had regretted his inability to arrest Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao, Sakharam Bapu, Nana Fadnavis and Krishnarao Kale at the meeting with the Peshwa at Purandhar on March 27. Moroba had also stated that he was suspicious of Holkars support and was waiting for Haripant Phadke and Mahadji Shinde to arrive. He had also asked for English troops to destroy Visajipant Biniwale a trusted ally of Nan Fadnavis who was in-charge to guard the road to the Maratha capital.⁴¹⁶

Krishnarao revealed to the French envoy that there was nothing to worry about the activities of Moroba as the Peshwa had secretly won over Holkar, Shinde and Phadke over to his side and that they too were just following the

instructions of the Peshwa to trap Raghunathrao and Moraba. There upon, Saint-Lubin suggested the Peshwa that since Holkar was favourable to Nana Fadnavis, Moroba should be immediately arrested for his treachery. But the Peshwa at this time did not want a civil war among the Marathas and hence gave a little more time to Moroba. The Peshwa also expected Saint-Lubin to imitate the same conduct during the visit to Purandhar as a mark of courtesy towards him.⁴¹⁷

Saint-Lubin arrived at Purandhar at the appointed day. As advised before, he paid a visit to Moroba and made him suitable presents. Moroba assured the French envoy that the treaty of alliance concluded between the King of France and the Peshwa in June 1777 would be adhered faithfully. The negotiations for the supply of French troops to expel the English from India were concluded after prolonged conference between the French envoy, on one hand, and Sakharam Bapu, Nana Fadnavis and Krishnarao Kale, on the other. The war against the English was to commence as soon as France furnished her contingent of two thousand five hundred infantry men.

The Marathas were to pay all the expenses of the French troops – there levy, arrangement, equipment, maintenance, transport and pay. They were also to furnish wood graciously for the construction of the French fleet composing of one vessel of sixty-four guns, four frigates of thirty-two, sixteen corvettes of sixteen, with all the launches cutters and other boats necessary for its service. This fleet armed, equipped and maintained by the King of France and attached to the French contingent of two thousand five hundred men would be stationed at the Isle of France (Mauritius) under the orders of the envoy, plenipotentiary of the King of France to the Maratha Court who was to assume the command of all these troops (land as well as naval) which would be called 'Troops of Alliance'.

It was decided that Saint-Lubin should proceed to France to explain personally all the terms of the treaty. He was entrusted with a letter from the Peshwa to the King of France and another from Sakharam Bapu to the Minister of Navy. The Peshwa stated that after a years counsel with Saint-Lubin, he was sending him back to brief all that was discussed and agreed by the two and that the King should reply as early as possible. He also stated that Saint-Lubin be sent back again at his Court, so as the latter should serve as a link of friendship between the two Crowns (May 13).⁴¹⁸ The copy of this letter was obtained by Mostyn, the English Resident at Poona on May 13 itself.⁴¹⁹

Saint-Lubin left Poona on July 12 for Daman (101 miles north of Bombay) where he arrived in the beginning of August.⁴²⁰ On his arrival he immediately arranged with the Portuguese commandant of the port for the hire of a corvette of sixteen guns which was then under going repairs but which would be ready for a voyage in about four months time.⁴²¹

On June 2, 1778, the Peshwa gave an undertaking in writing to the Bombay Government: "Hitherto no agreement had been concluded between him (Saint-Lubin) and this Darbar, neither shall any be made here after, and I never will hold with him or his nation, any sort of friendship, or permit the friendship to come into any of my ports, either for trade or other wise. This will continue so long as the Honourable Company and I remain in friendship."⁴²² Mahadji Shinde wrote to Hastings that he had obtained from Sakharam Bapu and Nana Fadnavis the dismissal of the French agent and persuaded them to break all connections with the French nation.⁴²³

Saint-Lubin maintained a regular correspondence with the Poona Darbar on one hand and with Briancourt, French Consul at Surat on the other. It was from Briancourt that Saint-Lubin came to know about the English designs

on Bassein.⁴²⁴ He sent to Briancourt an important document written in cipher with M. Lavary le Roy. The Bombay government in a select committee meeting held on October 12 had decided to send directions to the Chief at Surat 'to do everything in his power to prevent any correspondence being carried on between M. de Briancourt and the Poona Government, and to endeavour to intercept their letters.'⁴²⁵ It is a known fact the English were anxious to capture Bassein, but they could not attack the place before November 1780.

The information in cipher contained information related to the military plans of the Marathas against the English. Surat was to be attacked as soon as the French squadron arrived on the Maratha Coast. On receiving the message, Briancourt immediately began to consider means to help the Marathas at Surat.⁴²⁶ The English could not tolerate such activities in a place under their control and now took measures to prevent the French Consul from creating trouble. The English restricted the French Consul's activities to his Consulate garden and the rest were made prisoners and dispatched to Bombay.⁴²⁷ The English seized the papers in cipher addressed to Montigny from the French Consulate. Briancourt was arrested and sent with his family to the fort of Thana (20 miles north-east of Bombay).⁴²⁸ Briancourt had managed to obtain a copy of the plan of the city and Castle of Surat, made from the English original, and wanted to send it to Saint-Lubin who, in his turn, would dispatch it to the Marathas. The plan would help the latter to study the vulnerable points and direct the assault on the place accordingly. Briancourt was happy that, though under arrest, he was able to serve his country by dealing the English a blow which might prove extremely fatal to them.⁴²⁹

The English tried their best to find the key to the cipher, to find out the secret between the Marathas and the French. They were sure that Briancourt was in possession of the secret. Briancourt was himself worried about the

secret information. Fortunately, the English did not succeed in their attempt to understand the secret.⁴³⁰

Saint-Lubin reached Malta in July 1, 1780 and by this time had lost all his baggage. Even the Minister of Navy was replaced by M. de Castries and Saint-Lubin was not given a interview with the Minister for three months, since his arrival at Versailles in the end of October. He was finally arrested and made a prisoner by the Minister.⁴³¹ Even in prison, Saint-Lubin kept himself regularly informed about the situation in India, and persistently pointed out to the Minister the advantages of an alliance with the Marathas and disadvantages of a union with Haider Ali.⁴³² The Minister by this time was contemplating an expedition on the Coromandel Coast to co-operate with Haider Ali. Saint-Lubin was released from the prison in about the middle of 1783.

X) Montigny appointed as the French Resident at the Poona Darbar:

Colonel Montigny was dispatched to Delhi by the French Government to enter into negotiations with the Indian Princes in the north and persuade them to espouse the cause of the French in India incase of a war between France and England. He left Paris on October 3, 1776 and reached Agra on August 1, 1778.⁴³³ The English colonies in America had revolted against its parent country England, due to which England had got involved in the American War of Independence. The French thought it to be a right opportunity to avenge the humiliation Treaty of Paris, hence to divert the attention of England from America they choose to open a conflict with them on the Indian soil. Taking into consideration the heroic and gallant exploits of M. de Bussy, the French Government appointed him and entrusted with him an armed mission to India.⁴³⁴

The mission of Bussy to India primarily faced two major difficulties.

- 1) The political conditions were not the same as before i.e. as they had been before 1761.
- 2) The general policy of the French in India had now altered considerably. They were no longer interested in making conquests in India, but were rather interested to help the Indian Princes to recover their territories conquered or usurped by the English.

Bussy in his Memorandum has strongly advocated this reorientation of the French policy in India.⁴³⁵ Even the King of France, in his instructions to Bussy, two days prior to his departure said: "Our intention is not to make conquests in India, of the territories which our armies would capture in that country. His Majesty would keep the old French possessions in addition to those of the English on the Indian coasts. The rest would be returned to their legitimate masters."⁴³⁶

Bussy in his Memorandum had declared that the Marathas were the only power in India by whose alliance the French could obtain success against the English. He writes: "The Maratha nation is today paramount in the whole of the Mughal Empire. I had predicted this preponderance of the Marathas in 1753 and had then counseled an alliance with them in preference to that with the Mughals. Indeed, an alliance with the Marathas at this juncture deserves our special attention, not only because they have sought our assistance, but also because their interests at the present moment coincide with ours." Bussy was not very keen on framing a commercial treaty with the Marathas, as he said that they (Marathas) were mainly warriors and agriculturists.

The Marathas by this time had become anxious about the release of the Raja of Tanjore from the English captivity. The English had stormed Tanjore on September 17, 1773. Since then the Raja of Tanjore was under their bondage. The French assured total support to the Marathas in the cause of the release of the Raja of Tanjore, as they were finding an opportunity to humble the English. But Bussy, also urged upon the French Government, that if they had to gain the confidence of the Marathas then they must land a sufficient large troop on the Maratha Coast line and after the operations against the English are fulfilled, the Maratha right to Chautai would be safeguarded.⁴³⁷

The war between England and France began in March 1778. As its news reached India the English at Madras made all preparations to attack Pondicherry. Pondicherry at this time was not in good condition as to resist the English attack. Hence the French Governor Bellecombe dispatched urgent letters to the Marathas and Haider Ali for immediate assistance. The Marathas did not reply the urgent call. M.de Bellecombe in his letter to M. de Sartine dated October 5, 1778 has clearly mentioned: "As for the Marathas, they have not even replied to the very urgent letters which I wrote to them and I judged that their situation hardly permits them to get involved in the affairs of other nations."⁴³⁸

M.de Bellecombe had also wrote to Montigny to proceed to Poona from Delhi immediately and persuade the Maratha government to help the French by blocking the English at Bombay. Montigy was ready to carry out the instructions of the French Governor but unfortunately, Pondicherry, surrendered to the English on October 18, 1778.

The Embassy of St. Lubin at the Maratha Court and the close affinity of Nana Fadnavis towards the French nation had by this time alarmed the

English. They had become more concerned about their possessions on the West Coast in case of a war with the Marathas as they had signed an offensive and defensive treaty with the French. To prevent any harm to be caused the English decided to take advantage of the internal dissensions among the Maratha Ministers, actually to exclude Nana's influence from the Peshwa's government and install Raghunathrao as the Chief of the administration of the Maratha State so as to favour their cause.

Some scholars have attributed Nana Fadnavis's closeness towards the French to consolidate his position in the Maratha State administration and not expulse the English from India and rely on two contemporary evidences, viz.

1. William Farmer, a Member of the Bombay Civil Service, who had visited Poona at this time due to reasons of health write: "There is every reason to suspect, that Nana seeks to fortify himself in this government against his competitors and against us by means of his connections with the French."⁴³⁹
2. The Select Committee of the Bombay Council in its proceedings of October 26, 1778 writes: "It is certain that very dangerous offers have been made by Nana to the French nation, in order to engage there assistance in support of his usurped authority."⁴⁴⁰

The English were defeated by the Marathas at Wadgaon on 13 January 1779. A treaty between the two was signed. But very soon the English rejected the articles of the treaty to be disgraceful and hence forth made every effort to equip and improve its army to destroy the Marathas. The French Governor was delighted at the news of the defeat of the English at Wadgaon (Wadgaon is 55 miles east-south-east of Bombay). He immediately urged upon the French Minister to send prompt succor to the Marathas, who he thought were the only one who could easily overpower the English.⁴⁴¹

Montigny had two reasons to visit the Maratha Court

1. To espouse the cause of the French in India.
2. He wanted to secure employment for M.de Lalee at the Poona Darbar.

Lalee arrived in India with Lally and soon rose to the post of Quarter-Master of the cavalry. After the fall of Pondicherry, he returned to Europe. On his way, he was captured by the English and deprived of all his possessions. He was given a harsh treatment. He soon returned to India and joined the service of Basalat Jang. In a very short time he distinguished himself and became the leader of the French corps in August 1774. His services were recognized by the King of France and he was awarded with the brevet of Major in July 1775. Basalat Jang dismissed him under English pressure in April 1779. He then approached Parshurambhau Patwardhan with the intention to serve him, but as his services were too costly he was denied by Parshurambhau Patwardhan.⁴⁴² Lalee had under him at this time more than 5,000 men (including 500 Europeans), well armed, well kept and well equipped with artillery.⁴⁴³

The Marathas would have readily accepted the offer of Lalee and his service if they had been approached by him prior to the defeat of the English at Wadgaon. Nana Fadnavis took a long time to decide over the issue and finally in November 1779, Lalee was informed about their inability to accept his services at the present.⁴⁴⁴

The English disgraced with their defeat at Wadgaon now took recourse for a fresh campaign against the Marathas especially in Gujarat and North Konkan. They steadily captured Ahmedabad in February 1780 (Ahmedabad is 290 miles north of Bombay), Kalyan in May 1780 (Kalyan was an important trade centre) and Bassein in December 1780. They were now planning to attack the Maratha capital and take it by sudden

attack. Now to counter balance the English and put an effective check on them, Nana Fadnavis once again thought of getting French assistance. The English by this time had captured most of the French settlements in India. Hence, the Marathas now thought of sending a proposal to Souillac, the French Governor of Isle of France (Mauritius). According to the proposal...

1. The Marathas demanded 2,000 French troops with officers to command them.
2. The Marathas would pay Rs.50,000 per month as salary to the soldiers and the officers would be paid separately.
3. At the arrival of the French vessels and troops on the Konkan Coast, they would be placed on a suitable port and the port would be then ceded to them.
4. The French would get Bombay and the rest shall remain with the Marathas after the defeat of the English.
5. The French would be given liberty to establish factories in all the places.
6. The French troops would fight side by side with the Marathas against the English and would remain under the direct command of the French general.
7. Souillac was to select a general of repute to command the combined forces and who would act in close co-operation with the Poona Darbar.
8. On landing at the Maratha port, they would be paid six weeks additional salary to enable them to buy food and other things necessary for their journey to the Maratha camp.
9. The Marathas were ready to pay for all the ammunition required for the conducting the various operations.
10. The French were not to have any representative at the courts of other Indian Princes without the permission of the Poona Darbar.

11. The troops were to be dispatched immediately and delay on the French side was to be reported to the Poona Darbar.
12. After the capture of the English settlements on the west coast, the combined forces were to reduce all other possessions of the English in Bengal.
13. The Marathas would help the French to recover their lost possessions in India.

Sayyad Zain-ul Abedin Khan, who was deputed as the negotiator for this mission was entrusted with full powers by the Poona Darbar. He was to negotiate the terms with Souillac in February 1781.⁴⁴⁵ The report submitted by Montigny on his arrival at Paris to Castries, the French Minister of Navy, points out the advantage of an alliance with the Marathas as well as of a French landing on the west coast of India.⁴⁴⁶

Castries immediately sent Montigny back to India with a mission to prepare the ground work for co-operation by the Indian Princes with the French troops which he was planning to dispatch to India in the near future, the purpose of Montigny's embassy was to establish himself at the Maratha Court in preference to other Indian powers. The news of an anti-English coalition between the Marathas and Haider Ali had reached France. Montigny was hence instructed to keep a regular correspondence with Puymorin and de Lalee, leaders of the French corps in the service of Haider Ali as to know the day to day events at the court.⁴⁴⁷

The French Minister for Navy, Castries had dispatched two letters with Montigny, of which one was addressed to Nana Fadnavis and the other to Mahadji Shinde. The Minister had replied in these letters that the earlier letters and presents of the Peshwa to the King of France and his Ministers had been received safely but that the replies and presents of the King of France to the Peshwa perished on the coast of Madagascar due to a ship wreck in July 1777. Also it had become very difficult

for him to keep regular correspondence with the Maratha Court due to the war with England. He at last also recommended Montigny to Nana Fadnavis and Mahadji Shinde and requested them to have full trust in him.⁴⁴⁸

The Maratha Court by this time had sent Zain-ul Abedin Khan with a proposal to set sail to the Isle of France (Mauritius) to meet Souillac for negotiating a fresh Franco-Maratha alliance. Zain-ul Abedin Khan was at Goa in September 1781 and was waiting for transport to go to the Isle of France, when he met Montigny at Goa. Montigny arrived at Goa on 9th September 1781 and immediately contacted the Poona Darbar. He also met Zain-ul Abedin Khan at Goa and dissuaded him from going to the Isle of France. Montigny sent copies of all the documents to Souillac for his information and awaited assistance from him. After receiving the same from Montigny, Souillac sent a reply to the French Minister stating that it was highly impossible for him to send any succour to the Marathas and that it would be better according to his opinion to attack the English on the Coromandel Coast rather than the Malabar Coast. In his letter to Montigny, Souillac advised him to convince the Marathas to attack the English on the Western Coast.⁴⁴⁹

The French with the help of Haider Ali were equipping themselves to attack the English on the Coromandel Coast. The relations between the Marathas and Haider Ali had never been on good terms due to jealousy between the two. The French were actually trying to form a league of the three (Marathas, French and Haider Ali) to counter the English but it seemed to be impossible for them at this moment. The appointment of Montigny at the Maratha Court and that of Piveron at the Court of Haider Ali were made with an aim to explain the two powers the need of the time to fight the common enemy and that they must co-operate for its fulfillment. As regards to Haider the French knew that he would not come to terms with the English but

they were suspicious about the Marathas. Haider Ali too was of the opinion that to reduce him the Marathas would surely come to terms with the English. The French hence took every care to keep the Marathas on their side.⁴⁵⁰

The English taking into account the alarming situation abandoned their war with the Marathas and made a truce with them. Colonel Muir signed a non-aggression pact with Mahadji Shinde on October 13, 1781 and also wanted Mahadji to make Nana Fadnavis a party to it. The English by this move wanted to gain time and concentrate to reduce Haider Ali. The Marathas also due to their jealousy towards Haider Ali felt that the English should reduce him. The English were trying to lure the Marathas with offers of restoration of place captured from them. Montigny's task was to dissuade the Poona Darbar from making peace with the English and rather form a Franco-Maratha alliance to oust the English. Montigny in his letter to Souillac informed that, after the offers of the English for peace, the Maratha government's attitude towards the French was likely to stiffen. They were bound to take advantage of the rivalry between the two European nations who were both seeking their alliance, and put forth conditions which would be difficult to fulfill.⁴⁵¹

The terms of the projected treaty between Montigny and the Marathas was completed at the end of June 1782 and the following was agreed upon....

1. The French should land 10,000 men at Chaoul for a joint campaign against the English at Bombay and at other places on the Western Coast.
2. The Marathas would advance rupees two lakhs per month for four months for the maintenance of the French army. They were to supply boats, bullocks and labourers for transport of the French artillery.

3. Bombay and Surat were to be ceded to the French after they were captured from the English.
4. The Marathas were to retain their right of Chautai in Surat and in addition one-third of the amount raised from other sources of revenue.
5. The French would be at liberty to open factories at Bhadoach and Cambay.
6. The spoils of the war were to be shared equally.
7. The operations were to commence by the end of monsoon.
8. The French were to inform the Marathas three months in advance about the arrival of the French troops in India, so as to enable them to make preparations for the supply of food and other provisions for the French army.
9. After the reduction of all the places on the Western Coast, including that Danda-Rajapuri from the Siddi, the combined forces would proceed to Bengal to expulse the English from that province, in return of these services the Marathas would cede some territory to the French and finally
10. It was stipulated that the French should not conclude peace with the English either in India or in Europe, without the consent of the Marathas.⁴⁵²

Montigny objected to the last condition but he accepted it as an alliance with the Marathas, more than any other power, was absolutely necessary for the success for the French enterprise in India.⁴⁵³ The proposal of the Marathas did not satisfy the French government, especially the clause that the French should not conclude peace with the English either in Europe or in India. Hence certain modifications were suggested. Montigny rightly pointed out to the French government that the Marathas would neither make any move against the English nor advance any money to the French, unless French troops landed on the Konkan Coast. Montigny had also suggested that the salary of the French soldiers be paid by the King of France and

the cost of the sipahis be borne by the Marathas. If this was not possible then they should await for Bussy and his force to land at the Konkan Coast. Montigny further stated that Nana Fadnavis was loosing hope in the French assurance and at any time come under growing English pressure and the Maratha chieftains, especially Mahadji Shinde.⁴⁵⁴

The delay in the arrival of the French troops to India under the command of Bussy made Montigny's position very embarrassing. The English were pressing hard on the Marathas to conclude peace with them and join the alliance viz., English, Nizam Ali and Marathas to destroy Haider Ali completely.⁴⁵⁵ Hastings through the Vakil of Mudhoji Bhosale of Nagpur had put forth proposals of the Poona government to join an alliance against Haider Ali. The territory and the forts that would be captured from the ruler of Mysore were to be equally divided among the two parties; in such a way that the Marathas would get the portion that was adjoining to their territory.⁴⁵⁶ While all the other Maratha chieftains were ready for the proposal as they wanted to destroy Haider Ali completely. Nana Fadnavis was more anxious to punish the English as they had interfered into the internal matters of the Poona Darbar by siding with Raghunathrao. Nana Fadnavis also feared that if the Marathas joined the English and Nizam Ali then Haider Ali and French will form a strong alliance and in such a situation it would be very difficult for the Marathas to control the growing aspirations of Haider Ali.

The Treaty of Salbai was finally concluded between the Marathas and the English on May 17, 1782. Salbai is 200 miles south of Delhi and 25 miles east of Gwailor. On behalf of the Marathas, Mahadji Shinde signed the treaty, while Nana Fadnavis signed on it after six months. He was insisting on the Maratha chieftains and the English that Haider Ali too must be made a party to this treaty. But

the English by this time were determined to destroy Haider Ali and hence rejected the plea of Nana Fadnavis.⁴⁵⁷

Montigny was not aware of the Treaty of Salbai and he continued to assure Nana Fadnavis that a large force led by Bussy was soon expected to arrive in India.⁴⁵⁸ Nana Fadnavis too did not disclose that the Marathas were thinking about signing the Treaty of Salbai as he wanted to gain time and at the appropriate moment join hands with the side which would be definitely superior. The cause of the delay of the arrival of the French forces in India cannot be blamed on Montigny. Montigny was trying his best to perform his duty at the Maratha Court. It was only due to his presence at the Maratha Court, Nana Fadnavis could gain time to delay the signing of the Treaty of Salbai and by doing so Nana was also pressuring the English to restore Salsette to the Marathas.

The Marathas were also planning to form an alliance with Haider Ali and the French. But due to a stale-mate between Haider and the French the negotiations were not carried forward. The English by this time had become restless and started suspecting the Maratha moves. Hastings accused Mahadji Shinde of playing a double game. News of the death of Haider Ali arrived on December 7, 1782 and there was still no hope of the French force landing in India. Mahadji Shinde finally gave hope and ratified the Treaty of Salbai on December 20.

XI) The landing of the French forces in India:

In the Memorandum presented to the French Minister, Bussy had made it absolutely clear that to ensure the success of the French enterprise; the French must appear in India with financial resources and military forces large enough to enable them to dispense, if necessary, with any outside assistance.⁴⁵⁹ He had

therefore, demanded a military force of 8,000 to 9,000 men and a sum of ten million francs as expense for the French expedition to India.⁴⁶⁰ But the Minister only sanctioned 6,000 to 7,000 men. Disappointed with the reduction of the fighting forces, Bussy declared that he should not be held responsible for the failure of the enterprise; nor would it be possible for him to attack any one of the principal establishments of the English in India, Calcutta, Madras or Bombay.⁴⁶¹

Bussy had been given the command of the French expedition to India. He left Paris on November 13, 1781, and arrived at the Isle of France (Mauritius) on May 31, 1782. On June 13, he wrote a letter to Montigny that he had first planned to set out for India on June 24 with five to six hundred men, and that he landed in India with this small force it would shake the confidence of the Indian Princes in the French enterprise. He hence waited for reinforcements. The extra force arrived on July 29, but in a deplorable condition, about 1,032 out of 1,500 who arrived at the Isle of France were suffering seriously from scurvy. The forces were not having enough clothing and many had died during the voyage. Bussy was detected positive for scurvy on August 25, 1782. The forces suffering could not be cured for a month and delay caused further complications. Bussy left the Isle of France on December 20, 1782, and arrived at Trincomalee on March 10, 1783. He reached Porto-Novo on March 16, 1783. But Bussy could not be expected to fight with an army of sick and dying men.⁴⁶²

Historians on the whole, have failed to appreciate the difficulties of Bussy. G.B.Malleson while commenting upon the French general's role in his expedition writes: "But the Bussy who returned to India in 1783 was no longer the hardy warrior who had electrified southern India in the years between 1754 and 1760. The Bussy of 1783, corrupted by wealth, enervated by luxury, and careful on of

his ease, more resembled the scion of the House of Bourbon, once his sovereign, who consecrated all his hours to his mistresses.”⁴⁶³

Nana Fadnavis was afraid that the immediate consequence of the Treaty of Salbai would be the formation of an alliance between the French and the ruler of Mysore. The French had landed a part of their forces in India and had already established contact with that Prince. Haider Ali died in December 1782, but his son Tipu Sultan was determined to prosecute the war against the English with the same vigour as his father. The Franco-Mysore alliance would not doubt aim at the destruction of the English power in India, but which, as Nana feared, would subsequently constitute a potential danger to the Maratha State.⁴⁶⁴

By the terms of the Treaty of Salbai, the Marathas had agreed to ‘hold no intercourse of friendship with any other European nation’, Nana Fadnavis was unwilling to break of his relations with the French his intention was to prevent the French from allying themselves with Tipu Sultan against the Marathas. This is a reason why he purposely did not disclose the news of the Treaty of Salbai to Montigny. Although Nana Fadnavis did not received any letter from Bussy since August 1782, he still on several occasions at the Darbar, enquired with Montigny whether the French general intended to employ his troops with Haider Ali or whether they would also send these troops to join the Marathas.

As soon as Bussy arrived at Porto-Novo on March 16, 1783, he established personal contacts with the Indian Princes. He wrote letters to Nan Fadnavis and the Peshwa expressing his desire to co-operate and fight the common enemy. He also wrote to Montigny giving him detailed instructions about the conduct to be followed at the Maratha Court viz....

1. He should point out to Nana Fadnavis all the advantages which his nation would derive from the French alliance.
2. He should impress upon the Maratha Minister the urgency of making intensive preparations for a war with the English, which would be fought to their complete extermination from India.
3. He should exert his utmost to persuade the Darbar to accept certain modifications in the articles of the treaty which they had proposed to the French.
4. He should endeavour to dispel any suspicions which the Maratha Ministers might harbour in their mind about French relations with Tipu Sultan.
5. He should impress upon Nana Fadnavis the difference between the French and the English characters – emphasizing the contrast between the French spirit of moderation, their sincerity in their negotiations, their superiority in the strength of their forces, on land as well as on the sea, as against the ambitious nature of the English and their treachery.
6. He should convince Nana Fadnavis of the certain destruction of the English power if only the Marathas allied themselves with the French.
7. It was of the most importance that he should employ every device at his disposal to gain time until circumstances permitted him (Bussy) to move with his forces to the Maratha Coast to start combined operations against the English at Bombay.
8. He should make a proposal to the Poona Darbar for formation of an alliance between the French, the Marathas and Nizam Ali, without committing anything.
9. Finally, he was directed to maintain regular correspondence with the Darbar and keep Bussy informed of all the proceedings at the Maratha Court.⁴⁶⁵

Nana Fadnavis had sought Mahadhji's advice whether, after the Treaty of Salbai, he should allow the French Resident to retire from the Maratha Court or continue to entertain him. Mahadhji replied: "Although, in the past, the French have not rendered service to the Maratha nation, yet he would advise Nana to maintain relations with them."⁴⁶⁶

Montigny tried to impress upon Nana Fadnavis the great necessity for all the Indian Princes to compose their differences and act in concert to destroy the common enemy with the active assistance and support of the French. According to him it was the only way to punish a nation whose goal was to bring all the princes in India under its domination and then seize all the commerce of the country. Nana Fadnavis was not convinced with the idea of Montigny he also explained him that such a confederation were of no use as an example he informed him how the confederation formed in 1780 between the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Haider Ali was dissolved due to the defection of Nizam Ali and Haider Ali had gained Maratha territory worth sixty lakhs as promised in the terms of the alliance. Tipu Sultan too was following the same tactics of Haider Ali and hence Nana Fadnavis was not ready for an alliance with Mysore. According to Nana Fadnavis only the alliance between the Marathas and Nizam Ali, had the capacity to operate a general revolution in India with the assistance of French troops. Finally, Nana Fadnavis dismissed Montigny by remarking that he eagerly looked forward to a union of Maratha-French troops to expulse the English from Bombay and Bengal.⁴⁶⁷

Bussy received Gopalrao the Maratha Vakil at Pondicherry with all pomp and ceremony at a Darbar specially held for the purpose. During the interview, Gopalrao complained that the French had failed to keep their promise of sending assistance to the Marathas against the English. Bussy replied that

his inability to arrive in India earlier was due to circumstances beyond his control. Bussy then referred to the purpose of the French expedition to India, viz, to restore to the Indian Princes the territories which were conquered from them by the English and at the same time he warned the Maratha Vakil that do not rely on the promises of the English, who declared to be treacherous people. He informed Gopalrao that after the destruction of Tipu Sultan they will become an invincible power in India. Gopalrao proposed an alliance between the Marathas, Nizam Ali and the French against the English. But Bussy did not recommend it for he suspected the Marathas of secretly negotiating with the English against Tipu Sultan. Bussy rather suggested an alliance of three Indian Princes with the French to assist them i.e. Marathas, Nizam Ali, Tipu Sultan and the French. The minutes of this negotiation between Bussy and Gopalrao were then sent to Poona for further considerations in February 1784.⁴⁶⁸

The French at this period of time were trying to shift their capital in India i.e. Pondicherry to Mahe. Pondicherry before 1761 was a well fortified town but now it was in a disastrous position and was unable to defend the English settlement. Mahe on the other hand was in close proximity to the Marathas and Mysore. Bussy was negotiating with the Marathas and Tipu Sultan to gain some territorial concessions in the neighbourhood of Mahe.⁴⁶⁹

On November 14, 1784, Mahadji Shinde obtained from the Emperor the title of Vakil-i-Mutlak, this combined the office of the Vazir and that of Mir Bakshi. The French, at this news were very happy as it was going to serve their intentions. In a letter to the French Minister written on January 1785, Montigny writes: "All that I had honour to predict in your presence in 1781, prior to my departure from France, and which I have been repeating ever since, about the growing power and influence of the Marathas, has come true. This nation is hence forth going to play the

great role for which it was destined by its political and military constitution. Its aggrandizement ought to be considered as the beginning of the decline of the English power in this part of the world.”⁴⁷⁰

The worst blow came to the French interests in India with the Treaty of Versailles (1783). According to the terms and conditions of the treaty France and England had agreed not to interfere in the affairs of the Indian Princes without informing each other. Thus, after the conclusion of the treaty, the French were compelled to find out other means to carry out their designs against the English in India. But even after this the French maintained a regular correspondence with the Indian Princes through their agents stationed at the Courts viz. Marathas, Nizam Ali and Tipu Sultan. They also made continuous efforts to impress upon them that the French were concerned about their territories and they would always try to restore as legitimate rulers. They warned the Indian Princes not to believe the citing the English example of the Nawab of Bengal, Muhammed Ali and the Raja of Tanjore.⁴⁷¹ Bussy and Montigny tried their best to unite all the Indian Princes together in an alliance fight the English.⁴⁷²

Bussy died at Pondicherry on January 7, 1785 due to his illness. His second expedition to India remained a major failure due to lack of communication between the Residents and him on one hand and with the French government on the other. The Marathas had concluded a treaty with the English by the time he actually reached India. Bussy's expedition to India was a half-hearted attempt from the beginning itself and hence it lost its significance. It's a sad irony that the French failed to take the advantage of the great and the last opportunity to destroy the English power in India. The French forces sent were delayed, they were not properly equipped as they landed at the Isle of France, and 1,032 out of 1,400 fell ill. Bussy's illness too added further delay. The news of the delay was not properly communicated

in time to the Resident's who were stationed at the Courts of the Indian Princes. If the French troops would have arrived in India, it might have been their greatest achievement.

XII) Souillac's Approach to form a Fresh French-Maratha Alliance:

The death of Bussy in 1785 was a great loss to the French enterprise in India. The political conditions were rapidly changing and there was a state of interdependency and anarchy. On the other hand in France the situations had started to worsen on the administrative front due to civil strife. There was unrest among the peasants and middle classes; they were now determined not to support any policy of the French in India, unless proper attention was paid by the government to their demands. France at this time was at the point of a revolution.⁴⁷³

Vicomte de Souillac was appointed as the new Governor-General of all the French possessions beyond the Cape of Good Hope in 1785. Immediately after he received a letter of orders from the King of France about his appointment he wrote a letter to Nana Fadnavis and Mahadji Shinde. In his letter he wrote: "The King of France has instructed me to inform all the Powers in India that ever since the termination of the great war against the English in America, in which they were compelled to surrender all their possessions in that country, his sole desire has been to restore to the India Princes all the territories that have been conquered from them by the English, and to protect all those whom the European nations would try to subjugate. I have communicated to you the intentions of the King of France, so that you might be prepared to act in concert with the French when the appropriate occasion arises."⁴⁷⁴

As soon as Souillac took charge a Governor-General he disapproved all the policies of Bussy towards the Indian Princes. He concentrated his attention only on the chief powers in India, the Marathas and Tipu Sultan. He wanted to have fresh negotiations with them to clear all the misunderstanding and false impressions created by Bussy. This can be seen in his letter written to Montigny on November 4, 1784. He writes: " M. de Bussy had announced that a large number of French troops would shortly arrive on the Maratha Coast, a fact which the French Resident must have communicated to Nana Fadnavis. Would he (Nana) not see in a month or two, asked Souillac, that he has been grossly deceived? I regret very much the great embarrassment with this might have caused you. Why should we mislead a nation with which we have common interest? Let us on the contrary just explain to it the nature of their interest. Let us state our real aims in India and our means to achieve them."⁴⁷⁵

Souillac wanted to give a new turn to the Franco-Maratha alliance by making the Marathas understand that the French were rather more interested in reducing English power and influence in Europe by defeating her in America. The war in India with the English was just a supplement to their major objective. Hence he had instructed Montigny to clear all misunderstandings about the French among the Marathas. He had also instructed Montigny to inform the Marathas that the French could only spare a small amount of troops and vessels to India, as they had to assemble the mass of their forces for the American war. It was only after the defeat of the English in America that the French would think of India. No doubt the French succeeded in achieving their purpose in America, but then they could not achieve it in India. The major reason being the French Revolution of 1789 and the mismanagement of French affairs in India.

It was quite certain that the French approach towards the Indian Princes at this crucial time would create breach of trust. Hence to be more transparent on the French ambitions in India, Souillac assured the Maratha government that the new approach was mainly considered to build up commerce, with adequate protection and that it would be advantageous to both the French as well as the Indian Princes. He further stated that the King of France would protect the Maratha interests against any European nation which invade their territories or wage war against them. He (the King) did not wish to secure any vast territory in India but would only possess territory surrounding the two coasts (Konkan and Coromandel) which would maintain them and protect their commerce. The French would only demand Bombay from the Marathas in return for their help to oust the English from the west coast and the rest of the English territory would be handed to the Marathas.⁴⁷⁶ Such a treaty was to be concluded between the two at an appropriate time i.e. after the commencement of war between England and France.

As regards to the treaty to be concluded in the future between the Marathas and the French, Nana Fadnavis made it clear that he could only decide on the matter after the meeting of the Council of the Regency and that Souillac's decision of sending French troops to assist Haider Ali in preference to the Marathas had pained him.

The Marathas sincerely desired to remain at peace with Tipu Sultan, if he fulfilled all the promises made to them by his father (Haider Ali) and the French played a role as mediator between the two. Nana Fadnavis invited Montigny at the Poona Darbar held in the middle of October and reaffirmed the Poona government's decision and desire to make peace with Tipu Sultan with suitable terms. The situation of Montigny at this moment became very difficult. He hence came to a

conclusion that if war broke out, neither Marathas nor Nizam Ali could be held responsible for any losses but it would be Tipu Sultan for he was not ready to come to terms with the Marathas and Nizam Ali.⁴⁷⁷

Souillac tried his best to bring Tipu Sultan towards an understanding with Nizam Ali and the Marathas. But Tipu Sultan had his own grievances against the French and he was ambitious to extend his frontiers as far as Krishna at the cost of the Marathas and Nizam Ali. The Marathas due to the delay caused by the French in sending troops and also in forming a truce with Tipu Sultan, now became suspicious of the French moves.

Souillac wanted the Marathas to make a fresh proposal to form a Franco-Maratha alliance and he did his best to convince Nana Fadnavis. It must be remembered that the Marathas by the end of 1783 had on five occasions made proposals for a Franco-Maratha alliance against the English since 1772 i.e. in 1772, 1775, 1778, 1781 and 1782. In all these proposals the dispositions of the Marathas had not been changed towards the French. But it was the French who never cared and bothered even to reply the proposals of the Maratha Court on any single occasion. Hence after 1785 the Marathas nearly lost their faith in the capability and potential of the French nation.

The French Residents intrigues at the Maratha Court caused great suspicion among the English at Bombay and Madras. Finally the English decided to appoint a Resident (Mr. Charles Mallet) at the Poona Court. The object of the appointment was as much "to conciliate the affection of the people that had been alienated by a long destructive war as to counteract the operations of the intrigues of the French."⁴⁷⁸

Souillac was trying his best to reconcile the differences cropped up between the Marathas and Tipu Sultan but on the other hand he was forbidden to do so by the orders of the King of France which restricted the French from participating in the internal quarrels of the Indian Princes, except, however, exhorting them to remain at peace with one another.⁴⁷⁹

The letter of Souillac itself explains that all the French efforts towards the formation of Franco-Maratha alliance were half-hearted. In his letter to the French Minister dated 15 September 1785. (Souillac left Pondicherry to Isle of France on October 10, 1785) He writes: "The Marathas ought to be regarded as the best established nation in India. Their treaty with the English is only a matter of circumstance. They speak the truth when they say that the French have only to appear in sufficient strength in order to render it null and void."⁴⁸⁰

From 1785 to 1787 Franco-Maratha relations centered on the conflict between the Marathas and Tipu Sultan, Souillac and, following him Cossigny counseled patience and moderation to both sides in the interests of the final objective of keeping the Indian powers united till the outbreak of the next Anglo-French war. But their efforts were in vain, and in December 1785 the Marathas, in alliance with Nizam Ali, started hostilities against Tipu. Cossigny then tried to convince the Poona government that the French were determined to observe strict neutrality and gave repeated assurances, that they would not lend any military assistance to Tipu. He even offered his good offices to bring about a peace settlement and sent a special envoy named Godard for the purpose. The Marathas even after these favours firmly believed that the French were close ally of Tipu. Since Tipu was their worst enemy, they gradually drew away from the French and walked into the orbit of the English, as

became quite evident in 1790 when they entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the English against Tipu.

XIII) Cossigny becomes Governor of Pondicherry:

Cossigny became Governor of Pondicherry and other settlements in India in December 1785. Souillac had left instructions for Cossigny.

According to the instructions, Cossigny was to

1. Establish regular contact with Marathas and Tipu Sultan as they were the only two independent powers in the country.
2. He should avoid giving them any cause for complaint and attempt, as far as possible, to bring them together.
3. The Marathas can prove to be the most trusted and reliable assistance to the French if convinced.
4. Tipu Sultan is their natural enemy and relations with him can cause further mistrust.
5. The solid alliance with the Marathas will certainly bring all the independent powers in India together and could create a strong flank against the English.
6. Cossigny should also maintain regular contact with Mahadji Shinde through Montigny as he was the most influential Maratha chieftain in the north.⁴⁸¹

Cossigny before becoming the Governor of Pondicherry was the commander of the French unit which had accompanied Tipu Sultan to drive out the English from the territory which they had captured from Tipu's dominions on the Malbar Coast. Cossigny had rendered yeoman service but had to retire abruptly from Tipu's army, on instructions from Bussy, because of a truce signed between France and England. Tipu's wrath had fallen with full vengeance upon this officer.⁴⁸²

As Cossigny assumed the Governorship he advised a policy of moderation and compromise in the larger interests, and stated (what had become a stock expression in French diplomatic correspondence with the country powers) that it was the intention of the King of France to send another large expeditionary force to India in the next favourable occasion in order to liberate the country powers from the yoke of the English.⁴⁸³

On the news of the outbreak of war between the Marathas and Tipu, Cossigny expressed his deep concern in a letter to Montigny, dated 8th March 1786. He informed Montigny he had already written to Nana in the same expressions as Souillac's letter of October 1785 that "the English would one day take advantage of the disunion among the Princes of the country. If the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Tipu had been less concerned about their temporary interests, they would have been able to keep their eyes fixed on the increasing power of the English." Cossigny knew that the English had sent a Resident named Mr. Charles Malet to Poona, but that they had not accepted the proposal made by him for joining the condition against Tipu. He believed that the English were "undoubtedly quite content with the injury the Princes of the country were inflicting upon one another."⁴⁸⁴

In order to pacify the conflict, Cossigny sent a military officer named Godard on a special mission to Poona in August 1786. Godard's mission, however, proved fruitless, and in November he returned to Pondicherry, with a letter from Nana Fadnavis addressed to Souillac, presumably in reply to Souillac's letter of October 1785.⁴⁸⁵

In October 1786, Cossigny wrote to Montigny, urging him to exert his diplomatic ability to the fullest extent to destroy the English plan of exploiting the division among the Indian Princes and to try to bring the latter into a

union against their common enemy.⁴⁸⁶ In December, he again wrote to Montigny, informing him that he had sent a letter to Nana offering his good offices to bring out peace between the Marathas and Tipu.⁴⁸⁷

The Marathas were not totally persuaded with the French efforts of reconciliation with Tipu. The bitterness further enlarged when the Marathas came to know that Tipu had sent a special embassy to France to have closer relations. The other reason for the Franco-Maratha relations to get further tensed was the issue of the Maratha pirates operating on the Malabar Coast. On one such occasion in 1786, the Maratha pirates captured the vessel named Adelaide, the Captain of the ship, M.de Dayot, was a cousin of Mme.Cossigny, who was held for ransom. Cossigny wrote to Montigny about the matter and asked him to demand compensation from the Poona Government for the outrage, and in case of refusal, to warn Nana about the presence of six French warships in Indian waters.⁴⁸⁸ The matter, however dragged on for years before satisfaction could be obtained.⁴⁸⁹

Surprisingly after this incident Tipu who was prejudiced against Cossigny opened a friendly correspondence. Cossigny too forgetting all personal ill treatment meted to him by Tipu earlier placed national interests above personal ones and seized the opportunity to establish amicable relations with him. Cossigny in spite of instructions and warnings from Souillac, agreed to supply Tipu with 8,000 guns on demand. The transaction however was to be conducted with utmost secrecy.⁴⁹⁰

In improving his relations with Tipu, Cossigny developed a growing prejudice towards the Marathas. His letter to the French Minister, Castries dated January 20, 1786 explains the fact. He writes: "Shall I give my frank opinion about an alliance with the Marathas? This nation entirely depends upon cavalry,

a mode of warfare which is not suitable for us; any union of their armies with ours would, thus, be absolutely impracticable. Their object seems less to recover the territories which the English have seized from the Indian Princes, rather than to amass a huge amount of wealth with, perhaps an intention to expel one day all foreign powers out of India.” While he writes about Tipu: “I have no doubt that here after the French would turn Tipu Sahib into a potential ally. He has the genius to know what his true interests are, if they are represented to him in a manner which would satisfy his ambition. His resources, financial as well as military are so considerable that he is sure one day to operate some great revolution in India.”⁴⁹¹

The Franco-Mysore alliance had alarmed the Poona Government as Nana received reports from his agents about Tipu agreeing to pay forty lakhs of rupees for an alliance with the French and that 4,000 French soldiers and 10,000 sipahis were ready to march for his assistance.⁴⁹² Nana, hence repeatedly urged upon Mahadji Shinde to convince the English at Calcutta that the Poona Darbar had rejected all the French offers, due to their treaty with the English and no negotiations were been entertained by him of his Government with any European nation against the English.⁴⁹³

Mahadji Shinde accordingly made representations to the English at Calcutta. The Governor-General at Calcutta replied to him that it would be proper for Nana to apply at the English at Bombay in the matter.⁴⁹⁴ The dispatch of the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors to the Governor-General and Council dated July 21, 1786 stated: “If any Indian power takes the aid of France, we ought to give the most effective aid to the opposite party. If the French do not interfere with one of the powers here mentioned i.e. (Tipu & Marathas), we can have no business to take any part.” The minutes of September 22 stated: “You ought to have gone no

further than to intimate to the Marathas that in the event of the French joining Tippoo, they might rely on the assistance of the (English) troops and to this we would have added an intimation that we would not have looked on with indifference to the Marathas entering into engagements for obtaining assistance from the French, for we consider such a connection as a hostile tendency to us which we should be obliged to counteract by affording our aid to Tippoo.”⁴⁹⁵

Cossigny with reference to the suspicion of the Marathas regarding the French relations with Tipu Sultan wrote to Nana that, the King of France had no territorial ambitions in India, as he had many more possessions in other parts of the world. The French entertained Vakils at Pondicherry from all the India Princes, having friendly relations with all, and there was, therefore, no reason to suspect their bonafides. The Indian Princes could safely rely on the good faith and generosity of the French King who never had any other desire than to support the weakest against the strongest. He concluded by appealing to the Marathas to join the war against the common enemy and forget personal rivalries.⁴⁹⁶

Nana Fadnavis was surprised at the contents of Cossigny's letter as it revealed a self contradiction in itself. He wrote to Cossigny saying that the Indian Princes had waged wars in the past without the help of the foreigners and hence there was no reason why the Marathas in their present war should be required to seek the English assistance. The Maratha Government had never taken action anyone without cause, nor had broken any conventions or treaties. Nana reminded Cossigny that he had earlier too, received letters from Pondicherry announcing the intentions of the King of France, which were not only to refrain from participating in the quarrels of the Indian Princes but also to help in returning to their legitimate ruler's the territories which had been usurped from them. He was, therefore,

much surprised to hear from Cossigny that the orders of the King of France were now to help the weakest Prince against the strongest. He could not believe that the King of France could issue such a self-contradictory order. He further questioned how could the King consider a Prince in India to be the weakest and he (the King) to be the strongest in comparison to the Indian Princes?⁴⁹⁷

The French policy towards the Marathas appears to be strong when they consider the Marathas to be the weakest as compared to them in 1786. Prior to 1786 in all their proposals, correspondences and projects the French admit the Marathas to be the most important and strongest power in India.

The war between Tipu and the Marathas ended in February 1787. According to the terms of the treaty Tipu had agreed to cede to the Marathas Badami, Nargund and Kittur (places which had long been a cause of rivalry between the two), and Adoni to Nizam Ali. In addition he was to pay to the Marathas the arrears of tribute amounting to sixty five lakhs but now reduced to forty eight lakhs, of which thirty two lakhs were to be paid immediately and the remaining sixteen lakhs in six months. The news of the treaty was conveyed by Montigny to Cossigny but he refused to believe it until he got the news from Tipu Sultan.⁴⁹⁸

Tipu had kept Cossigny informed of all the details of his various battles with the enemy, describing them in glowing terms and the French Governor accepted them without reserve. While, on the other hand, when he found any contradiction in the reports supplied to him by Montigny, he thought that the latter was misinformed or deliberately deceived, because he did not enjoy the confidence of the Maratha Court.⁴⁹⁹

Cossigny repeatedly pressed on Tipu for information regarding the treaty; Tipu gave a very subtle and evasive reply saying: "You desire to

know the terms on which peace was signed between me, the Marathas and Nizam Ali. We have ceased all hostilities between us and resolved to terminate all our differences without having recourse to any other forces except our own. If, taking advantage of our disputes, a fourth power thought of attacking us, we would unite our forces against that power. Although we have not yet settled our differences, we have decided to forget our mutual hatred to destroy the common enemy who would have the impetuosity to attack any one of us.”⁵⁰⁰ Tipu had also written to Souillac saying: “Because they solicited peace on conditions which were acceptable to me and because they were sufficiently humiliated, I granted the peace.”⁵⁰¹

The Marathas were aware of the fact of Tipu sending his ambassadors to France to form a solid alliance and the chief aim of this alliance was to eliminate the Marathas. Hence Nana towards the end of 1787 proposed to the English Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis to form a defensive alliance with the Marathas to check the ambitious designs of Tipu Sultan.

Montigny tried his best to ensure the Marathas that the French were not in favour of forming an alliance with Tipu against the Marathas. He also wrote to Cossigny informing him that the Marathas would not settle their differences with Tipu Sultan as long as the issue of Dharwad and the territory between the Tungabhadra and Krishna rivers is not solved.⁵⁰²

The relations between the French and the Marathas were further worsened by the end of 1786. Hence, in the beginning of 1787, the French Government came to a conclusion that it was futile as well as expensive to maintain with the Indian Princes, French

Residents who always found it difficult to secure information about the various activities, political or otherwise at these Courts. It, therefore, resolved to replace the French Residents by Indians (Brahmins) who, because of their knowledge of the Indian languages were better qualified for such roles. More over, the practice would become more confirming to the uses of the country.⁵⁰³

According to the Memoir of the King of France, orders and instructions were issued to Pondicherry. Cossigny was replaced by the Count of Conway as Governor of Pondicherry. Latter, the French Government ordered the evacuation of the European troops from Pondicherry, and this once glorious capital of the French now became merely 'a comptoir to be guarded by Indian troops.'⁵⁰⁴ Montigny's stay of seven long years at the Maratha capital thus came to an end. He left Poona on May 13, 1788.⁵⁰⁵ He was later appointed Commandant of Chandernagore on October 28, 1788.⁵⁰⁶

XIV) Fall of the French Power in India:

With the departure of Montigny from Poona, the Maratha-French Relations may be said to have ended for all practical purposes. During the Anglo-Mysore War (1790-1792), the Marathas and Nizam Ali joined the English, but the French, due to their difficulties in Paris, could not spare troops for the east and were therefore, reduced to the mortifying position of playing the unhappy role of helpless spectators.⁵⁰⁷

In Europe, the French Revolution had broken out, and England and France were continuously at war with each other till 1815. It was quite natural that the French thought of depriving England from her riches she almost procured from India, which was a source of considerable power and influence in here

political relations with the other European nations. But the situation of France due to her internal revolution and her position in Europe made it impossible for her to participate in Indian politics.

Marquess of Wellesley arrived in India on April 26, 1798. His principle aim was to first destroy all the French possessions in India and also the Indian Princes who were their best allies. He in October 1798, made Nizam Ali to disband the French regiment in his army at Hyderabad. He then focused all his energies against Tipu Sultan. The Anglo-Mysore Wars finally ended with Tipu Sultan's death at Srirangapatam on May 4, 1799.

Mahadji Shinde died on February 12, 1794 and he was succeeded by his nephew Daulatrao Shinde. Daulatrao Shinde had a formidable force of 40,000 men in the highest state of discipline and efficiency; it was supported more than 400 guns and was under the command of French officers. M.de Perron was his chief officer, and his army was called the "Imperial Army".⁵⁰⁸ Wellesley called this force the "French State" in the Maratha domains in Hindustan.⁵⁰⁹

Wellesley hence directed his efforts to expel the French from Shinde's service. The death of Tipu had now made the English a recognized power in South India, but the Maratha Confederacy had become a cause of concern to the English due to their offensive and defensive alliances with the French. It was necessary for them to oust the French presence from the south as to further consolidate their position and finally deliver a severe blow to the existence of the Maratha Confederacy.

To achieve this objective the English Governor-General persuaded the Peshwa first to form a subsidiary alliance, when this did not work out he tried to excite the jealousy of the Marathas against the French.⁵¹⁰ The Peshwa Bajirao

II⁵¹¹ as well as Daulatrao Shinde knew that signing the alliance meant sacrificing their sovereignty to the English. Wellesley had proposed Daulatrao defensive alliance with the British Government, provided he agreed to dismiss the French contingent from his services.⁵¹² Colonel Palmer, English Resident at Poona, observes that: "The Peshwa was perfectly well-disposed to the proposed defensive alliance against the French invasion of India, but he was inflexible on the article of written engagement for the expulsion of the French."⁵¹³

Peshwa Bajirao II concluded a treaty with the English in 1803. The long cherished dream for the English to subjugate the Marathas totally was achieved by the treaty known as the 'Treaty of Bassein' which was concluded on December 31, 1802. By the eleventh article of the treaty, the Peshwa agreed, in the event of war breaking out between the English and any European nation, 'to expel from his territory any European or Europeans in his service, who may either have mediated injury towards the English or entered into intrigues hostile to their interests.'⁵¹⁴ With this all the French hopes of having an alliance with the Marathas and also of their presence in India came to an end.

But Wellesley was so frightened about the French invasion of India that exactly after three months later he got the article modified so as to preclude all the Frenchmen from the Peshwa's dominions even during times of peace.⁵¹⁵ The deaths of important Maratha leaders like Mahadji Shinde on February 12, 1794, Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao on October 27, 1795 followed by Nana Fadnavis on March 13, 1800, gave a severe blow to all the French aspirations in India. Finally with the destruction of Daulatrao Shinde's regiments officered by Frenchmen after 1803 all hopes of French survival in India were lost for ever.

XV) End of the Maratha Confederacy:

“Evil days seem to be ahead. There seems to be escape from destiny.” These were the words of Nana Fadnavis during the end of his career. These words scan the horizon of future and speak about the disturbed spirit and fate of the Maratha State. The Peshwa is reported to have said that Tipu’s death had been like the loss of his right arm.⁵¹⁶ It was Nana Fadnavis who had prevailed upon Bajirao II to dismiss Tipu’s Vakil.⁵¹⁷ But the reading of the future were clear to Nana. He warned the Peshwa saying: “Tipu is finished; the British power had increased; the whole of east India is already theirs, Poona will be the next victim.”⁵¹⁸

The fall of the Marathas did not come all of a sudden. It was a process of decline which started from 1774 and the final blow came in 1818. This period from 1774 to 1818, constitutes three major battles fought between the English and the Marathas. These battles are known as the Anglo-Maratha Wars, viz. the First Anglo-Maratha War (1774-1783), the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-1809) and the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817-1818).

(i) The First Anglo-Martha War (1774-1783):

This battle was fought on the Konkan and Gujarat fronts and in three different phases. Nana Fadnavis signed the ‘Treaty of Salbai’ on 24 February, 1783 i.e. after the death of Haider Ali. The terms and conditions of the treaty were....

1. English were to deliver to the Peshwa all places including Vasai, captured by them during the War except the island of Sashti and the smaller ones near Bombay.
2. The town of Bhadoch was to remain with the English.

3. Maratha territories conquered in Gujarat by the British were to be restored to the Peshwa and Gaikwad to whom they had belonged.
4. The English hereafter were not to support Raghoba. Raghoba was to choose his residence and a pension of Rs.25,000 per month from the Peshwa for his maintenance.
5. Fattesingh Gaikwad was to remain in possession of the territory he had before the war and was to serve the Maratha State as henceforth.
6. Both English and the Marathas agreed not to molest each others allies.
7. The English were to enjoy the privilege of trade as before, but the Peshwa engaged not to allow support to any other European nation especially the French.
8. Mahadji Shinde took the responsibility to observe the conditions of the treaty.
9. Territories granted to the English by Raghoba were to be restored to the Marathas.
10. Bhadoch was conferred on Mahadji Shinde⁴ by the English as a token fro his friendly disposition.

Regarding the treaty Warren Hastings described it as "Successful negotiations of peace... in the most desperate period of my distress". While Gense and Banaji assess: "the Treaty of Salbai was a clear acknowledgement of the failure for the English". G.S.Sardesai writes: "The English tried their hands against the Marathas and suffered a setback from which they found it difficult to recover their position".⁵¹⁹

One of the most important effects of the war was that, after its conclusion the Maratha mode of warfare underwent a complete change. This War was the last war in which the Marathas fought with their traditional warfare.

Mahadji Shiande, who was very much impressed by the 'rock like infantry' of the British in the nettle of Talegaon of 1778-1779, perceived the success of the troops trained on the French and English model and resolved to imitate them. Soon after the War, he setup drilled battalions, mostly of mercenary troop's of non-Marathas, with the help of M.de Boigne and other European mercenaries. Other Maratha sardars like Tukoji Holkar and the Bhoslaes of Nagpur followed his example. Thus the Marathas further reduced their great asset of swift cavalry movements.

During the war, almost all the major battles were fought on the Konkan front. Out of the five major battles four were fought on this front and one in the Gujarat region, the Marathas won three viz., the battle of Talegaon, the second Borghat expedition and the siege of Malanggad. The British won two siege battles viz., the siege of the front of Shasti in 1774 and the siege of the fort of Vasai in 1780. The battle of Adas was evenly matched, as both the sides suffered heavy losses and still no decisive result came out of it. These respective victories of both the contending parties show that the Marathas won the battles against the British only when geographical factors favoured them. The plains of Talegaon were suitable for the swift movements of their cavalry and the hilly and thickly wooded Borghat was very helpful to their 'ganimi-kava'. Similarly, in the siege of Malangad the natural impregnability of the fort made the British artillery ineffective.⁵²⁰

During the War, the French power was already on the decline. The War gave a death-blow to the French, thus leaving no European rival to challenge the on growing English power in India. Mahadji's rise to power was but a temporary phase, which finally gave way to the English supremacy in India.

(ii) The Second Anglo-Martha War (1803-1809):

The new regime of Yashwantrao Holkar at Poona was a flimsy structure; his approach to various problems was characterized by short-sighted opportunism. His financial difficulties became acute with the increase in his forces to meet which he heaped terrible misery upon the city of Poona.⁵²¹ Yashwantrao failed to seat Vinakyr Rao, son of Amrit Rao, in the place of Bajirao II as he attempted to form a new aristocracy. On 13th May, 1803, the Peshwa, backed by British was placed at Poona. This restoration was due to the consummate planning and skilful execution of Arthur Wellesley.⁵²² Amrit Rao was assured by Wellesley of British protection against the Peshwa and other Maratha chiefs.

The English secured success in Gujarat, Bundelkhand and Orissa against the Marathas in 1803. Colonel Murrey captured Broach on August 29, 1803; Champaner and Pavagad on September 17, 1803. The province of Cuttack including Balasore was conquered in October 1803. A large number of minor chiefs such as the Rajputs and Jat princes, the Nawabs of the Doab, the Bundela chiefs, Himmat Bahadur and Shamsheer Bahadur, and Ambaji Ingle were detached from Maratha allegiance.

By the 'Treaty of Devgaon' signed on 19th December, 1803....

1. Raghuji Bhosale II ceded to the English the province of Orissa with its whole coastline including Balasore, and the whole of the territory and share of the revenues to the westward of the river Wardha and south of the hills.
2. He retained in his possession the two forts with districts below with revenue of four lakhs.
3. The province of western Berar up to the river Wardha was ceded to the Nizam.

4. Bhosale was to respect all the treaties concluded with his feudatories by the British Government.
5. No British subject, European (especially French) or American, was to be entertained by him without the consent of the British Government.

Raghuji renounced his adherence to the Maratha State, recognized the treaty of Bassein and admitted Elphinstone as the British Resident in his Court.⁵²³

Daulatrao Shinde concluded the 'Treaty of Surjijanangaon' on 30th December, 1803, by the terms and conditions of the treaty....

1. He recognized the 'Treaty of Bassein' and surrendered his territories between Yamuna and the Ganga and all those situated to the north of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad.
2. He ceded to the British Government Ahmednagar, Broach and his possessions between Ajanta and the Godavari.
3. He renounced his claims in the British Government, the Peshwa, the Nizam and the Gaikwad.
4. He confirmed all treaties made by the British Government with his feudatories and recognized their independence.
5. He agreed never to retain in his service any European (especially French), American or any British Indian subject, and he renounced his control upon the Mughal Emperor.
6. He accepted Malcolm as the Resident in his Court, but he refused to accept a British subsidiary force.

On his representation, Burhanpur, Pavagarh and Asirgarh were restored to him by a separate treaty concluded on 27th February, 1804, Shinde entered into a defensive alliance with the English.⁵²⁴

There was a wide spread internal dissension between the Holkar's and the Shinde's by 1804. During the first phase of the second Anglo-Maratha War, Yashwantrao Holkar had been favourable to the British interests. But after the death of Mahadji Shinde and Raghuji Bhosale, he tried to raise a coalition of Indian rulers and entered into secret correspondence with the Raja's of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udiapur, Begum Samru, Raja of Machery, the Rohilla chief Ghulam Muhammad and the Sikh chiefs Rau Singh, Mir Singh, Gural Singh, Banga Singh and Jadu Singh.⁵²⁵

The overtures of Holkar did not succeed because Daulatrao Shinde who was persuaded to withdraw from the British alliance by Holkar promptly tail-tetted the news to the British Resident. There upon war commenced between Holkar and the English.

This war brought the end of Yashwantrao's career and also that of the second Anglo-Maratha War.

Yashwantrao was compelled to conclude the 'Treaty of Rajpurghat' with Lake on the banks of the Beas on 24th December, 1805. By the terms and conditions he agreed ...

1. He renounced his rights to every place to the north of the Chambal and all claims on Poona and Bundelkhand.
2. He agreed not to employ any European in his service without the consent of the Company's Government and never to admit Sarjerao Ghatge into his counsel or employment.

3. The Company's Government agreed not to interfere in Holkars territories south of the Chambal.
4. The forts and territories belonging to the Holkar family in the Deccan excepting Chandor, Ambar and Shegaon, were to be restored to Yashwantrao, this was a conditional measure adopted as a security for Yashwantrao's good behaviour during the period of eighteen months.⁵²⁶

Sir George Barlow made an alteration in the treaty and restored to Holkar Tonk, Rampura and all the territories north of the Bundi hills. Thus the Raja of Bundi, who had rendered valuable service to Monson, was abandoned to his faith. The declaratory article of the 'Treaty of Rajpurghat', which was ascribed to the dread of military talents of Yashwantrao Holkar, came as a surprise to the latter. The 'Treaty of Rajpurghat' rang down the curtain on Yashwantrao Holkar's conflict with the English.

(iii) The Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817-1818):

The third Anglo-Maratha war virtually marked the end of the Maratha Confederacy, the British too accepted that with the fall of the Marathas they had become the true masters of the large continent of India and it became possible to them only after the fall of the Marathas.

The first few years after the conclusion of the Anglo-Maratha War (1803-1809), were marked by the greatest cordiality between the Peshwa and the English. The Peshwa felt almost free to follow his inclinations in the arrangements of his affairs. He selected men of his choice and trust for the office in the government and he followed a life of pleasure alternated by religious observances. The British Resident at Poona took care to see that he did not involve himself in foreign

intrigues and kept him in good humour, and the presence of the subsidiary force hastened the restoration of tranquility in the Peshwa dominions. Out of the revenue of twelve million rupees per annum, the Peshwa saved almost half and his treasury was now over flowing. The Peshwa was profuse in expressing his gratitude to the British “for saving him from destruction and demanding nothing in return”.⁵²⁷

Colonel Close had avoided discussion on important administrative topics and followed the non-interference policy of Barlow and Minto who were at the head of the English Company Government. The appointment of Elphinstone as the Resident at the Poona Court in February, 1811 changed the earlier policies followed. Elphinstone now started to deal directly the affairs of the Maratha State from the Residency. He also tried to settle the issues and disputes of the Peshwa with the southern jagirdars, viz., the Patwardhans, Rastes, and Desai's of Kittur and Nipani which displeased the Peshwa. He also made the jagirdars to pledge for security from the Company Government by concluding the ‘Treaty of Pandharpur’. The pledge of security to the jagirdars made a mockery of the Peshwa's authority over his subjects. It was not so much their allegiance that he desired as their destruction. The arbitration affected by the Resident embittered the Peshwa's mind. This was the first serious rift between the Peshwa and the English.⁵²⁸

At the same time the Governor-General conveyed to the Peshwa a message telling him that his authority no longer extended over his former feudatories, and the Company's Government would not restore the old order of things.⁵²⁹ This the Peshwa felt as a deliberate insult added to the injury, and his thoughts now turned to revenge and retaliation. Baloji Kunjar, his favourite Minister, made a tour of the Maratha States and Bajirao II put a crore of rupees at Bapu Gokhale's disposal.⁵³⁰ The Peshwa increased his revenues and forces, repaired his forts, and made fresh

recruits at the annual fair of Mahuli.⁵³¹ He sought the co-operation of the Burmese King,⁵³² Ranjit Singh of Lahore, the influential people in Nepal,⁵³³ Bhosale, the Raja of Satara and Shinde, against the English. Bajirao II also made friendly gestures to the Patwardhans, the Panses, the Rastes and Appa Desai of Nipani. He also attempted dissension among the sepoys and European soldiers in the British army through his agents.

The preparation of the Peshwa against the English did not escape the British eye. Elphinstone promptly reported the matter to the Governor-General. At last Lord Hastings wrote a letter to the Resident on March 23rd, 1816, He writes: "Enough, however, has been detected to make it expedient that I should write to you for the purpose of showing him that we are apprised of what he had been doing".⁵³⁴

On 10 May, 1817, Lord Hastings instructed Elphinstone to circumscribe the Peshwa's power and to obviate inconvenience found to exist in the performance of the articles of the 'Treaty of Bassein'. The Peshwa was compelled by Elphinstone to sign the 'Treaty of Poona'⁵³⁵ On 13th June, 1817. His moral influence received a deadly blow and his material interests were affected seriously. The Peshwa recognized the dissolution in form and substance of the Maratha Confederacy and confirmed the treaty with the southern jagirdars....

1. He claims on Baroda were commuted to an annual payment of four lakhs of rupees.
2. The Peshwa agreed to let the form of revenues of Ahmedabad to Gaikwad for a sum of four and half lakhs of rupees annually.
3. He ceded in perpetuity to the Company the fort of Ahmednagar and surrendered his rights, interests and pretensions over Bundelkhand, Malwa, territories to the

north of the Narmada except those he possessed in Gujarat, and also the fort of Mailghat, a possession on the Nizam's frontier.

4. The article in the treaty of Bassein regarding his obligation to send a contingent to act with the subsidiary force was annulled.
5. The Peshwa ceded in perpetuity to the Company territory yielding thirty-four lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of a force of 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry with sufficient military stores and ordnance.
6. He promised not to maintain a foreign agent at his Court especially any Frenchmen.

The terms of the 'Treaty of Poona' made the British control more difficult to resist, but more irksome to bear.⁵³⁵ The third Anglo-Maratha War was indeed the aftermath of a decade of British diplomacy at the Court of the Peshwa. It is not clear whether Elphinstone exasperated the Peshwa to violate the treaty of Bassein and thus offer a pretext to the English to declare war against him.⁵³⁶ It is certain, however, that Elphinstone found it impossible to keep peace with the Peshwa⁵³⁷ who behaved with studied disrespect towards the former.⁵³⁸ Bajirao II misjudged the political situation, played in to Elphinstone's hands, and supplied the legal justifications for war. The slowly growing resolution of the Peshwa ripened to action on 5th November, 1817, when his military advisor Bapu Gokhale set fire to the Residency buildings. Bapu Gokhale with 18,000 horse, 8,000 foot and 14 guns launched an unsuccessful attack on the small force led by Captain Burr, who had 3,000 men and 5 guns on the plains extending from the Chatushringhi hill to Kirkee near Poona.⁵³⁹ In the battle of Kirkee the British losses were eighty-six killed and wounded as against five hundred of the Marathas. From Sirur General Smith arranged at Kirkee, defeated Bapu

Gokhale at the battle of Yeravda on 15th November, 1817 and compelled the Peshwa to retreat to Purandhar.


On 11 February, 1818, Elphinstone issued a proclamation urging the subjects of the Peshwa not to afford any assistance to him.⁵⁴⁰ A number of jagirdars left the Peshwa's standard.⁵⁴¹ Elphinstone rescued the Raja of Satara and treated him courtesy. On 20 February, 1818, Bapu Gokhale was overtaken by General Smith at Ashta and killed in a hotly contested battle.⁵⁴² Bajirao II was surprised by Colonel Adams near Shevni on 17 April, 1818. He surrendered to Malcolm at Mhow near Indore on 3rd June, 1818. The Peshwa lost his title 'Shrimant'. His military following was disbanded. Trimbakji was condemned to the life long imprisonment in the fort of Chunar. Chhatrapati Pratapsingh was setup as ruler of a small principality "as a sop to Maratha sentiment". Munro's suggestion that the Company should attend forth a Peshwa was not accepted by Lord Hastings. The Governor-General at the request of Malcolm reluctantly guaranteed the Peshwa a pension of eight lakhs of rupees per annum.⁵⁴³ Bajirao II was allowed to live at Bittur, 12 mile north-west of Kanpur, for more than thirty years in splendid isolation till his death on 14th January, 1851.

There is no doubt that "the year 1818 marks a watershed in the history of British India. In that year the British dominion in India became the British dominion of India".⁵⁴⁴


CHAPTER V



The Diplomatic Projects of the French in India and The Role of French Privateers



(1761-1818)



Chapter V

THE DIPLOMATIC PROJECTS OF THE FRENCH IN INDIA AND THE

ROLE OF FRENCH PRIVATEERS

(1761-1818)

Of the five great European maritime powers of the 16th and 17th century, France was the fourth to enter into the race for commercial communication with India. The fifth power, Spain never attempted the contest while Portugal, Holland and England had reaped considerable profits from their enterprise before the attention of the French people had been sufficiently attracted to the trade. All these great European maritime nations including France were at first only interested in the riches of the Eastern trade, but it was France alone in the initial stage that dreamt and dared of having a vast empire subordinate to the Mughals. He was a French statesman who first conceived the idea of conquering by the aid of Indians.... “of arming, drilling and training natives after the fashion of European soldiers, thus forming the germ of that *sipahi* which has since become so famous. It was the French soldier who first demonstrated on the battlefield the superiority of a handful disciplined Europeans to the uncontrolled hordes of Asia.”⁵⁴⁵ They were the French who conceived the ambitious projects of building up a large territorial empire in India. It was possible for them to do so because of the political condition of India in the first half of the 18th century. But equally important, at least, was the genius of one man, Dupleix. It was Dupliex who first showed the way of intervening in the internal disputes of the Indian powers and acquiring political control over vast territories through puppet Indian Princes.⁵⁴⁶

It was mainly due to the efforts of Colbert the then Controller of finances of the French Crown did the 'French East India Company' came into existence in the year 1664. This was a sixth attempt to form a grand company to trade with the East Indies. The previous five attempts went unsuccessful.⁵⁴⁷ The French East India Company from the year 1664-1761 made rigorous attempts to enlarge its trade volume with India, at the same time it even tried to compete with the English and Dutch in gaining trade rights, procuring *firman*s and also establishing factories on the Malabar Coast and the Coromandel Coast. It established itself by securing factories at Surat, Rajapur, Masulipatam, Mirjan, Tellicherry, Pondicherry and Mahe etc.⁵⁴⁸ The period 1664 to 1761 was the only prosperous period in the history of the French East India Company, for it was served by efficient Governors like Francois Martin, Lenoir, Dumas, Dupleix and Bussy under whom the French power in India was recognized to be one of the major European power in India equivalent to the English. It was on January 16, 1761 that Pondicherry surrendered to the English, a severe blow from which it never recovered.⁵⁴⁹

After 1761 onwards attempts were made by many French administrators and also by French adventurers to reestablish the Company on a firm footing, to check the growing power of the English and help all the native powers to free themselves from the yoke of the English Company. These administrators and adventurers to the French government in Paris hence forwarded major projects and plans. The present chapter is an attempt to evaluate and analyze these diplomatic projects and plans with the help of available primary and secondary source material. Although there were many projects and plans submitted, only a few important of those will be reviewed as to restrict the vastness of the subject. The chapter mainly focuses on the projects and plans of Jean Baptiste Chevalier, Law de Lauriston, M. de

Bellecombe, Saint Lubin and Montigny which were concerned towards having diplomatic relations with the Marathas in particular.

A) Diplomatic Projects of the French in India:

I) Jean Baptiste Chevalier⁵⁵⁰ :

Chevalier Jean Baptiste was appointed as Director-General of all the French establishments in Bengal. No other Frenchman in India has submitted such a large number of projects to his government for diplomatic alliances and military operations against the English in India. There are three distinct phases in Chevalier's projects about the French intervention in India:

1. First from 1769 to the installation of the Emperor Shah Alam at Delhi in 1772.
2. Second from 1772 to the formation of the Tatta project in 1774.
3. Third from 1775-1778, when hostilities broke out between France and England due to the sudden capture of Candernagore by the English.⁵⁵¹

The first time that Chevalier drew the attention of the French government to the political situation in North-India and held out a prospect of an anti-English coalition was in a letter to the Minister of Marine and Colonies, Duc de Paralin, dated 10th January 1769.⁵⁵² In it he tries to explain that the north Indian Princes have been very much antagonized due to the rapid expansion of the English and a joint attack on the English by combining with the Princes and assuring them French military help and naval assistance can workout for the French establishment in Bengal. In the second attempt Chevalier formed a project under which he tried to explain the importance of forming an alliance with the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam and assisting him with military troops and navy. The third project focused attention on Tatta (Sind)

province. Accordingly the French had to form a solid alliance with the Mughal Emperor who in return must cede Tatta to the French. As Tatta was far away from the English possessions in India the French could land a large force here and could utilize it whenever hostilities broke out in India. Chevalier had persuaded Rene Madec an adventurer serving under the Jat ruler to the Emperor and serve under the plan for the French government.

In the first plan, Chevalier's ideas are rather vague and not based on any definite line of action. In the second one it took more definite and concrete shape, but a dispatch of such a large force to Delhi could alarm the English as a war signal. The French government at this time was unwilling to reopen hostilities on the Indian issue and hence it turned a deaf ear to the urgent representation of Chevalier and the project was abandoned. In his last project he tried to obviate the difficulty of the English opposition by just forming a solid alliance with the Emperor and acquisition of the province of Tatta, which could have helped during hostilities. The plan received due attention but by the time Chandernagore was capitulated by the English and Chevalier made prisoner of war.⁵⁵³

II) Jean Law de Lauriston⁵⁵⁴ :

The first official dispatch of Law that may be reviewed is the 'Memoire sur les diverses Nations Europeennes etablies dans l'Inde', written in 1767.⁵⁵⁵ Law in his project, which was submitted to the French Government in Paris, discussed at length the means to achieve equality in political influence with the English. At the same time he admits that no improvement in the French position in India could be made without another trial of strength with the English. Hence he advocated a policy of maintaining peace for at least four years in view the completely

defenseless condition of the French settlements which could be captured by the English in a month from the declaration of war. He suggested the following measures for the period of peace.

Firstly the French should try to create an impression among the English that they were not much concerned about their lost possessions in India and at any cost they (French) were not in position to resume hostilities for at least six or seven years. Secondly the person who commanded the expedition must be informed at least one year in advance before the commencement of the hostilities and lastly he stressed on positive orders and necessary funds to be supplied to fortify Pondicherry, Mahe and Karikal at the earliest, to raise a sepoy force of twenty thousand men which could be quadrupled with the efforts of the French officers. He also stressed the need of having naval superiority in Indian waters and admitted that the French could wage a purely maritime war. Regarding the plan of the operations, Law indicated four points of attack viz. 1. Calcutta 2. Madras 3. Masulipatam 4. Bombay. Of the four he considered Bengal as the most desirable for delivering the first attack, since Bengal was the source of English power in India. The next point of attack was Madras, provided the French had naval superiority and an expeditionary force of 4000 European troops, 4000 sepoys and 2000 mariens. In this plan the French had to secure the alliance of Haider Ali to overrun the whole of Carnatic and secondly to send some frigates to the mouth of the Ganges to block Bengal. If the first two plans were not feasible then Law recommended the third where an attack on Masulipatam was to be effected. The capture of this place could bring in the possessions of the rich Northern Sarkars, which were to be secured with an alliance of Nizam Ali. The last point of attack was Bombay, which would provide the French

with a good port for all seasons, also it would be easy from here to capture Surat and overrun the whole of the Malabar Coast.⁵⁵⁶

Accordingly the whole project and implementations of the plan as stated by Lauriston seem to be grand. But he has avoided himself from giving the accurate information i.e. political situation in all the four points of attack and does not states which of it will work more efficiently. Again the total project of Law seems to be very expensive, at a time when the French Government could not invest in such large projects due to lack of finance. In his correspondence to the French Government he always states the importance of the Maratha power but shows least attention to them in his plan of Bombay. But his initial recommendations like the need of positive orders, necessary funds and a need of a port, all count on his concern for the French power in India, which one should acknowledge with due respect.

III) M.de Bellecombe ⁵⁵⁷ :

Unlike, Law who was in favour of an alliance with the Marathas, Bellecombe was in favour to have an alliance with Haider Ali, it could have been so because of the proximity of his kingdom to the Carnatic so that he could quickly run to the succor of Pondicherry in case of a need. The first thing he did after assuming office was that he sent a high ranking official M.de Coutanceau, to Shrirangapatan to thrash out the differences between France and Mysore which had evolved due to Dupart.⁵⁵⁸ The first memoire of Bellecombe that we may notice is report on the political situation in India, dated 24th January 1778.⁵⁵⁹ In this report he gives information of the developments in North-India. He says that 'the position of the Mughal Emperor has been improved due the efforts of his general Najaf Khan who is a skilful warrior and an astute diplomat. Asaf-ud-dualah, Nawab of Oudh is

tired of English control and wants to get rid of them. Another power in the north i.e. Raja of Gohad has been constantly extending his territories and has a cavalry of nearly 50,000. This person is also in close alliance with Najaf Khan. If the French succeeded to score a solid alliance with the Emperor, it is possible for the French to 'get a firm footing in the North.' He also states the English developments in regard to the Marathas internal dimensions, their regular communication with the Bhosale of Nagpur and Mahdaji Sindhia. About Haider Ali he speaks high by stating that this Prince has succeeded in breaking the alliance formed against him by Nizam Ali, Marathas and Basalat Jang. Further he says that the English were trying to exploit the enmity between Haider Ali and the Marathas and incase war broke out the French must side with Haider Ali for he is a reliable ally of the French in the Carnatic.

There is another memoire of Bellecombe of the same date 24th January 1778, 'Observations sur les Cipayes'.⁵⁶⁰ In this memoire Bellecombe clearly presents his views on who should the French choose between the Marathas or Haider Ali if they could not be brought against the English. On it he presents his view that in such a case the French should side over to Haider Ali for the enmity of this Prince is more dreaded than the Marathas. This Prince could go on to any extent in allying himself with the English, which could bring in total ruin to the French plans. Next his position was becoming stronger day by day and he was not divided as the Marathas were, also his troops could be relied on for its discipline. Secondly he severely criticizes Saint-Lubins character and his mission to Poona. He calls him an incompetent man of falsehood.

In the third memoire of Bellecombe 'Reflexions sur le memoire de M.Law', dated 1781.⁵⁶¹ He wholly rejects the plans of Law as diverting the attention of the French from what should be their real objective. He says, "Our

real interest is to establish solidly in India, the English have forced us out and the honour of our country requires our re-entry atleast on a footing of equality with them....". Secondly he also states his opinion that military success in India solely lies in their success in Europe and America.

IV) Pallobot de Saint- Lubin.⁵⁶²:

The French diplomatic agent who gained the greatest notoriety in the eyes of the English, even more than Chevalier, was Pallobot de Saint-Lubin; whose mission to Poona was viewed with great alarm by the government of Bombay and Calcutta.⁵⁶³ With the exception of Comte de Modave, who expressed a high opinion about Saint-Lubin, all the other contemporary Frenchman in India, including Bellecombe considered him as a mere unprincipled adventurer who had for a time successfully imposed on the credulity of the Minister of Marine and Colonies, de Sartin. No one thought of this man anything more than a successful knave and gave no importance to his negotiations with the Marathas which if implied could have bore fruits for the French power in India, if the implementation could have been enacted by other capable person than Saint – Lubin. Saint – Lubin remained at the Poona Court at the most important time. He was a falseman who had struck at the right target, but due to his incompetence he could not materialize his plans. Throughout his stay at the Poona Court one sees his unjustified negotiations and false claims. The extent of panic caused to the English relating to Saint-Lubins activities is well documented in the Bombay Archives and also published by Forrest in his 'Selections from Letters, Despatches..' etc, Bombay Secretariat, Maratha Series. But even after such a good development neither the two, the French nor Saint – Lubin could make a better account of their position in India.

V) M. de Montigny⁵⁶⁴ :

In 1780, Montigny had submitted to M. le Marquis de Castries, French Minister for Navy. In which he pointed out the advantages of an alliance with the Marathas as well as of a French landing on the West Coast of India. The Minister had at once sent him on a special mission to the Maratha Court with two letters, one to Nana Phadnavis and requested them to have full confidence in him.⁵⁶⁵ His diplomatic plans and projects are mentioned in his memoir- "*Meomire et Reflexions sur les negociations de la cour de France avec les Marathas, et particulierement sur celle dont a et charge M. de Montigny*".⁵⁶⁶ His diplomatic work in India can be divided in two periods, the first from 1778 to 1779 and the second from 1781 to 1788. There was a new vigour in the French colonial policy due to the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1776, which had opened new prospects for renewal of conflict with England. Montigny was there in India at the right time and at the right place i.e. Maratha Court. But something somewhere went totally wrong. The French Government issued permission to the projects, which were presented by Chevalier in 1775. This project was mainly related to North-India but there was a greater necessity to pay attention on the political developments of the South. As Montigny was instructed to keep in close contact with the Governor of Pondicherry and follow his instructions, he even after having successful negotiations at the Maratha Court, he could not fulfill the promises he had assured to them, as he had to obey the orders of his Directors.⁵⁶⁷

B) Role of the French Privateers:

Shortly after, the Governor-General, Conway resigned in disgust and was succeeded by Cossigny. Cossigny also had no better luck. He soon

got tired of the troubles in the Isles and wanted to be recalled. He was succeeded in June 1792 by Malartic, sent from France. With the new Governor-General also came four Civil Commissioners, Laboucher, Dumorier, Lescallier and Triol, to organize administration in the different French possessions in the East on the lines of the new Constitution for colonies decreed by the Constituent Assembly. In 1793 the outbreak of war lost for the French all their settlements in India, and the Isles of France and Bourbon also were practically cut off from the mother country. The Revolutionary Government of Paris was much too occupied with its own problems to think of the two small colonies in the distant Indian Ocean. They were thus left to their own resources for self-preservation.

Under the Directory an attempt was made to draw the colonies closer to the mother country. In July 1796 there arrived in the Isle of France twelve hundred troops under General Magallon and a small naval division. But the attempt to re-establish the authority of the mother country failed, because of the opposition of the Colonial Assembly to abide by the decree about the emancipation of slaves made by the Revolutionary Government of Paris. The economy of the two islands was dependent on slave labour. Besides, the emancipation of the slaves was considered dangerous for the security of the small white population. Thus during the Directory regime the Isle of France and Bourbon continued to remain practically independent from the mother country. The situation changed under the Consulate, which modified the decree about the emancipation of the slaves to suit the interests of the white population of the two islands. It helped the re-establishment of the authority of the mother country over the islands, although the local assembly continued to function for a few years more. Malartic died in the Isle of France on the 28th July 1800 and was succeeded by Magallon, who retained office till the arrival of Decaen as

Captain-General of all French possessions in the East in August 1803. Decean proved to be an able lieutenant of the First Consul, by whom he had been nominated. He promptly dissolved the Colonial Assembly, established a strong government, and by introducing a number of beneficial measures endeared himself to the people.

During this period the French of the two Isles were not indifferent to the great national struggle against the English. But distracted by revolutionary troubles and left without adequate military and naval resources for an expedition to India. They confined their efforts to commerce-raiding operations in Indian waters, which did not of course affect the dominating position held by the English in India, but nevertheless inflicted severe damage to their trade and commerce. They were not, however, inspired entirely, or even largely, by patriotic motives. The policy of commerce-raiding was imposed on them more by the necessity of circumstances. They had to live, and being virtually cut off from the mother country till the Peace of Amiens, and not getting adequate help from her even after the Peace, they were forced to engage in privateering as only means of survival. The prizes to be hoped for were enormous, since the English had obtained practically a monopoly of the Eastern trade during the war; while the risks involved for the French were nil. It was possible for the English to maintain an adequate naval force in Indian waters to assure protection to all their merchants; and with ordinary daring skill it was always possible to surprise and capture richly laden ships. There was again no fear of retaliation in kind, since the French had no trade of their own. It is necessary to bear this aspect of the situation in mind, although it must be admitted that among the French privateers of the period there were men who showed extraordinary daring and adventurous spirit, even at moments of the gravest crisis and in face of superior

enemy forces. Their conduct was in keeping with the best naval traditions in any country, and drew admiration even from their adversaries.

The information relating to these adventurers are written in 'Les Corsaires Français sous la République et L'Empire' by Gallois, Robert Surcouf by Canat, and in the 'Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian Seas' by Malleson. The privateers generally employed small, light armed and fast-sailing vessels, with just a small crew. Some of these boats were built in the Isles, and some were the very ships captured earlier. Among the most well-known of the privateers were: Robert Surcouf, Potier de la Houssaye, Perroud, Lememe, Malroux and Dutertre. The losses they inflicted ran into millions of pounds, and the panic they created among English traders may be gathered from the pages of the Asiatic Annual Register of the period.

The degree of success of the French privateers may be measured from the fact that from 1793 to 1794 the English lost 1800 ships more than the French.⁵⁶⁸ This figure is of course to be viewed in the light of the fact that practically all the trade was then in English hands, while the French shipping had been swept off the seas. Even then one cannot get away from the conclusion that the French, without any navy, had succeeded in dealing a blow to the English. This success was due to the efforts of these privateers operating in this region.

The attitude of the privateers is illustrated by the advice given by Surcouf to the First Consul in 1803. In the larger context the operations of the French privateers had only a nuisance value, which, but for the distraction of the Egyptian expedition and the second Anglo-Maratha war, would have been eliminated long before the final attack on the French Isles in 1810. It was the depredations of the

privateers, rather than feeble French projects for an attack on India, which forced upon the English the necessity of capturing the Isles of France and Bourbon.

In the last decade of the 18th century French influence in this sense was rising in many of the important Darbars of India. Tipu had in his service a French contingent commanded by de Lalle, and after his death in action in 1790, by his cousin de Vigie. But it was neither numerous nor strong, and after the fall of Pondicherry in 1793 was deprived of the means of receiving regular reinforcements. This contingent soon languished and became rabble, but its Jacobinical enthusiasm became naturally a source of anxiety for the English.

D) Raymond:

An important force was organized by Raymond in Hyderabad. He started with a small infantry corps of 300 men, which was raised to 1500 at the time of the Confederate war against Tipu (1790-1792). After the war Raymond was even allowed by the English to select arms from the arsenal at Madras.⁵⁶⁹ He had raised a corps of 11,000 in the battle of Kharda in 1795. His corps fought bravely against the superior forces of the Marathas and could have achieved victory over them but this did not happen due to the retreat of the Nizam Ali. It was due to the achievements of Raymond that the Nizam kept the French contingent in his army and dismissed the two English battalions lent by the Company's Government for his protection. The Nizam due to the rebellious nature of his son Ali Jah, asked Raymond to increase his battalion. At the time of Raymond's death it numbered to 14,000. Raymond had been assigned territory yielding revenue worth 18 lakhs for the maintenance of his battalion which include the district of Kurpa and the sea-coast. This

enabled him to communicate with the French Company and co-operate with any expeditionary force that France might have sent.

Raymond had acquired great influence at the Darbar of Nizam Ali. Malleson writes about him in the following words: "No adventurer in India ever stood higher than he did.... No European of mark who preceded him, no European of mark who followed him, in India, ever succeeded in gaining to such an extent, the love, the esteem, the admiration of the natives of the country".⁵⁷⁰ But it is doubtful whether "the one dream of his life was to carry out, by the means still open to him, the schemes of Dupleix, of Lally, and of Suffren".⁵⁷¹ It is true that all the officers in Raymond's army Frenchmen, fervent Jacobins like him, that they fought under the French flag and the Cap of Liberty was engraved on their buttons, and that Raymond sometimes corresponded with the French adventurers in Mysore as with those in Maratha service. But there is nothing to show that he had a deep laid political project in his mind or that he had any connection with the Isle of France or with the Revolutionary Government of Paris. Fortunately for his reputation, Raymond died on the 25th March 1798, six months before the sudden crisis which destroyed his army without a single shot being fired.

II) Piron:

Raymond was succeeded by his second-in-command another remarkable French adventurer named Piron. He was an even more ardent Jacobin than Raymond and less tactful and prudent. He roused the susceptibilities of the English by sending to Shinde's General Perron, a silver tree with a Cap of Liberty as a souvenir and by his open profession of hostile intentions. The moves of Piron caused great concern for the English because it was at the same time the ruler of

Mysore, Tipu Sultan had started intrigues either the French to create a revolution in the whole of south India also the Egyptian expedition of Napoleon had alarmed the English against the ruler of Mysore. It was only due to the activities of Piron that the English Governor-General Wellesley imposed a treaty on the Nizam and forced him to disband all the French contingents for his forces. The contingent created by Raymond was disbanded and instead four additional English battalions were added to the Nizam's military. Nizam Ali signed the treaty on 1st September 1798, partly under English pressure and partly for the fear of the overgrowing power of Piron and his French officers. English troops were quickly moved in on 22nd October 1798, the 'French army' as said by Wellesley was disbanded without a single shot been fired. The French army was then sent to Chandernagore and from there to Europe.

III) M.de Boigne:

A similar force as that of Raymond was been raised by the same time by another young adventurer in the Maratha camp of Mahadji Shinde by M.de Boigne. M.de Boigne did his best to serve Mahadji Shinde in his bid to establish his supremacy in the north India. M.de Boigne was not a Frenchmen but a Savoyard; the force he organized fought under the flag of Savoy, the White Cross; and the officers he appointed were taken from all nationalities, including English. But when he retired from Shinde's service in December 1795 and the command was given to a Frenchmen, Perron, French influence became decidedly predominant, and Shinde's infantry brigades became as much a source of anxiety to the English as the force under Raymond and Piron in Hyderabad. M.de Boigne's whole career shows that he came to India not to organize an anti-English force but only to seek fortune in trade or in the service of an Indian Prince. He started for India with letters of introduction

from an English nobleman, Earl Percy, served for a time as an ensign in a regiment of the Madras Native Infantry, quitted the English service and yet won patronage of the Governor-General Warren Hastings, entered the service of Mahadji Shinde with the help of the English Resident at his Darbar, Anderson, and with the consent of Warren Hastings, stipulated in his agreement with Shinde that he would never be required to fight against the English. He joined in very profitable trading operations in Oudh with the French deserter in English service Claude Martin, and invested a large part of his private fortune in the English Company's papers.

M.de Boigne first entered the service of Mahadji Shinde in 1784. He was entrusted with raising two infantry battalions of 850 men each, equipped and trained in the European fashion, and was given a salary of one thousand rupees a month. It was this force rose by M.de Boigne that Mahadji could prove his worth in the politics of north India. He was then asked in 1790 to raise it to a *corps d'armee* of thirteen battalions of infantry with cavalry and artillery, and later three brigades of 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, 2,000 irregular horse, 600 Afghan cavalry and 2,000 guns. For the maintenance of this army he was assigned with a vast region in the Doab, consisting of 52 districts and yielding revenue of 16 lakhs of rupees (later raised to 22 lakhs of rupees). He administrated this region virtually as an independent potentate. The fortress of Agra was handed to him to serve his arsenal, and he fixed his headquarters at Aligarh. When Mahadji Shinde started to Poona in 1793, he was left practically as the ruler of the north India. But the turn of Maratha politics after the sudden death of Mahadji Shinde made him feel uneasy about his future, and at the end of 1795 he retired from the Maratha service with the reluctant consent of Daulatrao Shinde. He then returned to Europe with enormous riches.

IV) Perron:

After the retirement of M.de Boigne his position was taken by Perron. Perron first came to India in 1780 as a common sailor. He deserted his ship to seek fortune in the service of an Indian Prince. It was not till 1789 that luck favoured him and he was given the command of the second brigade newly raised by de Boigne. Perron soon distinguished himself in the battle and won the confidence of his chief by his courage, enterprise and devotion to duty. In 1793 he was sent with his brigade to accompany Mahadji Shinde to Poona. He fought the battle of Kharda in 1795 and won the favour of Daulatrao Shinde. It was Daulatrao Shinde who appointed him as the commander of his armies in north India after the retirement of de Boigne.

Under the able command of Perron the Maratha army was increased by two more brigades, and at the same time the character of the force changed. Perron showed marked favour for French officers. He increased their number and appointed them to higher ranks in preference to officers of other nationalities. Due to this many able officers left the army. It is been suggested that Perron had a deep laid plan of creating a strong French force in India, either to throw of the allegiance of Shinde and establish French domination in north India or to co-operate with an expeditionary force that might be sent from France for the destruction of the English power in India.

Perron enjoyed undisputed power for about six years. But on the eve of the crisis which ended his career in 1803, he felt his position shaky and committed a political blunder which hastened the crisis. The instigation of his enemies lost him the confidence of his master, Daulatrao Shinde, and he lost his judgement in trying to be alert to preserve his own power. Thus, when towards the end of 1802 he received a summons from Daulatrao Shinde to send a part of his force

to the assistance of the Peshwa, driven out of Poona by Holkar, he saw in it a sinister move to deprive him of his power, and delayed to obey the summons too long to prevent the Peshwa from concluding the Treaty of Bassein with the English, which made the Anglo-Maratha war inevitable. When the war broke out in 1803, Perron, was deserted by many of his trusted French officers. Anxious to save his private fortune he surrendered to General Lake without striking a blow. Only at Assaye and Laswari did the European trained battalion offered a stiff resistance, revealing to the English how difficult it would have been to them to overcome the Marathas if they had given them some more time to organize them on the lines of de Boigne, Perron and Dudrenec. Perron returned to Europe in 1805. He had amassed immense fortunes from India.

Malleon and also some French historians have tried to justify the efforts of the French adventurers and Privateers in the service of the Indian Princes. They have been pictured as agents of France, pursuing national interests, and providing a plausible hope for the establishment of French political influence over a large part of India. Contemporary English opinion had alarmed the presence of such men in India and the threat of Napoleon Bonaparte's Egyptian expedition at the same time had caused a feeling of deep insecurity among the English. It was at this time the battalions of the Frenchmen in the service of the Indian Princes magnified the threat for the English. The letters and dispatches of Wellesley show clearly the extent of his anxiety caused by the presence of large 'French armies' in position to co-operate with any expeditionary force that might be sent from France. The impositions of the treaty of subsidiary alliance on the Nizam in 1798 and the second Anglo-Maratha war were both mainly prompted by the desire to eliminate the French menace.

Chapter VI.



Epilogue



Chapter VI

Epilogue

The French relations established with the Marathas is one of the most striking features of the 17th and 18th century. Hence it is imperative to carry out research relating to these relations. It is indeed a coincidence that the careers of the two nations in India i.e. the Marathas and the French ran concurrently. At the very moment the French had thought of establishing in India the Marathas had also started to carve out an independent state for themselves. Chhatrapati Shivaji was crowned as King in the June 1674 while the French under the able leadership of Francois Martin founded Pondicherry in April 1674 as the capital of French India. The period 1690-1699 was the darkest period for both the nations as the Mughals overran the Maratha territory while the Dutch, captured Pondicherry. The period 1750-1754 brought the two to the zenith of there glory in India while both were crushed in 1761.

Throughout the period from 1668 to 1818 the French came into contact with the Marathas and developed relations. Broadly these relations can be categorized into three time brackets, as the nature of the relations between the two varied accordingly i.e. the period from 1668-1700 from 1700-1761 and 1761-1818. The relations between the two has been studied with their interaction with other major and minor contemporary powers viz., Indian powers like the Mughal, The Nizam, Haider Ali, Tipu Sultan, the Siddi of Janjira etc and the Europeans such as the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch. The Maratha State which gradually got transformed into a Confederacy was a geographically centrally located power and

right from its very inception as a state it came into contact with nearly all the major and minor powers in the Hindustan, the Deccan and the Karnatak.

The relations between the two were purely commercial on the side of the French and politically and commercially motivated on behalf of the Marathas. The commercial policy of the Marathas related to the Europeans clearly states that political issues of the state should be given importance and due recognition when ever there is a clash between the two policies. This policy of the Marathas is been stated in the 'Treatise of the Maratha State Policy' known as the '*Ajnapatra*'. *Ajnapatra*, is a volume of about 7000 words, compiled in 1715 A.D. at the instance of Shambhu or Sambhaji, the King of Karveer (Kolhapur) State, by Ramchandra Pant Amatya a veteran statesman-cum-administrator of Shivaji's times. This is the only work related to Maratha State Policy. The second part of the *Ajnapatra* deals with seven chapters. The fifth of them relates to '*Shukar*' meaning financiers, indigenous and foreign merchants like the Portuguese, the French, the English, the Dutch, the Danes, etc. It reveals the attitude of Shivaji towards the foreign merchants and the importance of the existence of '*Shukars*' for the economic prosperity of the State. The commercial policy discusses the character, political ambition and the policy to be followed towards them during peace and at war in the following words....

"Amongst the merchants the "Amongst the merchants the Portuguese (Firangi), the English (Ingraz), the Dutch (Valandaze), the French (Francese), the Danes (Dingmar) and hat wearing (Topikar) merchants carry on trade, and commerce. But they are not like other merchants. Their masters, every one of them, are ruling Kings. By their orders and under their control these people come to trade in these provinces. How can it happen that these rulers have no greed for territories? These hat-wearers (Topikars) have full ambitions to enter into these provinces to increase their territories, and to

establish their own opinions (religions). According at various places they have already succeeded in their ambitious undertakings. Moreover this race of people is obstinate. Where a place has fallen into their hands they will not give it up even at the cost of their lives. Their intercourse should therefore be restricted to the extent of only their coming and going (for trade). They should strictly never be given places to settle. They should not at all be allowed to visit sea-forts. If some places have sometimes to be given for a factory, it should not be given at the mouth of an inlet or on the shores of the sea. If land is given in such places, it may be that they remain obedient as long as they like; they would, however, establish new forts at those ports at sometime or with the help of their navy to protect them. Their strength lies in their navy, guns and ammunition. As a consequence so much territory would be lost to the kingdom. Therefore if any place is at all to be given to them it should be given in the midst of two or four famous towns distant about eight to sixteen miles from the mouth of the sea, just as the French (Francese) were given lands at Rajapur. The place must be such that it must be low-lying and within the range of control of the neighbouring town so as to avoid trouble to the town. Thus by fixing their place of habitation factories should be permitted to be built. They should not be allowed to built (strong) permanent houses. If they live in this way by accepting the above conditions it is well; if not there is no need of them. It's enough if they occasionally come and go, and do not trouble us; nor need we trouble them. When the country of the enemy is looted or during naval warfare, if merchants are captured they should be made to pay a fine after considering the circumstances. The realization of the amount of fine should be with the idea of preserving them. After it is paid some hospitality should be done to their respect. The punishment which is inflicted on the servants of the enemy is not proper for merchants". ⁵⁷²

It clearly states that the Marathas gave importance to administration in comparison to the economic policy. The '*Ajnapatra*' also makes it clear that the Marathas differentiated between the European and understood their administrative and economic interests in India.

The period 1668 to 1700 broadly forms the first phase of relations among the French and the Marathas. It was in 1668, the French first came into contact with the Marathas. The French were granted permission by Shivaji to establish a factory at Rajapur. During this period, Shivaji was in constant conflict with the Siddi of Janjira and he was in need of arms and ammunition. To achieve this objective he wanted help from the European nations and he was ready to give any place on the Konkan Coast to the nation which would supply him with arms and ammunitions. The English and the Portuguese preferred to remain neutral due to their relations with the Mughals and Bijapur, while the Dutch asked for Maratha help against the English in return for their co-operation. Shivaji at this point was not interested to arouse the English hence he turned down the Dutch offer. The French were the only nation which supplied Shivaji with guns and lead without and pre-condition. Shivaji in return gave them permission to settle at Rajapur. The deal served the purpose of both the nations. Shivaji with French arms was able to arm a notable fleet against the Siddi of Janjira and keep a check on the activities of the English and the Portuguese. The French secured Shivaji's friendship got a place (port-town) on the west-coast for trade and marked their presence against the English and the Dutch. Unfortunately, French trade could not prosper much during the 17th century, due to shortage of funds, lack of proper communication and jealousy among the French chiefs at Surat.

The settlement of Pondicherry gradually made progress under Francois Martin, due to which the French shifted their administrative headquarters from Surat to Pondicherry. The Konkan conquest of Shivaji and later continued by Sambhaji literally crippled the trade and commerce on the Konkan Coast due to which the French factory at Rajapur had to closed in 1688. On the Coromandel Coast too the French trade did not prosper. The Dutch rivalry crippled their trade considerably. Pondicherry came under Maratha rule in July 1677, due to the Karnatak expedition of Shivaji. The French friendship with Sher Khan became a cause of concern between the French-Maratha relations. Thus during the time of Shivaji and Sambhaji the French came into contact with the Marathas on both the coasts viz., Konkan and Coromandel. The relations on the Konkan coast were commercial and politically motivated while those on the Coromandel Coast were purely politically motivated. The relations were cordial in the initial stage but worsened due to the tyranny of the Maratha officers at Pondicherry. The Dutch wanted to secure Pondicherry since 1678 and their rivalry with the French had soared due to loss of trade.

The reign of Rajaram marked the commencement of Mughal-Maratha War which almost severely affected all the regions in the Deccan and the Karnatak in terms of political and commercial change. Due to the Mughal invasion Rajaram had to flee to the south. He shifted his capital from Raigad to Jinji in November 1689. As Marathas controlled both Jinji and Pondicherry the French came in direct day-to-day contact with the Maratha Court at Jinji. The relations between the two further worsened due to the prejudice of the French officers against the Marathas. The Marathas had demanded money, arms and ammunition, and French help against the Mughals, but the French preferred to remain neutral, neither did they

supplied money and ammunition. The financial constraints of Rajaram forced him to sell Pondicherry. At first he gave priority to the French but they followed delaying tactics to have a better bargain. Finally Rajaram sold Pondicherry to the Dutch arch rivals of the French only because they were ready to pay a better price. His act was not a purposely crafted revenge on the French but only dire need of money. The French misunderstood the Maratha King for his act.

According to Dr.V.G. Hatakar there was no contact between the French and the Marathas for the forty seven years, as the Marathas left the Coromandel Coast after the sale of Pondicherry, this seems quiet strange and the relations were established only in 1740 with the coming of Dupleix in India. Even if there was no direct contact between the two for four decades there was an indirect contact between the two. This indirect contact relation is highlighted from the regular correspondence between the French and the Portuguese on the west coast and the French on the Coromandel Coast. The prime subject of the correspondence between the two was the Maratha activity in the central and peninsular parts of India. This correspondence forms a regular feature for the overall five decades when a direct contact between the two was lost. In the edited works of A.B.De Braganza Pereira which came out in Portuguese in 1968 and latter translated into Marathi by Shri S.S.Desai under the title “Marathanchya Itihasachi Sadhane, Portuguese Daftar Khand” Vol. 1-3, (1663-1739) we find many such correspondences between the Portuguese, Governor of Goa, King of Portugal, French Governor of Pondicherry and various Directors at Mahe, Karikal, Chandernagore, Surat, etc.

The letters dated 26, January 1732, Goa and 25, May 1737, Goa read as follows....

144-Livro Das Monsoes.

Letter of the Portuguese Governor of Goa to the King of Portugal. Dated: 26, January 1732, Goa.

In this letter to the king of Portugal the Governor explains the political situation in the Deccan. He states that due to the prolonged war with the Marathas the treasury has become empty and there is also an acute need of soldiers. Due to which he had written a letter to the French Governor of Pondicherry for supply of soldiers. Accordingly a Frenchman named Lobardian from Pondicherry had brought with him 100 French soldiers. But as these soldiers were incapable of handling arms they had been sent back.

23 – Livro Dos Reis Vizinhos, No.9., FLS 16V.

Letter of the Portuguese Viceroy of Goa, Count De Sandomille to the Governor of Pondicherry and the Council. Dated – 25, May 1737, Goa.

In his letter he requests the French Governor of Pondicherry that in the past the French had helped the Portuguese against the Marathas. The Marathas have not kept their word as signed in the treaty with the Portuguese and have invaded the Portuguese territory. Hence he requests the French to help the Portuguese with men, money and arms. He writes that whatever help the French will offer he is ready to pay for the same, but that the help must reach Goa as early as September 1737 for he is going to start his campaign against the Marathas in October 1737. He further requests him to send the help to the port of Mahe as to save time.

However the direct contact between the two powers which resumed in 1740 i.e. after a period of forty seven years once more played a significant role in the history of the French in India. The political situations in 1740 were quite different to those in 1668-1697. Chhpa. Rajaram, the King of the Marathas died on March 2, 1700. Francois Martin the French Governor of Pondicherry died on January 21, 1701 and the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb died on February 20, 1707. Thus all the old contenders for power had died. The political setup was completely changed, thus the purpose of maintaining relations between each other had also changed.

Pondicherry was restored to the French in 1697 by the Dutch (the actual possession was given in 1699). Since 1740, the French trade on the Cormandel Coast gradually increased and it improved their position in India. Pondicherry was now recognized as one of the strongest towns in India and many South-Indian Princes took protection in it during the times of difficulty. This had enhanced the French prestige in both trade and politics. The French Governor Dumas by his gallant defense of Pondicherry against the equally strong Raghuji Bhosale proved French valour and got recognition from the Mughal Emperor and the Nizam. He also got *firman*s issued in the Company's name to start mints in the French settlements. His political and commercial policy was further promoted by Dupleix. The advent of Dupleix marked a turning point in the political activities of south India. Dupleix was the first European who dreamt of establishing an empire in India. His primary aim was to establish French supremacy in south India by interfering in the internal matters of weak Princes and exploiting them for French cause by making them puppet rulers. This he did in the case of Chanda Sahib and Salabat Jang.

The Marathas by this time had become one of the most formidable powers in India. The political set-up had changed rapidly due to the need of establishing one's power and the politics done to achieve the purpose. The beginning of the 18th century saw the rise of new regional powers due to the disintegration of the Mughal Empire. It also witnessed the transformation of the Maratha State into a Confederacy. The French influence rose steadily under the leadership of Dupleix from Aurangabad in the north to Cape Camorin to the south. The policy of interference of Dupleix brought in the second phase of the Maratha-French relations i.e. 1740-1761. Throughout the period there were no amicable

relations between the two nations and their interests clashed with each other on various issues relating to the Deccan and the Karnatak.

The Maratha Confederacy was centrally located and the Peshwa on behalf of the Chhatrapati was carrying out the functions of the Confederacy. The influence of the Marathas was resounded from the Karnatak to Attock. Nearly all parts of India were directly or indirectly affected by the Maratha Confederacy. Until the rise of the French in Karnatak the Marathas had acted as supreme authority in that part. They had managed to keep a check on the Nizam with their influence at the Mughal Court and had not allowed the English to penetrate into the southern politics. The policy of Dupleix to build a French Empire in the south of India with the help of puppet Princes brought the French in direct conflict with the Marathas. Dupleix first helped Muzaffir Jang and then Salabat Jang to secure the Viceroyalty of the Deccan and almost attained the position of the supreme arbiter of southern India. It was essentially due to this policy that the downfall of Dupleix and as well as the French power and influence in India. His victories over Anwar-ud din and Nasir Jang made him to think that every thing is possible for the French arms in India. He misjudged the power of the Marathas and he in his arrogance invited the hostility of the Marathas who were the only formidable power in India. The French-Maratha conflict (1749-1752) wherein the French supported the case of Nasir Jang and attacked the Maratha capital further deteriorated the relations. This conflict of the French with the Marathas in real sense brought the downfall of the French in India. The Nizam's treasury was emptied by the French due to hostilities with the Marathas. While the French trade in Bengal was ruined due to the Maratha invasions in Bengal carried out by Raghuji Bhosale from 1741-1748. This paved way to the English to

establish their control in Bengal as the French evacuated their trade from Bengal and shifted their interest towards the trade on the Coromandel Coast.

After Dupleix, Bussy concluded a treaty of friendship with Peshwa Nanasaheb in November 1752 and the relations between the French and the Marathas remained amicable to the end. The result of the treaty of Balki was, the Peshwa secured a sufficiently large slice from the Nizam's territory, and the French did not derive any benefit from the Franco-Maratha friendship. The Peshwa also avoided himself from getting involved in the struggle between the English and the French in India.

The second half of the 18th century witnessed a period of anarchy and interdependency. Nearly all the major powers in India had to suffer losses due to constant warfare and the northern invasions of the Afghans. The Marathas received a severe blow at the battle of Panipat in 1761 which paved way to the rise of Haider Ali in the south and English intervention in the politics of north India. The State of Mysore rose to prominence under Haider Ali and later under his son Tipu Sultan especially on the territories conquered from the Marathas. Due to this reason Haider Ali had become the most important rival of the Marathas in the south. The period after 1761 witnesses the third phase of the relations between the French and the Marathas. After 1763 the French ceased to be contestants for supremacy in India. The humiliations at the 'Treaty of Paris' after the Seven Years War had become a matter of shame for the French. They at any cost wanted to avenge this humiliation. Also there was a complete change in the French Company affairs after 1763. They wanted to destroy the growing influence of the English in India and to achieve this purpose the French needed help from one or the other Indian power. The French for this purpose visualized three Indian powers namely the Marathas, the Nizam and

Haider Ali. Finally they settled to have an alliance with the Marathas as Marathas were the only one who had the complete potentials of driving the English out of India.

The French on the other hand also tried to persuade Nizam Ali and Haider Ali (later Tipu Sultan) to form a friendly alliance with the Marathas to achieve the common purpose. The embassies of Saint Lubin and Montigny tried their best to formulate the alliance between the French and the Marathas. But on all the five occasions the Maratha proposal made to the French for an alliance against the English were left unanswered by the French Government viz., in 1772, 1775, 1778, 1781 and 1782. The Marathas hence felt that the French approach towards the alliance was fake and finally they gave up the thought of having an alliance with the French. The French residents like Saint-Lubin, Bellecombe, M. Piveron and M.de Morat at the courts of the Marathas and Haider Ali undermined their purpose and gave way to personal jealousy and rivalry this lost the French credentials at the Maratha Court. The French intimacy towards Haider Ali too caused suspicion in the minds of important Maratha leaders like Nana Phadnavis and Mahadji Shinde. For France Indian politics always remained subservient to European politics, France could not and would not interfere in the Indian affairs unless and until she was forced to it by a war in Europe between herself and England. The French involvement in the American War of Independence and the French Revolution further hampered the French interests in India.

The French warning that the destruction of Tipu would consequently bring the ruin of the Marathas came to be true. The French ceaselessly tried to bring the Marathas, Nizam Ali and Tipu together against the English. But due to petty rivalry amongst them the English could carve out an Empire in India. The

French-Maratha relations although did not succeed in the cause to oust the English from India but remain as one of the most striking features of the 18th century in India.



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542. P.R.C., Vol. XIII, pp.306-310.
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544. R.C.Majumdar & V.G.Dighe (ed.), *The History and Culture of the Indian People: The Maratha Supremacy*, Vol. VIII, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1977, p.507.
545. G.B. Malleson, *History of the French in India and on the Indian Seas*, First Reprint, Delhi, 1986, pp.1-2.
546. S.P. Sen, *The French in India*, Second Edition, Delhi, 1971, p.27.
547. In the reign of Louis XII of France in 1503 an attempt was made to trade in the Eastern seas. In 1537 and 1543, the successor of Louis XII, King Francis I, made a similar attempts. On June 1, 1604, a Company was established under Kings letters patents, granting exclusive trade rights in the reign of Henry IV. In the year 1615, the company established in 1503 and 1604 were united. Under the auspices of Richelieu a new company named "La Compagnie des Indes" was formed on June 24, 1642.
548. U.A. Kadam, '*Glimpses of the French Administration in Pondicherry*', (1701-1761), unpublished paper, pp.4-5.
549. V.G. Hatakhar, *Relations between the French and the Marathas*, (1668-1815), University of Bombay, 1958, p.157.
550. Jean Baptiste Chevalier came to India as a second in grade clerk in 1752. He became a Council in 3 years. He succeeded to visit Assam and establish a factory at Gopalpara. He was made prisoner of war by the English with the fall of Chandernagore in March 1757.
551. V.G. Hatakhar (Trans & ed.), *French Records*, Vol.III, Bombay, 1980, pp.xxxiii-xxxiv.
552. BNF, Fr. (NAF) 9366, pp.1-9.
553. Op.cit., pp.xxxiv-xxxv.

554. Jean Law de Lauriston was nephew of Jean Law, the celebrated French Financier of the Regency in France (1715-1723). Starting as a supernumerary clerk in Pondicherry he became Deputy Chief of kasimbazar in 1747. In 1747 itself he became Council at Chandrenagore. He became chief of the company at Patna in September 1749 upto 1757. Finally in 1763, he was appointed by the French King as Governor General of all French establishments in India.
555. P.A., MS.100.
556. S.P. Sen, *The French in India*, Second Edition, Delhi, 1971, pp.154-155.
557. M. de Bellecombe had a long military career. He was in Canada in 1755 with the Regiment of Royal –Roussillon serving as Assistant Medical Officer with the rank of Captain. He got wounded in the battle at Qubec in 1758 and was decorated with the Cross of St. Louis and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. On January 1, 1777 he assumed charge as Governor-General of Pondicherry.
558. Dupart was the Governor of Mahe and developed differences with Mysore. He also had threatened to wage war against Mysore.
559. P.A., MS.289.
560. P.A., MS.290.
561. P.A., MS.323.
562. Saint Lubin had visited in 1757. In 1759 he was sent by Lally on a secret mission to Bengal. He returned to France in 1762, again returned to India in 1766 to serve his country by studying the political condition in India. He came to Poona in 1776 as a

special envoy of the French Government. He formulated new plans for a Franco-Maratha alliance.

563. S.P.Sen, *The French in India*, Second Edition, Delhi, 1971, p.180.
564. M. De Montigny had visited the court of the Mughal Emperor in 1778. He also visited the Court of Poona in 1779. He was the French Resident at Poona from 1781-1788.
565. V.G. Hatakar (Trans & ed.) *French Records*, Vol.V, Bombay, 1980, pp.i-ii.
566. BNF, Fr. (NAF) 12093. Written in 1784 this memoire discusses the causes of the failure of Montigny's mission to negotiate a Franco-Maratha Alliance.
567. BNF, Fr. (NAF) 12093.
568. G.B.Malleson, *Final French Struggles in India and on the Indian Seas*, First Reprint, Delhi, 1986, p.81.
569. Wilks, *History of Mysoor*, Vol. II, p.622.
570. op.cit., p.244.
571. Ibid., p.244.
572. A.R.Kulkarni (ed.) *Ramchandra Pant Amatyanche Ajnapatra*, 1st edition, Mansanman Prakashan, Pune, 2004.

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3. I/1/3: 1754-1755 Correspondence on the French in India.
4. I/1/4: 1752-1779 Copies of miscellaneous papers on the French in India
5. I/1/5: 1771-1775 Proceedings of the Madras Government of French complaints about interruption to their commerce.
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C) Orme Manuscripts

- 1) Volume 3.
- 2) Volume 14.
- 3) Volume 55

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- 2) Fonds Asie - Volumes 4, 6, 7, 11, 16, 20.
- 3) Fonds Perse - Volume 5.

These are Memoires and Documents which are either copies or extracts (1668-1815).

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Vol.6:- f.279.

Vol.7:- .f.,123-123v.

Vol.11:- f.272v,304-310v.

Vol.16:- f.323-326,354-355.

Vol.20:- f.287-288v.

Fonds Perse ;

Vol.5:- f.92-96,94v.

B) Archives du Ministere des Colonies. (Primary Documents)

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2. AN,C²100,f.169-171

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3. AN,C²102,f.263v-264
4. AN,C²102,f.266
5. AN,C²102,f.293v-294
6. AN,C²102,f.307

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3. AN,C²118,f.269-270

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2. AN,C²120,f.8v-9

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
Abbreviations

A B B R E V A T I O N S


1. Archives de Versailles (AV).
2. Archives du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (AMAE).
3. Archives du Ministere des Colonies (AMC).
4. Archives Nationales (AN).
5. Bibliothèque Nationale (BN).
6. English Records on Shivaji (ERS).
7. India Office Records (IOR).
8. Indian Historical Records Commission Proceedings (IHRCP).
9. Kavyetihasa Sangraha (KS).
10. Mahadji Shinde Hyanchi Kagad Patre (MSHKP).
11. Marathyanchya Itihasachi Sandahe (MIS).
12. Memoire a Consulter et Consultation, pour le Sieur de Bussy, avec des Letters
de Bussy, Lally, etc. (MCCBLBL).
13. Nouvelles Acquisition Francaises (NAF).
14. Peshwa Daftar (PD).
15. Poona Residency Correspondence (PRC).
16. Selections from the Satara Rājas and Peshwas Diaries (SSRPD).
17. The Despatches, Minutes and Correspondence of the Marquess of Welesley
(DMCMW).
18. The Secret and Political Department Diary (SPDD).

Genealogy

GENELOGY OF THE BHOSALE FAMILY




GENELOGY OF THE BHATT PESHWA FAMILY



**Chart specifying the various dimensions of the
French-Maratha Relations**

Chart specifying the various dimensions of the French-Maratha Relations.



Chronology of French Directors and Governor-Generals

Chronological Details of the French in India.

French India

| | |
|-------------|-----------------------------------|
| 1674 | French territory |
| Jan 1760 - | 1765 British occupation |
| 1778 - | 1783 British occupation |
| 1793 - | 1816 British occupation |
| 2 May 1954- | Chandernagor transferred to India |
| 1 Nov 1954 | Pondicherry transferred to India |

Governors (from 1948, commissioners)

| | |
|------------|---|
| 1699 - | 31 Dec 1706 François Martin (b. 1634 - d. 1706) |
| Jan 1707 - | Jul 1708 Pierre Dulivier (1st time) |
| 1708 - | 1712 Guillaume André d'Hébert (1st time) |
| 1712 - | 1717 Pierre Dulivier (2nd time) |
| 1717 - | 1718 Guillaume André d'Hébert (2nd time) |

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|--------------------------|--|
| Aug 1718 - - d. 1721) | 11 Oct 1721 Pierre André Prévost de La Prévostière (b. ... |
| 1721 - | 1723 Pierre Christoph Le Noir (1st time) (acting) |
| 1723 - | 1726 Joseph Beauvollier de Courchant |
| 1726 - | 1734 Pierre Christoph Le Noir (2nd time) |
| Nov 1734 - | 1741 Pierre-Benoît Dumas (b. 1668 - d. 1745) |
| 1742 - | 1754 Joseph François Dupleix (b. 1697 - d. 1763) |
| Aug 1754 - | 1754 Charles Robert Godeheu de Zaimont (acting) |
| 1754 - | 1758 Georges Duval de Leyrit |
| 1758 - | Jan 1760 Thomas Arthur, comte de Lally-Tollendal (b. 1702 - d. 1766) |
| 1765 - | 1766 Jean Law de Lauriston (1st time) |
| 1766 - | 1767 Antoine Boyellau |
| 1767 - | 1777 Jean Law de Lauriston (2nd time) |
| 1777 - | 1782 Guillaume-Léonard de Bellecombe, seigneur de Teirac (b. 1728 - d. 1792) |
| 1783 - | 1785 Charles Joseph Pâtissier, marquis de Bussy-Castelnau (b. 1718 - d. 1785) |
| 1785 | François, vicomte de Souillac (b. 1732 - d. 1803) |

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|---------------|--|
| Oct 1785 - | 1787 David Charpentier de Cossigny (b. 1740 - d. 1801) |
| Oct 1787 - | 1789 Thomas, comte de Conway (b. 1733 - d. c.1800) |
| Oct 1789 - | 1792 Camille Charles Leclerc, chevalier de Fresne |
| 1792 - | 1793 Dominique-Prosper de Chermont (b. 1741 - d. 1798) |
| Sep 1816 - | Oct 1825 André Julien, comte Dupuy |
| Oct 1825 - | 19 Jun 1826 Cordier (1st time) (acting) |
| 19 Jun 1826 - | Aug 1828 Philippe Panon, vicomte Desbassayns de Richemont (b. 1774 - d. 1840) |
| Aug 1828 - | 10 Apr 1829 Cordier (2nd time) (acting) |
| 10 Apr 1829 - | 3 May 1835 Auguste Jacques Nicolas Peureux de Mélay |
| 3 May 1835 - | Apr 1840 Hubert Jean Victor, marquis de Saint-Simon |
| Apr 1840 - | 1844 Paul de Norquer du Camper |
| 1844 - | 1849 Louis Pujol |
| 1849 - | 1850 Hyacinth Marie de Lalande de Calan |
| 1851 - | 1852 Philippe Achille Bédier |
| 1852 - | 1857 de Verminac Saint-Maur |
| 1857 - | 1863 Alexandre Jean Baptiste de Verminac Durand d'Ubaye |
| 1863 - | 1871 Napoléon Joseph Louis Bontemps |

| | |
|--------|--|
| 1871 - | 1875 Pierre Aristide Faron |
| 1875 - | 1878 Adolph Joseph Antoine Trillard |
| 1878 - | 1881 Léonce Laugier |
| 1881 - | 1884 Julien Théodore Drouet |
| 1884 - | 1886 Étienne-Antoine-Guillaume Richaud (b. 1841 - d. 1889) |
| 1886 - | 1888 Louis Evenor Édouard Manès |
| 1888 - | 1889 Georges Jules Piquet |
| 1889 - | 1891 Louis Hippolyte Marie Nouët |
| 1891 - | 1896 Léon Émile Clément Thomas |
| 1896 - | 1898 Louis Jean Girod |
| 1898 - | 1902 François Pierre Rocher |
| 1902 - | 1904 Victor Louis Marie Lanrezac |
| 1904 - | 1905 Jean-Baptiste Philémon Lemaire |
| 1905 - | 1906 Joseph Pascal François |
| 1906 - | 1908 Gabriel Louis Angoulvant (b. 1872 - d. 1932) |
| 1908 - | 1909 Adrien Jules Jean Bonhoure (b. 1860 - d. 19...) |
| 1909 - | 1910 Ernest Fernand Lévêque |

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|------------|--|
| 1910 - | 1912 Pierre Louis Alfred Duprat |
| 1912 - | 1918 Alfred Albert Martineau (b. 1857 - d. 1941) |
| 1918 - | 1926 Louis-Martial-Innocent Gerbinis (b. 1871 - d. 1954) |
| 1926 - | 1928 Pierre Jean Henri Didelot |
| 1928 - | 1931 Robert Paul Marie de Guise |
| 1931 - | 1934 François-Adrien Juvanon |
| Aug 1934 - | 1936 Léon Solomiac (b. 1873 - d. 1960) |
| 1936 - | 1938 Horace Valentin Crocicchia |
| 1938 - | 1945 Louis Alexis Étienne Bonvin (b. 1886 - d. 1946) |
| 1945 - | 1947 Nicolas Ernest Marie Maurice Jeandin |
| 1947 - | 1949 Charles François Marie Baron |
| 1949 - | 1950 Charles Chambon |
| 1950 - | 1954 André Ménard |

CHRONOLOGY

Events relating to the Marathas, French, Mughals, English, Dutch and others from 1600 to 1818

| Year | Date | The Marathas | The French | The Mughals, The English & The Dutch etc. |
|------|-------------|---|---|---|
| 1600 | December 31 | | | The English East India Company formed. |
| 1602 | March 28 | | | The Dutch East India Company formed. |
| 1630 | February 19 | Birth of Shivaji the Great. | | |
| 1664 | August 27 | | The French East India Company formed. | |
| 1666 | March 29 | | La Boullaye le Gouz and Beber arrive at Surat. | |
| 1666 | September 4 | | The French obtain a firman from the Emperor to open a factory at Surat. | |
| 1668 | February 13 | | Francois Caron arrives at Surat as Director of the Company. | |
| 1668 | December | Shivaji grants a firman to the French to open a factory at Rajapur. | | |
| 1669 | January 17 | | Francois Martin arrives at Calicut. | |
| 1670 | October 3-5 | Shivaji sacks Surat for the second time. | | |
| 1674 | January | | The French establish themselves at Pondicherry. | |
| 1674 | June 6 | Shivaji crowns himself as King (Chhatrapatti) | | |

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|------|--------------|--|--|--|
| 1674 | September 23 | | The French capitulate at St. Thome. | |
| 1675 | April 6 | | Francois Baron's interview with Sherkhan. | |
| 1676 | September 24 | | The French storm the fortress of Valadour. | |
| 1677 | May 31 | Jinji surrenders to Shivaji. | | |
| 1677 | July 6 | Shivaji defeats Sherkhan. | | |
| 1677 | July 17 | Treaty signed between Shivaji and Sherkhan. | Pondicherry passes under Maratha rule. | |
| 1680 | April 3 | Shivaji dies. | | |
| 1689 | January 9 | The French obtain a firman from the Marathas to fortify Pondicherry. | | |
| 1689 | March 11 | Shambhaji assassinated by the Mughals. | | |
| 1689 | November 15 | Rajaram arrives at Jinji. | | |
| 1690 | June | | Customs and other revenues of Pondicherry ceded to the French in return for a loan of Rs.10,000 by the Marathas. | |
| 1690 | September 15 | | | The English purchase the fort of Tegnapatam (Fort St. David) from Rajaram. The Mughals besiege Jinji. |
| 1693 | August 27 | Rajaram sells Pondicherry to the Dutch. | | |
| 1693 | September 8 | | Pondicherry capitulates to the Dutch. | |

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|------|-------------|--------------------------------------|--|---|
| 1698 | February 7 | | | Jinji surrenders to the Mughals. |
| 1699 | March 16 | | Pondicherry restored to the French. | |
| 1700 | March 2 | Rajaram dies. | | |
| 1701 | January 21 | | A Council established at Pondicherry. | |
| 1706 | December 31 | | Francois Martin dies. | |
| 1707 | February 20 | | | Emperor Aurangzeb dies. |
| 1708 | January 12 | Shahu coronated as King of Marathas. | | |
| 1722 | August 16 | | Dupleix arrives at Pondicherry as Councillor. | |
| 1724 | | | | Nizam-ul-Mulk becomes Viceroy of the Deccan. |
| 1726 | August 21 | | Lenoir becomes Governor of Pondicherry. | |
| 1731 | August 28 | | Dupleix becomes Director at Chandernagore. | |
| 1735 | | | Duma becomes Governor of Pondicherry. | |
| 1736 | August 17 | | Duma obtains a firman from the Emperor to coin money at Pondicherry. | |
| 1739 | February 14 | | The French occupy Karikal. | |
| 1739 | May 5 | Bassein capitulates to the Marathas | | |
| 1740 | May 19 | | | Dost Ali killed in a battle with the Marathas. |
| 1740 | May 25 | | | Dost Ali's family takes shelter at Pondicherry. |

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|------|---------------------|--|---|---|
| 1740 | June 25 | Balaji Bajirao alias Nanasaheb becomes Peshwa. | | |
| 1740 | August | Treaty signed between the Marathas and Safdar Ali. | | |
| 1740 | September 1 | | | Safdar Ali and Chanda Sahib arrive at Pondicherry. |
| 1741 | March 26 | Chanda Sahib made prisoner by the Marathas.. | | |
| 1742 | January 14 | | Dupleix becomes Governor. | |
| 1742 | August | | | Safdar Ali assassinated. |
| 1746 | November 4 | | | Battle of Adyar. |
| 1748 | April 25 | | | Emperor Muhammad Shah Shah dies. |
| 1748 | April 28 | | | Ahmad Shah becomes Emperor. |
| 1748 | May 21 | | | Nizam-ul-Mulk dies. |
| 1748 | June- October 17 | | Siege of Pondicherry raised by the English. | |
| 1749 | August 3 | | | Nawab Anwar-ud-din killed in the battle of Ambour. |
| 1749 | December | King Shahu dies. | | |
| 1750 | September 12 | | Bussy captures Jinji. | |
| 1750 | December 16 | | | Nazir Jang assassinated: Muzaffir Jang declared Viceroy of Deccan. |
| 1751 | February 14 | | | Muzaffir Jang assassinated; Salabat Jang proclaimed Viceroy of Deccan by Bussy. |
| 1751 | April 3 | Treaty of Pangal signed between Balaji and Salabat Jang. | | |

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|------|-----------------|---|---|--|
| 1751 | November 23 | | | Salabat Jang declares war against the Peshwa. |
| 1751 | December 1 | Battle of Parner; the Marathas retire before the accurate firing of the French artillery. | | |
| 1751 | December 3 | | Bussy launches a surprise attack on the Maratha camp. | |
| 1751 | December 10 | Battle of Malthan; honours with the Marathas. | | |
| 1751 | December 14 | The Marathas capture the fort of Trimbak. | | |
| 1752 | January 17 | Treaty of Ahmednagar signed between the Peshwa and Slabat Jang. | | |
| 1752 | April | | | Ramdas Pant assassinated; Sayyad Lashkar Khan becomes Diwan. |
| 1752 | June 13 | | The French capitulate at Trichinopoly. | |
| 1752 | August | | | Ghazi-ud-din arrives at Barhanpur. |
| 1752 | September | | | Ghazi-ud-din arrives at Aurangabad. |
| 1752 | October 16 | | | Ghazi-ud-din dies being poisoned. |
| 1752 | November 24 | Treaty of Bhalki signed between the Peshwa and Salabat Jang. | Treaty of alliance between the Peshwa and Bussy. | |
| 1752 | December 24 | | | The Mughal army revolts; refuses to march to the Karnatak. |
| 1753 | End of February | | Bussy leaves for Masulipatam for the reasons of health. | |
| 1753 | June 15 | | Bussy returns post-haste to Hyderabad. | |
| 1753 | September 13 | The Peshwa stations a Wakil at Bussy's camp. | | |

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|------|-----------------|--|---|---|
| 1753 | End of November | | Bussy returns to Aurangabad. | |
| 1753 | December 9 | Bussy sends presents on the occasion of the marriage of the Peshwa's second son Madhavrao. | | |
| 1753 | December | | | Sayyad Lashkar Khan resigns; Shah Nawaz Khan becomes Diwan. |
| 1754 | January | | Bussy obtains the release of the two brothers of Salabat Jang. | |
| 1754 | January 22 | | A conference at Sadras begins between the French and the English delegates. | |
| 1754 | End of February | Raghuji Bhosale invades the Nizam's territory. | | |
| 1754 | June 2 | | | Ahmed Shah desposed; Alam Gir II becomes Emperor. |
| 1754 | April 10 | Peace signed between Raghuji and the Nizam. | | |
| 1754 | June 7 | | Bussy leaves Hyderabad for the Circars. | |
| 1754 | August 2 | | Godeheu arrives in India. | |
| 1754 | October 11 | | Truce signed between the French and the English. | |
| 1754 | October 15 | | Dupleix leaves for France. | |
| 1755 | January | | Bussy returns to Hyderabad. | |
| 1755 | January 11 | | Treaty signed between the French and the English in India for 18 months. | |
| 1755 | February 14 | Raghuji Bhosale dies. | | |
| 1755 | April | | De Leyrit becomes Governor of Pondicherry. | |

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|------|------------------|---|---|---|
| 1755 | April 7 | Murrarao seeks Bussy's co-operation in a conspiracy against the Peshwa. | | The Mughal army led by Bussy arrives before Shrirangapatan. |
| 1755 | December | | Bussy receives a proposal from the Emperor for a French detachment. | |
| 1755 | July | Balaji seeks Bussy's assistance against Tulaji Angre. | | |
| 1755 | December | Balaji repeats his demand for French Troops. | | |
| 1756 | January 20 | The Peshwa arrives before Savnur. | | |
| 1756 | February 14 | Tulaji Angre surrenders to the Peshwa. | | |
| 1756 | End of April | Peace concluded between the Peshwa, Murarrao and the Nawab of Savnur. | | |
| 1756 | Beginning of May | | Bussy dismissed by the Nizam. | |
| 1756 | June 14 | | Bussy arrives at Char-Minar. | |
| 1756 | June-August | | Bussy's famous defense at Char-Minar. | |
| 1756 | August 30 | | Bussy reinstated at the Nizam's Court. | |
| 1756 | November | | Bussy leaves for the 'Circars' | |
| 1757 | June 23 | | | Battle of Plassey; Siraj-ud Daulah defeated and killed. |
| 1758 | February | | Bussy arrives at Aurangabad at the Nizam's urgent call. | |
| 1758 | May 11 | | Hyder Jang, Bussy's Diwan assassinated. | Shah Nawaz Khan assassinated. |
| 1758 | July 18 | | Bussy finally leaves Hyderabad. | |

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|------|--------------|--|--|--|---|
| 1759 | March 4 | | | | Surat captured by the English. |
| 1760 | January 22 | | | Bussy made prisoner by the English. | |
| 1761 | January 14 | The Marathas routed at the Panipat by Ahmed Shah Abdali. | | | |
| 1761 | January 16 | | | Pondicherry surrenders to the English. | |
| 1761 | June 23 | The Peshwa Nanasaheb dies. | | | |
| | July 20 | Madhavrao becomes Peshwa. | | | |
| 1761 | September 3 | | | Chevalier de Mouhy arrives at Goa. | |
| 1761 | December 9 | Queen Tarabai dies. | | | |
| 1762 | April 4 | | | Comte de Maudave arrives at Negapatam. | |
| 1762 | July 7 | | | | Salabat Jang made prisoner by Nizam Ali. |
| 1762 | September 16 | | | | Salabat Jang assassinated. |
| 1763 | February | | | Treaty of Paris signed between the England and the France. | |
| 1764 | October 23 | | | | Battle of Buxar; the English defeat the Emperor, Shuja-ud-daulah, Nawab of Audh and Mir Kasim, Nawab of Bengal. |
| 1765 | April 11 | | | Law de Lauriston arrives at Pondicherry. | |
| 1765 | August 12 | | | | The English acquire the Diwani of Bengal. |
| 1767 | August | | | | War commences between Haider Ali and the English; |
| 1769 | April | | | | Peace concluded between Haider and the English; honours with Haider Ali. |

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|------|--------------|--|--------------------------|--|--|
| 1770 | December 15 | The Marathas capture Etawah. | | | |
| 1770 | December | | | | The Emperor seeks Maratha protection. |
| 1771 | February 10 | The Marathas take possession of Delhi. | | | |
| 1771 | February 24 | | Huguel joins Haider Ali. | | |
| 1772 | January 6 | | | | Shah Alam enters Delhi and occupies the throne under Maratha protection. |
| 1772 | January | Madhavrao proposes Franco-Maratha alliance to Law. | | | |
| 1772 | October 13 | | | | Mostyn arrives at Poona as English Resident. |
| 1772 | November 18 | Peshwa Madhavrao dies. | | | |
| 1772 | December 13 | Narayanrao becomes the Peshwa. | | | |
| 1773 | January | Treaty signed between Mahadji Shinde and Chevalier to expel the English from Bengal. | | | |
| 1773 | August 30 | Peshwa Narayanrao assassinated. | | | |
| 1773 | September 17 | | | | The English capture Tanjore. |
| 1773 | October 10 | Raghunathrao alias Raghoba becomes Peshwa. | | | |
| 1774 | April 18 | Sawai Madhavrao born. | | | |
| 1774 | May 28 | Sawai Madhavrao receives robes of Peshwaship. | | | |

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|------|-----------------|---|---|--|
| 1774 | October 26 | | | Warren Hastings becomes Governor-General. |
| 1774 | December 28 | | | The English capture Salsette. |
| 1774 | End of 1774 | Council of the Regency of the Barbhais formed. | | |
| 1775 | March 6 | | | Treaty of Surat signed between the English and Raghoba against Poona Darbar. |
| 1775 | Middle of April | The Marathas propose an alliance to the French against the English. | | |
| 1776 | March 1 | Raghoba proposes a treaty to Braincourt. | | |
| 1776 | July 4 | | | War of American Independence declared. |
| 1776 | September 19 | | St. Lubin sets sail for India. | |
| 1777 | January 8 | | Marquis de Bellecombe becomes Governor of Pondicherry. | |
| 1777 | March 16 | | St. Lubin arrives at Chaoul. | |
| 1777 | April 26 | | St. Lubin arrives at Purandhar. | |
| 1777 | June 18 | Treaty of Commerce signed between the Marathas and the French. | | |
| 1777 | September 1 | | Pascal de Santy arrives at Surat with packets for Europe. | |
| 1778 | March | | | War declared between England and France. |

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|------|----------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|
| 1778 | March 25 | Revolution at Poona; Moroba assumes power. | | |
| 1778 | May 13 | The Peshwa's proposal for the French troops against the English. | | |
| 1778 | July 10 | | | The English capture Candernagore. |
| 1778 | July 11 | Moroba arrested and imprisoned. | | |
| 1778 | July 12 | | St. Lubin leaves Poona for Daman. | |
| 1778 | October 18 | | Pondicherry capitulates to the English. | |
| 1778 | November 3 | | Briancourt made prisoner by the English. | |
| 1779 | January | | St. Lubin leaves Daman for Europe. | |
| 1779 | January 13 | The Marathas force the English to capitulate at Wadgaon. | | |
| 1779 | March 19 | | | Col. Braithwaite captures Mahe. |
| 1779 | April | Raghunathrao escapes to Surat. | | |
| 1779 | June | | St. Lubin arrives at Mecca. | |
| 1780 | February 13 | | | The English capture Ahmedabad. |
| 1780 | February 26 | Treaty of alliance signed between the Marathas and Haider Ali. | | |
| 1780 | May 11 | | | The English capture Kalyan. |
| 1780 | July 1 | | St. Lubin arrives at Malta. | |
| 1780 | July 20 | | | Haider Ali enters the Karnatak. |
| 1780 | August 4 | | | Capt. Popham captures Gwalior. |
| 1780 | End of October | | St. Lubin arrives at Versailles | |
| 1780 | December 12 | | | The English capture Bassein. |

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|------|--------------|--|--|--|
| 1781 | February | The Marathas make proposals for a French alliance against the English. | | |
| 1781 | March 24 | | | Col. Camac defeats Mahadji Shinde. |
| 1781 | April 15 | The Marathas force Gen. Goddard to retreat from Khandala. | | |
| 1781 | July 1 | Mahadji defeats Col. Muir. | | Gen. Coote defeats Haider at Porto-Novo. |
| 1781 | August 7 | | | Battle of Poilur; Haider Ali defeated. |
| 1781 | September 9 | | Montigny and Piveron de Moriat arrive at Goa. | |
| 1781 | September 27 | | | Battle of Sholinghur; Haider Ali defeated. |
| 1781 | October 13 | Truce signed between Mahadji and Col. Muir. | | |
| 1781 | November 5 | | Montigny arrives at Poona as French Resident. | |
| 1781 | December | | Piveron arrives at Haider's camp near Chittoor. | |
| 1782 | January 25 | | The French squadron arrives in the Gulf of Bengal. | |
| 1782 | February 9 | | D'Orves dies; Suffern becomes the C-in-C of the French Naval forces. | |
| 1782 | February 17 | | Naval battle near Madras between the French and the English squadrons; indecisive. | |
| 1782 | February 21 | | The French squadron arrives before Pondicherry. | |

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|------|---------------|--|---|--|---|
| 1782 | March 10 & 11 | | French troops under Duchemin land at Porto-Novo. | | Tipu Sultan captures Cuddalore, assisted by the French. |
| 1782 | April 3 | | | | |
| 1782 | April 12 | | Second action between the French and English squadrons near Trincomallee; indecisive. | | |
| 1782 | May 17 | Treaty of Salbaisigned by Mahadji and Col. Anderson. | | | |
| 1782 | May 31 | | Bussy arrives at the Isle of France. | | |
| 1782 | June 6 | | | | Hastings signs the Treaty of Slabai. |
| 1782 | End of June | The Marathas make fresh proposals to the French for an alliance. | | | |
| 1782 | July 6 | | Third action between Suffren and Hughes; Suffren fails to capture Negapatam. | | |
| 1782 | July 26 | | Grand interview between Suffren and Haider Ali. | | |
| 1782 | July 31 | | De Launay, Bussy's envoy, received at a Darbar by Haider Ali. | | |
| 1782 | August 12 | | Duchemin dies; Hoffelize assumes command | | |
| 1782 | August 31 | | Suffren captures Trincomallee. | | |
| 1782 | September | | Fourth battle between Suffren and Hughes; indecisive. | | |
| 1782 | December 7 | | | | Haider Ali dies. |
| 1782 | December 18 | | Bussy leaves the Isle of France. | | |

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|------|-------------|--|--|---|
| 1782 | December 20 | Nana Padhnavis affixes his signature to the Treaty of Salabai. | | |
| 1782 | December 29 | | | Tipu Sultan ascends the throne of his father. |
| 1783 | February 10 | Peshwa Sawai Madhavrao married. | | |
| 1783 | March 10 | | Bussy arrives at Trincomallee. | |
| 1783 | April 8 | Maratha flotilla captures English vessels. | | |
| 1783 | April 17 | | Bussy arrives at Cuddalore. | |
| 1783 | April 30 | | | Tipu Sultan recaptures Bednur from the English. |
| 1783 | June 13-30 | | Battle between the French and the English; Suffren triumphs. | |
| 1783 | July | Raghoba surrenders to Haripant Phadke at Dhodap. | | |
| 1783 | December 11 | Raghoba dies at Kopergaon. | | |
| 1784 | Early | | De Boigne enters Mahadji's service. | |
| 1784 | March 11 | | | Peace signed between Tipu and the English. |
| 1784 | November 14 | Vakil-i-Mutalak conferred on Mahadji by the Emperor. | | |
| 1785 | January 7 | | Bussy dies at Pondicherry. | |
| 1785 | February 5 | | | Hastings leaves India. |
| 1785 | May | | Souillace arrives at Pondicherry as Governor General.. | |

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|------|--------------------|---|--|--|
| 1785 | June 19 | | Souillac's fresh proposal to Franco-Maratha relations. | |
| 1785 | October 10 | | Souillac leaves India for the Isle of France. | |
| 1786 | March 3 | | | Mallet arrives at Poona as Resident. |
| 1786 | August 8 | | Godard arrives at Poona. | |
| 1786 | September 7 | | Godard leaves Poona. | |
| 1786 | September 22 | | | Cornwallis becomes Governor-General. |
| 1787 | Middle of February | Peace signed between the Marathas and Tipu. | | |
| 1787 | July 22 | | | Tipu's Ambassador leave for France. |
| 1788 | May 13 | | Montigny retires from Poona. | |
| 1790 | June 1 | Tripartite treaty signed at Poona. | | |
| 1790 | December 12 | | | War begins between Tipu Sultan and the Allies. |
| 1792 | February 11 | | | Peace signed between Tipu Sultan and the Allies. |
| 1793 | October 20 | | | Cornwallis retires from office. |
| 1794 | February 12 | Mahadji dies. | | |
| 1795 | March 11 | Battle of Khardā; Nizam Ali defeated. | | |
| 1795 | December | | De Boigne retires. | |
| 1796 | October 27 | Sawai Madhavrao dies. | | |
| 1796 | December 6 | Bajirao II becomes Peshwa. | | |
| 1798 | April 26 | | | |
| 1798 | October 22 | | French regiments at Hyderabad disbanded. | Lord Morington arrives in India. |
| 1799 | May 4 | | | Tipu Sultan dies on the battle field. |

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| 1800 | March 13 | Nana Fadnavis dies. | | |
| 1802 | December 31 | Treaty of Bassein signed by Bajirao the Second with the English. | | |
| 1803 | August 7 | War begins between Daulatrao Shinde and the English. | | |
| 1803 | December 30 | Daulatrao Shinde sues for peace; Perron's regiments disbanded. | | |
| 1805 | July 30 | | | Lord Wellesley resigns. |
| 1818 | June 3 | Bajirao surrenders to Malcom; End of the Maratha Confederacy. | | |